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I. INTRODUCTION
If advisory clients are to realize the full benefits from the
allocation of brokerage on their accounts, then regulatory
policy towards brokerage rebate arrangements must be
rethought. Rebate practices known as soft dollar
typically directly benefit investment
arrangements
advisers by providing them with research services, but
benefit their advisory clients only indirectly, if at all. Other
customer-directed rebate arrangements benefit advisory
clients directly, but generally are too cumbersome and
expensive for most advisory clients to administer. To
directly and efficiently benefit all advisory clients a third
type of arrangement - collective cash pass-through
rebates administered by investment advisers on behalf of
clients - should be encouraged by the elimination of
existing legal and practical obstacles. The resulting
benefits would be three-fold: (i) the conflicts of interest that
affect many other rebate arrangements would be avoided;
(ii) the decision to obtain services priced using a rebate
would be separated from decisions regarding use of rebate
proceeds; and (iii) competition in the provision of
execution, research and brokerage services would be
enhanced by the availability of more transparent
brokerage rebate arrangements.

A. THE SOFT DOLLAR DEBATE
Soft dollar arrangements refer to business arrangements
in which an investment adviser or money manager obtains
either an explicit or implicit rebate in the form of products
or services from a broker-dealer based on commissions the
broker earns in executing trades for accounts managed by
the adviser.' Under existing law, rebates obtained in this
IAlthough the safe harbor for soft dollar arrangements found in
section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(e)(1999), ("section 28(e)" or "section 28(e) safe harbor"),
establishes conditions which, if satisfied, entitle the arrangement to
safe harbor treatment, soft dollar arrangements themselves are not
defined under the federal securities laws. Nevertheless there is a rough
consensus among regulators and industry participants regarding a
generic definition. See, e.g., THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, INSPECTIONS AND
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fashion are generally not subject to legal challenge,
provided that the rebate is not earned by causing advisory
clients to pay unreasonably excessive conmmissions and
that the rebate consists only of research or brokerage
services or other forms of soft dollar benefits rather than
cash (so-called hard dollars). These conditions are codified
as part of the safe harbor found in section 28(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("section 28(e)" or
"section 28(e) safe harbor").2

EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, INSPECTION REPORT ON THE
SOFT DOLLAR PRACTICES OF BROKER-DEALERS, INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
MUTUAL FUNDS, 5-6 (Sept. 22, 1998) (hereinafter 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT

DOLLAR REPORT) (defining soft dollars as "arrangements under which
products or services other than execution of securities transactions are
obtained by an adviser from or through a broker-dealer in exchange for
the direction by the adviser of client brokerage transactions to the
broker-dealer."):
SECURrIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION,
SOFT DOLLAR
ARRANGEMENTS 1 (1997) (hereinafter 1997 SIA SOFT DOLLAR STANDARDS)
(noting that soft dollar arrangements generally refer "to an arrangement
in which a fiduciary receives products or services from a broker-dealer
in consideration of the fiduciary directing trades for its fiduciary
accounts to the broker-dealer for execution."); ASSOCIATION OF
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH, AIMR SOFT DOLLAR STANDARDS
(Guidance for Ethical Practices Involving Client Brokerage) 9 (Dec. 22,
1997) (hereinafter 1997 AIMR SOFT DOLLAR GUIDELINES) (" 'Soft dollar
arrangement' refers to an arrangement whereby the Investment
Manager directs transactions to a Broker, in exchange for which the
Broker provides Brokerage and Research Services to the Investment
Manager."): THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, SOFT DOLLARS AND OTHER
BROKERAGE ARRANGEMENTS 1 (1997-98 ed.) ("a soft dollar arrangement
involves an agreement or understanding where a discretionary money
manager receives research or execution services from a broker-dealer in
addition to transaction execution in exchange for the brokerage
commissions from transactions for discretionary clients' accounts.").
The definition of soft dollar arrangement used in this article
emphasizes that soft dollar arrangements are properly viewed as either
implicit or explicit rebate arrangements to clarify their kinship with
other brokerage rebate arrangements.
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (1999). It is easy to confuse the relationship
between the generic definition of soft dollars and soft dollar
arrangements that technically comply with the safe harbor of section
28(e)(1). As discussed below, compliant soft dollar arrangements are
limited to arrangements involving research and brokerage services as
defined in section 28(e)(3). In this article, soft dollar arrangement will be
used generically to encompass compliant and non-compliant soft dollar
arrangements, unless specifically referring to section 28(e).
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Soft dollar arrangements, including those within the
safe harbor, have always been viewed guardedly. Although
widely employed in the securities industry, such
arrangements entail the potential for significant conflicts
between the interests of investment advisers and the
clients on whose behalf advisers exercise investment
discretion. The source of conflict derives from the fact
that an investment adviser, while acting in an agency
capacity for its client, generally derives a direct benefit
from the soft dollar arrangement, which the client as
principal shares, if at all, only indirectly. The obvious risk
of conflicted loyalty in this situation accounts for the
existence of various restrictions under federal and state
laws on rebate practices that do not comply with the safe
harbor. The conditions of the safe harbor, however, do not
themselves eliminate the possibility of conflicted loyalty
but merely ensure that such risks are confined within
acceptable bounds.
Debate regarding the merits of soft dollar arrangements
has involved two well-defined camps. Critics argue that the
practices are injurious to the interests of advisory clients
and such practices persist only because they 3 serve the
interests of brokers and investment advisers. In other
words, such practices allow the adviser to retain profits,
earned directly or indirectly at the expense of its clients. A
related line of criticism is the inherent complexity and
heavy transaction costs associated with negotiating and
maintaining such arrangements. Soft dollar practices
3

See, e.g., Lee B. Burgunder & Karl 0. Hartmann, Soft Dollars and
Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A 1985 Perspective,
24 AM. Bus. L.J. 139 (1986): Robert C. Pozen, Money Managers and
Securities Research, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 923 (1976): 1997 ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE WELFARE AND BENEFITS
WORKING GROUP ON SOFT DOLLARS/COMMISSION

PLANS, REPORT OF THE
RECAPTURE (hereinafter

1997 ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT) 9-10 (Nov. 13, 1997) (minority
report). These academic and task force recommendations have been
echoed in the popular press. See Paula Dwyer, Wall Street's Soft Dollars:
Only a Ban Will Do, BUS. WK., Oct. 12, 1998, at 58 (advocating ban on
soft dollars); A Quiet Sort of Plunder, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 11. 1992, at
13 (advocating ban of soft commissions - the equivalent British practice
to soft dollars - in America and Britain).
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thrive in the view of critics only because such practices
enrich investment advisers.
Proponents of the current soft dollar regulatory scheme
offer a benign explanation for such practices. 4 The
research and brokerage services received by investment
advisers pursuant to soft dollar arrangements indirectly
benefit the advisers' clients. Moreover, prohibiting rebate
schemes entirely would not guarantee a reduction in
commission
rates. According to proponents,
the
complexity of soft dollar arrangements reflects the
difficulties of pricing brokerage services. Thus, for
proponents, soft dollar arrangements promote market
efficiency by permitting advisers to deliver higher quality
services to clients on a cost-effective basis.
Soft dollars remain a frustrating regulatory issue
because there is no method that can determine with
certainty which of these two views is correct.5 Indeed, it is
quite conceivable that many soft dollar arrangements
support elements of both views and it may not be possible
to generalize beyond the facts and circumstances of any
particular arrangement. The inability to ascertain with
precision the benefits or harms of soft dollar arrangements
for advisory clients poses a significant challenge to
effective policy formulation.
Repeal of section 28(e), advocated by critics of soft dollar
arrangements, would significantly disrupt industry
brokerage practices, would entail uncertainty for brokers
and investment advisers and would have undetermined
consequences for advisory clients. Absent evidence that
4 See, e.g., D. Bruce Johnsen, PropertyRights to Investment
Research:
The Agency Costs of Soft Dollar Brokerage, 11 YALE J. REG. 75 (1994);
1997 ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-8 (majority
report): THE ALLIANCE IN SUPPORT OF INDEPENDENT RESEARCH, THE PROVISION

OF INVESTMENT SERVICES BY BROKER-DEALERS: A GUIDE TO SOFT DOLLAR

PRACTICES (March 1997) (hereinafter 1997 ASIR SOFT DOLLAR PAPER).
5The leading treatise in the area provides a catalogue of the wellrehearsed advantages and disadvantages of soft dollar arrangements.
See LEMKE & LINS, supra note 1, at 15-32. The catalogue evidences the
conflicting and unresolved policy considerations associated with such
arrangements.
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soft dollar arrangements are in fact injurious to investors,
it is difficult to imagine mustering the necessary
consensus to proscribe them. On the other hand,
continuation of existing regulatory policy - as proponents
of such practices urge - would perpetuate the status quo
(with an industry trend toward increased use of brokerage
significant
notwithstanding
arrangements),
rebate
reservations regarding the benefit of such rebate
arrangements for advisory clients generally.
Over the last two years, there has been a flurry of activity
relating to soft dollar arrangements. Most notably, the staff
of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
undertook a major examination of industry practice with
respect to soft dollar rebates and issued a report of its
findings and recommendations. 6 In addition, the
Department of Labor's ERISA Advisory Council on
Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans formed its
own Soft Dollar and Directed Brokerage Working Group
(the "DOL Advisory Group") to evaluate the need for
additional regulation of pension plan sponsors and
7
fiduciaries in the area of rebate arrangements. Finally,
See 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supranote 1. Although the
report revealed a number of abuses and raised questions about certain
practices, the report's findings of abuses were far more muted than
many had expected at the outset of the SEC staff sweep. Compare
Michael Schroeder, SEC Urges More Details on "Soft Dollars",WALL ST.
J., Sept. 23, 1998, at C25 ('The soft dollar industry - which has been
on tenderhooks since the SEC began its examination in 1996 generally embraced the SEC's findings.") and Marcia L. MacHarg &
Matthew A. Chambers, SEC Issues Soft Dollar Report, INSIGHTS, Nov.
1998, at 13, 14 ("[The report] largely vindicates current industry
practices . . .")with Charles Gasparino, SEC PreparesAction on Soft
Dollar Abuses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1997, at C1 ("SEC officials say the
probe is the broadest of its kind, employing more SEC examiners than
any time in the commission's history."). The report's recommendations
propose refinements to the existing conduct and disclosure regulatory
scheme, such as improved recordkeeping and better internal controls
with respect to such arrangements, enhanced disclosure requirements
to promote more meaningful disclosure and additional guidance to
eliminate misunderstanding in applying existing interpretations.
7 See 1997 ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3. The most
interesting aspects of the ERISA Advisory Group's report were the
emergence of majority and minority positions regarding the continued
need for section 28(e) and whether investment advisers should be
6
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two industry groups - the Association for Investment
Management and Research and the Securities Industry
Association formed working groups to examine
practices in the area and to formulate recommendations
regarding so-called "best practices" to foster high
standards of commercial conduct. 8 While each of the
reports provides varying degrees of insight into ways of
fostering better compliance by investment advisers and
pension
plan sponsors
with
existing regulatory
restrictions, these reports (with the exception perhaps of
the DOL Advisory Group) do not purport to address the
larger issue of the soundness of the regulatory scheme or
its coherence.
B. THE NEED FOR ALTERNATIVE REBATE ARRANGEMENTS
This article advocates a new approach toward brokerage
rebate arrangements that places primary emphasis on
facilitating competition with respect to rebate practices
and greater choice for advisory clients. Increased
competition would promote more efficient rebate
arrangements by enabling advisory clients to exercise
more influence over the types of rebate arrangements
offered by broker-dealers and selected by investment
advisers.
The argument for increased competition, including
elimination of legal and practical impediments to certain
rebate arrangements rests on three propositions. First,
economic considerations suggest that the current policy
concerning rebate practices is unduly restrictive and fails
required to pay for execution and research separately. The division of

opinion reflects genuinely conflicting views within industry regarding
the desirability of such arrangements.
8 See 1997 AIMRSoFr DOLLAR GUIDELINES, supranote 1; 1997 SIA SoFr
DOLLAR STANDARDS, supra note 1. Because both industry groups
represent constituencies that regularly employ soft dollar
arrangements, it is perhaps unsurprising that neither challenges the
existing status quo. Rather each group's "best practices" standards
seek to avoid common legal pitfalls in entering into soft dollar
arrangements. These standards emphasize procedures aimed
principally at avoiding liability. They do not assess the continued
wisdom of such practices.
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to address the underlying economic factors that contribute
to the use of rebate arrangements. Second, current legal
policy toward soft dollars and directed brokerage lacks a
coherent overarching rationale. Finally, the removal of
legal obstacles to competing forms of rebate arrangements
in particular restrictions that discourage pass-through
cash rebates administered on a collective basis - would
likely facilitate more efficient rebate practices.
There are existing brokerage rebate arrangements that
compete with soft dollar arrangements. The primary form of
competing rebate arrangement involves customer directed
brokerage where an investment adviser directs a client's
brokerage transactions to a broker selected by the client.
The advisory client, not the investment adviser, receives
any rebate on the brokerage transaction. However, the competition provided by client directed brokerage arrangements
to soft dollar arrangements is limited by the complexity and
cost of administering client directed brokerage arrangements on an account-by-account basis. Therefore, to provide effective competition for soft dollar arrangements,
another more efficient type of arrangement is needed. This
article sets forth the argument for one such arrangement, a
cash pass-through arrangement administered collectively
for all or some of an investment adviser's managed
accounts.
Section II of the article reviews the history of the section
28(e) safe harbor and the legal restrictions that apply to
brokerage rebate practices not covered by the safe harbor,
and discusses the confusion inherent in the legislative
intent underlying section 28(e). Many of the historical
reasons advanced for enacting section 28(e), which may
have been valid in 1975, are no longer valid. More
importantly, the drafters of the safe harbor largely failed to
anticipate the way in which rebate practices would evolve.
Section III provides an overview of the two principal
kinds of brokerage rebate practices used today and their
role in defining competition between different categories of
brokerage firms.
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Section IV explores the economics of brokerage rebate
arrangements and salient policy issues. Two underlying
economic considerations have fueled the use of rebate
arrangements generally (both soft dollar and customer
directed rebate arrangements): the agency relationship
between the investment adviser and its client and
competition among brokers for order flow from managed
accounts. There is an inherent divergence between the
economic interests of adviser and advisory client when it
comes to the issue of rebates. The different competitive
strategies brokers have used in catering to these interests
have led to the emergence of different kinds of brokers that
compete for order flow from advisers and their clients'
accounts. These strategies differ in terms of execution
quality, how brokerage execution is bundled with
research, the type of research services offered advisers and
commission rates. Each strategy has potential advantages
and disadvantages for advisory clients.
Section V examines flaws in the current regulatory
system governing soft dollar arrangements. The continued
application of the sometimes arbitrary distinctions in
section 28(e) to market circumstances that have radically
changed since 1975 has rendered the provision's operation
increasingly capricious. The infirmities of current policy
are evident in SEC interpretations that define eligible
conduct and practices under the safe harbor. In some
cases the SEC conduct interpretations reflect economic
considerations. In other cases the interpretations are
narrowly drawn and appear to lack an overarching policy
rationale.
In contrast, the SEC disclosure policies with respect to
rebate practices described in Section VI exhibit a more
consistent philosophy, namely to ensure that advisory
clients receive meaningful disclosure from investment
advisers regarding the advisers' use of rebate
arrangements. These disclosure policies have enabled
clients to become better informed regarding the nature of
the practices employed by their investment advisers.
However, because of the significant transaction costs faced
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by clients in monitoring rebate arrangements and the
relative dearth of competitive alternatives, improved
disclosure has not translated into genuinely efficient
rebate practices.
Section VII describes a new form of rebate arrangement
to benefit advisory clients, a cash pass-through
arrangement administered collectively for an investment
adviser's managed accounts. A collective cash passthrough arrangement should be more commercially
feasible than pass-through arrangements administered on
an account-by-account basis. Collective arrangements,
however, would face legal and operational obstacles that
do not exist for arrangements involving individual
accounts, specifically: (i) devising a legal standard that
reconciles the pass-through arrangement with best
execution obligations; (ii) ensuring fair allocation of passthrough benefits among managed accounts (a collective
pass-through arrangement would permit a managed
account's fiduciary to make brokerage allocation decisions
based on rebates jointly shared by the investment
adviser's managed accounts); and (iii) designing a
mechanism to serve as a conduit for payment of passthrough rebates. This article argues that these obstacles
can be overcome.
Section VIII argues that public policy favors regulatory
steps to encourage such rebate arrangements. Collective
cash pass-through arrangements offer advantages for
advisory clients over both soft dollar and customer
directed brokerage arrangements in that the rebate will
directly benefit advisory clients while preserving the
investment adviser's discretion in directing brokerage
allocation. A collective pass-through rebate would also
dramatically reduce the transaction costs associated with
monitoring and evaluating rebate practices and make
commission rates and the costs of research and brokerage
services more transparent. A concomitant benefit of
permitting pass-through cash rebates is that it would
encourage price competition in the securities industry by
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creating favorable market conditions for unbundling the
delivery of execution and research services.
II. THE REBATE CONTROVERSY AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE SOFT DOLLAR SAFE HARBOR
Regulation of soft dollar arrangements has been shaped
by two underlying forces: traditional agency law concepts
and the events leading up to and including both the
deregulation of brokerage commissions in 1975 and the
near-simultaneous enactment of section 28(e). A body of
federal and state law restrictions, grounded in traditional
agency law principles, generally prohibits receipt of
rebates by advisers with respect to client brokerage
commissions. As part of the Securities Acts Amendments
of 1975, 9 however, Congress enacted a new provision
under the Securities Exchange Act - section 28(e). This
new provision addressed statutorily for the first time the
issue of soft dollar arrangements by creating a safe harbor
with respect to certain soft dollar practices and granting
the SEC additional specific rule-making authority to
regulate disclosure in connection with such arrangements.
A. FIDUCIARY ISSUES

An investment adviser acts in a fiduciary capacity on
behalf of its advisory clients. 10 An adviser's fiduciary duty
to a client when acting in a discretionary capacity (that is
with authority to purchase and sell securities for the
client's account) involves not only making investment
decisions, but also arranging for the execution of
securities
transactions.
Arranging
for securities
transactions typically entails directing or allocating
9Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97
("1975
Securities Acts Amendments").
10 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 201
(1963) (imposing fiduciary duty on investment advisers to their clients);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979).
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brokerage to a broker-dealer and monitoring the quality of
the execution provided by the broker-dealer."'
An investment adviser's receipt of rebates in connection
with its decisions directing brokerage involves an inherent
conflict of interest. When rebates are provided to an
adviser, a question arises as to whether the investment
adviser is exercising its discretion solely in the client's best
interests. Under common law agency principles, the
adviser's retention of a rebate earned from client
transactions can be viewed as a form of unjust
enrichment, a transfer of property from the client's
2
account to the adviser (acting as agent). '
Rebates represent not merely an appropriation of the
client's property, but also may serve to potentially distort
an investment adviser's judgment in directing brokerage
on behalf of the client. An adviser should direct brokerage
to the broker-dealer that will provide the best execution for
a client's trades.1 3 The rebate, however, may skew an
I See Sinclair v. SEC, 444 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1971); Arleen Hughes, 27
S.E.C. 629, 639 (1948), affd, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
Alternatively, arranging for securities transactions may involve
directing an account to trade securities at a markup or markdown with
a dealer, transactions not covered by the section 28(e) safe harbor.
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. a (1958); Martin v.
Heinold Commodities, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. App. 1992) (noting that
broker receiving undisclosed foreign service fee rebate must provide
accounting to customers), appeal allowed, 612 N.E.2d 514 (Ill. 1993)
affd in part,rev'd in part,643 N.E.2d 734 (Ill. 1994)(noting that trustee
is under duty not to benefit at expense of fiduciary); cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TRUSTS § 170 cmt. a, § 216 (1959).
13 Best execution customarily requires that investors' orders be
executed so that the investors' total cost or proceeds are the most
favorable, in light of all relevant factors bearing on execution quality,
such as timing and execution capability. See U.S. Equity Market
Structure Study, Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, [1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,012, at 82,906 (July 14, 1992):
accord SEC, Second Report on Bank Securities Activities: Comparative
Regulatory Framework Regarding Brokerage-Type Services, 97-98, 98
n.233 (Feb. 3, 1977), as reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING
AND URB. AFFAIRS,

9 5 th

Cong. REPORT ON BANKS SECURITIES AcTWrIES OF

THE SEC 145, 251-52, 252 n.233 (Comm. Print 1977). The standard is
not static, but rather "evolves over time with changes in technology and
transformation of the structure of financial markets." Newton v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 1997)
(en banc). See generally Lipton, Best Execution: The National Market
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adviser's decision in selecting a broker by inducing the
adviser to direct a trade to a particular broker in order to
receive the rebate, even if the broker will not provide
best execution of the client's transaction as compared to
other brokers.
Rebates may also distort an investment adviser's
decision regarding timing of trades in a particular account.
An adviser, all things being equal, is more likely to favor
trading by the client, if as a result the adviser obtains a
rebate. In abusive situations, the incentives provided by
rebates might be conducive to churning - excessive
trading designed principally to obtain the rebate. 14 In most
arrangements
rebate
dollar
soft
conventional
(arrangements for research or brokerage services),
however, churning as an exclusive factor motivating an
ongoing pattern of trading in one account may be rare
since the form of rebate only indirectly adds to an
5
investment adviser's wealth.'
B. SPECIFIC LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON REBATE PRACTICES
Because of the conflicts of interest inherent in the
receipt of brokerage rebates on client accounts by
investment advisers, the receipt of such rebates potentially
violates provisions of both federal and state law. The
System's Missing Ingredient, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 449 (1982)
(discussing early development of best execution concept under federal
securities laws); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Law and
Economics of Best Execution, 6 J.

FIN. INTERMED.

188 (1997) (arguing

that best execution as legal standard is vague and, except in most
egregious of cases, largely aspirational).
14 See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTI, 174 (1966), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
89-2337 (1966) (hereinafter PUBLIC POLICY STUDY).
15 Even

in seemingly innocuous rebate contexts, though, there is

cause for concern. If arrangements contemplate attainment of certain
thresholds (e.g., more than $100,000 in commissions), trades at or near
the threshold level may take on added significance (because they enable
the investment adviser to satisfy its obligation, whether formal or
informal, to the broker). In such circumstances, the marginal benefit for
an adviser of accelerating or making an unnecessary trade may far
exceed potentially adverse economic consequences suffered by the
adviser in terms of its client relationship.
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elimination of fixed commissions in 1975 followed by the
enactment of Securities Exchange Act section 28(e)
modified the legal environment for brokerage rebates but
the basic prohibitions summarized below remain in place.
Arrangements pursuant to which investment advisers
receive rebates may violate provisions of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940,16 the Investment Company Act of
194017 (if the arrangement involves assets of investment
companies) and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA)'8 (if the arrangement involves assets of
an employee retirement or pension plan), as well as state
fiduciary law requirements. The various types of legal
restrictions can be divided into two basic categories:
general fiduciary restrictions and express statutory
obligations imposed on fiduciaries of specific classes of
managed accounts.
The general fiduciary restrictions arise under the
Investment Advisers Act, which regulates the activities of
investment advisers, and state law. Section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act 19 prohibits fraudulent conduct by
investment advisers as well as conduct in breach of
fiduciary obligations. 20 An undisclosed conflict of interest
constitutes breach of the adviser's fiduciary obligations to
its clients. Because soft dollar arrangements invariably
present conflicts of interest between an adviser and its
client, the SEC has sanctioned advisers for violating
section 206 where the advisers have received undisclosed
soft dollar rebates in arrangements that do not qualify for
section 28(e)'s safe harbor. 21 State common law fiduciary
U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (1999) ("Investment Advisers Act").
17 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et. seq. (1999) ("Investment Company Act").
18 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1368 (1974)).
19 See Investment Advisers Act section 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1999)
(defining
prohibited transactions by investment advisers).
20
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194
(1963) (holding that adviser's fundamental obligation under Investment
Advisers Act is to act in best interest of client).
21See, e.g., Renaissance Capital Advisors, Inc., Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 1688, 66 SEC Dkt. 408 (Dec. 22, 1997) (holding that
Renaissance willfully violated Investment Advisers Act sections 206(1)
16 15
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restrictions may be viewed as imposing restrictions similar

to section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act on rebates
22
obtained by advisers for directing client brokerage.
The other category of restrictions relating to rebates
concern express statutory obligations imposed on
investment advisers of specific classes of managed
accounts. In particular, the Investment Company Act and
ERISA contain express restrictions on money managers
and persons acting as fiduciaries on behalf of investment
companies or employee benefit plans, respectively, that
preclude the receipt of rebates, disclosed or undisclosed,
23
absent exemption.
and (2) by making materially false and ornissive statements in
Renaissance's Form ADV and by failing otherwise to disclose to
Renaissance's clients that it was using soft dollar credits to pay nonresearch expenses); Schuykill Capital Management, Ltd., Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 1,766, 68 S.E.C. Dkt. 281 (Sept. 30, 1998);
Oakwood Counselors, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1614,
11997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,919, at 89,394 (Feb.
10, 1997) (holding that investment adviser's failure to disclose its soft
dollar practices violates Investment Advisers Act sections 206(1) and
206(2); S Squared Technology Corp., Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 1575, 62 SEC Dkt. 1446 (Aug. 7, 1996)(same).
22 See Police Retirement Sys. of St. Louis v. Midwest Inv. Advisory
Serv., Inc., 940 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1991) (appealing after trial on claims
of breach of fiduciary and fraud under state law in connection with
disputed soft dollar arrangements). If anything, state law restrictions
may require a somewhat higher standard of fidelity than section 206 of
the Investment Advisers Act. See generally Robert J. Moran & Cathy G.
O'Kelly, Soft Dollars and Other Traps for the Investment Adviser: An
Analysis of Brokerage Placement Practices, 1 DEPAUL BUS. L. J. 45,
47-52
(1989).
23
Section 36 of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35
(1999), establishes a federal standard of fiduciary duty and in the case
of investment advisers and their affiliates fiduciary obligations "with
respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a
material nature, paid by [a] registered investment company.., to [an)
investment adviser." Although specifically directed at transactions on
behalf of registered investment companies, the nature of the obligation
is analogous to the general fiduciary obligations imposed under section
206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1999), except in
addition to investment advisers, the section extends to officers,
directors, and principal underwriters of the fund. I will not separately
discuss section 36 as it relates to brokerage rebate arrangements since
the analysis would largely echo the discussion of section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act. In addition, banking regulators, principally
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), have addressed
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Section 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act 24 comes
into play when an investment adviser acts on behalf of an
investment company. It prohibits advisers acting as agents
for an investment company from receiving compensation
in connection with brokerage transactions, although the
SEC retains authority to exempt arrangements where
appropriate. 25 An adviser's receipt of research pursuant to
a soft dollar arrangement, absent an exemptive safe
harbor, in connection with its management of an
investment company's portfolio would likely be deemed to
26
violate section 17(e)(1)'s compensation prohibition.
Several provisions under ERISA generally prohibit
investment advisers, absent exemption, from receiving
in
connection
with
directing brokerage
rebates
retirement plan. 2 7
employee
an
of
behalf
on
transactions
brokerage rebate issues in connection with their oversight of bank trust
departments and bank management of common funds. See generally
LEMKE & LINS, supranote 1, at 235-49. The OCC has implicitly deferred
to established SEC interpretations of section 28(e). See, e.g., Soft Dollar
Arrangements with Municipal Securities Dealer, Trust Interpretation
No.24 195 (Jan. 13, 1989).
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (1999).
25
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1)(C) (1999).
26
Parnassus Investments, et al., Initial Decision Release No. 131
(Sept. 3, 1998), notice that initial decision has become final, Exchange
Act Release No. 40,534 (Oct. 8, 1998); Interpretive Release Concerning
the Scope of Section 28(e), Exchange Release No. 23,170 (Apr. 23,
1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 16,004, 16,010 (Apr. 30, 1986)(hereinafter 1986
SEC Soft Dollar Release). See also Investor Research Corp. v. SEC, 628
F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirming finding that adviser's receipt
pursuant to directed brokerage arrangement of cash rebate used to
defray costs of developing computerized research methods constituted
additional compensation in violation of section 17(e)(1)), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 919 (1980). Cf. Stein Roe & Farnham, Inc., Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 1217, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
84,512, at 80,575 (Jan. 22, 1990) (noting section
17(e)(1) was violated where adviser directed brokerage from registered
investment companies to broker-dealers that provided the adviser with
referrals of non-investment company advisory clients): Fleet Investment
Advisors, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1821, 1999 WL 695,211
(S.E.C.)
(Sept. 9, 1999)(same).
27
The Department of Labor ("DOL") has provided specific guidance to
plan fiduciaries regarding the use of rebate arrangements. See
Statement on Policies Concerning Soft Dollar and Directed Commission
Arrangements, ERISA Technical Release No. 86-1, 11986-1987 Transfer
84,009, at 88,154 (May 22,
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
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Among the relevant fiduciary standards imposed by ERISA
are the so-called "exclusive purpose" requirements that
require plan assets be held, and that any fiduciary
discharge its duties with respect to the plan, for the
exclusive purpose of providing benefits to the plan's
participants or defraying legitimate administrative
expenses. 28 The exclusive purpose rules are supplemented
by a prudent man requirement that obligates fiduciaries to
obtain best execution in directing brokerage. 29 In addition,
on
ERISA imposes specific statutory prohibitions
0
interest.a
of
conflicts
involving
transactions
1986)(hereinafter ERISA Technical Release No. 86-1) (outlining Pension
and Welfare Benefits Administration's views on the use of brokerage

rebate arrangements): see also Donald J. Myers, Directed Brokerage
and "Soft Dollars" Under ERISA: New Concernsfor Plan Fiduciaries, 42
Bus. LAw. 553, 572-73 (1987); Ian Lanoff & Claudia Brobst, DirectedBrokerage Arrangements Under ERISA, TRusTs & ESTATES 44 (July
1986); LEMKE & LINS, supra note 1, at 127-147.
Soft dollar practices that do not comply with the section 28(e)'s safe
harbor have given rise to alleged violations of ERISA. See Letter from
Charles Lerner, Director of Enforcement, Pension and Welfare Benefit
Administration, U.S. Dept. of Labor to Thomas B. Kelley, Chief Executive

Officer, Associated Capital Investments, Re: Department of Labor
Investigation of Associated Capital Investors (formerly BA Investment
Management Company) (dated Aug. 17, 1989) (noting alleged violations
of ERISA in connection with use of soft dollar credits to reimburse
clients in connection with trade error corrections); Ossey v. Marolda,
No. 96 C 296, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1767 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 1998)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment in civil action for
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA because alleged kickbacks were
not legitimate soft dollar arrangements).
28 Sections 403(c)(1) & 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c)(1) &
1104(a)(1)(B) (1999). See also ERISA Technical Release No. 86-1, supra
27.
note
29
Section 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)(1999); see also
Technical Release No. 86-1, supra note 27.
ERISA
30
Three provisions from section 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 are relevant.
Section 406(a)(1)(D) prohibits transactions that would result in a direct
or indirect transfer of plan assets for the benefit of a "party in interest."
Section 406(b)(1) prohibits self-dealing transactions by plan fiduciaries.
Section 406(b)(3) prohibits a plan fiduciary from receiving any
consideration for his personal account from another party dealing with
the plan in connection with a transaction involving plan assets. See
ERISA Technical Release No. 86-1, supra note 27.
Although the foregoing restrictions and other ERISA restrictions
generally are not applicable in the case of customer directed brokerage
arrangements, there are exceptions. Under ERISA, an investment
adviser which acts as a plan fiduciary may have an independent duty to
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exemptions
ERISA creates limited transactional
pursuant to statute and confers exemptive authority on
the Secretary of Labor with respect to certain
arrangements in furtherance of the interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries and protective of their
31
rights.
C. THE REBATE CONTROVERSY PRIOR TO DEREGULATION OF
COMMISSIONS

1. Industry Practices
Despite fiduciary concerns and legal restrictions, rebate
practices in the securities industry flourished during the
era of fixed commission rates that existed before 1975.
Prior to 1975, minimum brokerage commissions were
mandated by exchanges. 32 These fixed commissions were
well above the commissions that would have been charged
in competitive markets. A glaring deficiency of the thenprevailing fixed commissions is that the fixed commissions
did not reflect the considerable economies of scale
associated with the costs of executing larger institutionally-sized - orders. 33 Thus, even though it was
far cheaper on a per share basis for brokers to execute a
trade for ten thousand shares than for a round lot (100
determine that portfolio transactions on behalf of a plan are receiving
best execution, even if the plan sponsor or trustee is technically
responsible for directing brokerage under a directed brokerage
arrangement. In such situations, the investment adviser must take
independent steps to ensure that any directed brokerage arrangement
is not inconsistent with the obligations owed to plan beneficiaries to
obtain best execution, even if it is not responsible for the offending
directed brokerage arrangement. Id.
31 See ERISA section 408(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b) (1999) (enumerated
transactions exempt from § 1106's prohibitions); ERISA section 408(a),
29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1999) (the Secretary's exemptive authority).
32 Because of the dominance of the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") as a market for securities trading, the NYSE's schedule of
commission rates effectively fixed commissions on brokerage
in the United States.
transactions
33
See PUBLIC POLICY STUDY, supra note 14, at 162-63; U.S. SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS,

H.R.

DOC. No. 88-95, at 311-12 (1963) (hereinafter SEC SPECIAL STUDY);
Pozen, supra note 3, at 926.
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shares), the per share commission cost levied by brokers
did not reflect this fact at all until the latter part of the
1960s. Even the introduction of modified commission
schedules in the latter part of the 1960s did not fully take
into account the diminished execution costs associated
with institutionally-sized orders. As a result, institutional
brokerage was extremely profitable for broker-dealers. At
the same time, because of fixed commissions, brokerdealers were unable to compete with one another on the
basis of price (that is reduced commissions) for this
profitable segment of brokerage business.
Broker-dealers nevertheless did compete indirectly with
one another during this period by providing services and
various types of rebates to investment advisers in return
for their brokerage business. During the 1960s and the
early 1970s, regulators became increasingly concerned by
the proliferation of special side-deal and rebate practices
in connection with the system of fixed brokerage
commissions. Three types of rebate arrangements
emerged: reciprocal arrangements, give-ups and recapture
arrangements.
In return for reciprocal benefits, investment advisers
rewarded broker-dealers with brokerage commissions
earned by the broker from brokerage directed from
accounts managed by the adviser. The "reciprocals"
consisted typically of services rendered by the broker that
benefited the adviser. Some of the most common
arrangements involved sale of shares of investment
companies advised by the adviser, direct wires to the
broker to facilitate trade execution and pricing of mutual
fund portfolios. 4 The surplus associated with the inflated
commission rates in effect paid for these services. One of
the clearest examples of an abusive reciprocal
arrangement concerned broker sales of shares of a mutual
fund managed by an adviser which, in return, directed
34

See

REPORT

PREPARED

BY THE

WHARTON SCHOOL

OF FINANCE AND

H.R. REP. No. 2274,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 527-30 (1962) (hereinafter WHARTON STUDY). See
PUBLIC POLICY STUDY, supra note 14, at 163-67.
COMMERCE FOR THE SEC: A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS,
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broker. 35

The
brokerage from the fund to the selling
principal beneficiary of the additional sale of fund shares
was the fund adviser since the sale of shares increased the
amount of assets under management, thereby serving to
increase the asset base used in calculating the adviser's
fee.
Give-ups involved a generalization of the basic reciprocal
arrangement. In the case of a give-up, an investment
adviser directed a broker-dealer to surrender some portion
of the brokerage commissions from accounts managed by
the adviser to persons not having a role in the execution of
portfolio transactions. The adviser directed the give-up to
compensate these third-parties for services to the adviser.
Like reciprocal arrangements, the economic benefits of
give-ups flowed primarily to the investment adviser rather
than to its clients. As a result, give-ups became a way for
advisers to receive3 6benefits and services from third parties
at client expense.
Recapture arrangements entailed a variant on give-ups.
Instead of directing the give-up to a third-party, the
7 In
investment adviser directed the give-up to an affiliateY3
this way, the adviser "recaptured" through the affiliate a
portion of the brokerage commission derived from the
the
adviser's client whose brokerage generated
commission. Because the recapture arrangement
represented a strategy for recovering a portion of the
inflated commissions paid by the advisory client, issues
arose as to who was entitled to the rebated benefit - the
adviser or the adviser's client - and as to whether
35

See WHARTON STUDY, supranote 34, at 527-28; PUBLIC POLICY STUDY,
COMM'N, INSTITUTIONAL

supra note 14, at 164-67; U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.

INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92nd Cong. 2283-84 (1971)
(hereinafter INSTrrUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY).
36

See SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 33, at 316-17: PUBLIC POLICY

supranote 14, at 169-75.
See INSTITUrIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supranote 35, at 2296-99: PUBLIC
POLICY STUDY, supra note 14, at 173. Affiliates were used to overcome
the anti-rebate rules of the NYSE and other exchanges which barred
members from giving rebates on commissions to customers.
STUDY.
37
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investment advisers were under a general duty to
38
recapture commissions for their clients' benefit.
2. The Commission Response
Between 1965 and 1975, the SEC engaged in a twopronged strategy to eliminate abusive give-up and
reciprocal arrangements. First, the SEC sought to address
the issue of fixed commissions. The SEC recognized a
major cause of the give-up and recapture problem was the
artificially high fixed commission schedule imposed by the
exchanges.3 9 The SEC initiated a series of steps during this
period that eventually led to the elimination of fixed
commission rates. Beginning in 1968, the SEC effected a
gradual relaxation of fixed commissions by encouraging
the exchanges to permit negotiated commissions for largesized orders. Gradually the circumstances in which
negotiated commissions could be used were expanded
until finally the SEC adopted Securities Exchange Act rule
38 These issues resulted in a series of decisions that addressed the
fiduciary obligations of investment advisers and boards of directors to
seek recapture as well as the disclosure obligations of mutual funds in
connection with those issues. See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369,
383-84 (1st Cir. 1970) (stating that fund investment adviser breached
its fiduciary duties in violation of section 36 of Investment Company Act
in failing to disclose opportunity for recapture to fund's independent
directors), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533
F.2d 731, 745-50 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Tannebaum v. Zeller, 522 F.2d
402, 432-34 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding fund's proxy statement false and
misleading in failing to disclose to investors opportunity for recapture,
notwithstanding disclosure made to fund's independent directors); see
also Commissions of Portfolio Brokerage of Mutual Funds - Obligations
of Management and Brokers, Exchange Act Release No. 8746,
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,760 at 83,746
(Nov. 10, 1969), 34 Fed. Reg. 18,543 (letter from SEC General Counsel
addressing these issues). See generally Gavin Miller & Robert E.
Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual Funds, 46
N.Y.U. L. REv. 35 (1971) (comprehensively discussing recapture issues
prior to final judicial disposition of these disputes); Tannebaum v.
Zeller, 522 F.2d at 405-10 (summarizing regulatory and judicial history
regarding recapture arrangements,
including SEC's "possibly
conflicting views" over preceding ten years).
39
See PUBLIC POLICY STUDY, supra note 14, at 162-63; SEC SPECIAL
STUDY, supra note 33, at 311-12.
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19b-3, eliminating' 40fixed commissions effective May 1,
1975 - "May Day.
During this period, the SEC took a more aggressive
posture in policing rebates. The SEC recognized that
brokerage rebate arrangements presented conflicts of
interest between clients, investment advisers and brokers,
and that such arrangements raised specific concerns
regarding whether trades from managed accounts received
best execution or whether managed accounts were
churned for brokerage commissions. The SEC issued
numerous reports identifying regulatory concerns with
respect to give-ups and reciprocal arrangements because
of the fundamental conflicts of interest they presented

investment advisers. 4 1 The SEC brought administrative

proceedings against broker-dealers and investment
advisers highlighting undisclosed conflicts of interest in

connection with mutual fund brokerage allocation. 42 The

SEC also used its considerable administrative resources
through proposed rule-making, oversight of the exchanges
(and exchange mandated commission rates) and oversight
of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to
43
discourage give-ups and reciprocal arrangements.
40 See Adoption of Securities Act Rule 19b-3, Exchange Act Release
No. 11,203 (Jan. 23, 1975), 40 Fed. Reg. 7394 (Feb. 20, 1975) (adopting
Securities Exchange Act rule 19b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3). For a brief
history of the legislative and regulatory efforts to deregulate
commissions, see 7 Louis LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION
2851-2885 (1990).
41 See WHARTON STUDY, supra note 34, at 525-37; SEC SPECIAL STUDY,
supra note 33, at 294-351; PUBLIC POLICY STUDY, supra note 14, at
162-90: INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 35, at 2263-2300
(1971). See generally 2 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS, 607-25 (1979) (summarizing history).
42See Delaware Management Co., Inc., 43 S.E.C. 392 (1967);
Management Corp., 44 S.E.C. 442 (1970).
Provident
43
See Proposed Rule 10b-10 - NYSE Commission Rate Proposals,
Exchange Act Release No. 8,239, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 77,523, at 83,078 (Jan. 26, 1968)(proposing new rule
1Ob-10 to ban give-ups and noticing NYSE's proposed revisions to fixed
commission schedule), withdrawn, Exchange Act Release No. 8743
(Nov. 7, 1969). The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
("NASD") adopted its anti-reciprocal rule prohibiting broker-dealers
from soliciting brokerage commissions as a condition for the sale of
investment company shares or providing sales representatives with
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Simultaneously, fund shareholders brought successful
judicial challenges based on contractual and disclosure
theories regarding the failure of fund advisers to recapture
44
brokerage commissions for the benefit of managed funds.
While policing rebate practices that it believed to be
abusive, the SEC, nevertheless, recognized that certain
services provided by brokerage firms, such as research
were "ancillary to the brokerage function," and thus stood
on a different footing from other types of arrangements
that resulted in payments for services that had nothing to
do with a customer's securities transactions. 45 This
distinction was blurred somewhat in the SEC's Delaware
Management Company decision which sanctioned an
investment adviser in part because it engaged in securities
transactions at inferior prices with a dealer that provided
the adviser with research. 46 One possible reading of the
decision - a reading particularly alarming to advisers
and full-service firms - was that it construed an adviser's
best execution obligations as precluding the adviser from
considering research benefits obtained in determining
whether a broker provided best execution for a client's
order. 47
Shortly thereafter, and in part to dispel concerns raised
by the implications of the Delaware Management decision,
the SEC undertook to clarify its position with respect to
preferential compensation in connection with such sales. The rule is
currently codified at NASD Manual, NASD Conduct Rule 2830(k). See
Securities and Exchange Commission Concurrence in NASD Reciprocal
Brokerage Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 10,147, 11973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,372, at 83,086 (May 14, 1973)
(approving NASD's anti-reciprocal rule). Subject to the rule's
requirements, however, sales may be used as a basis for allocating
portfolio brokerage, if fully disclosed to the investment company's
shareholders. Id.
44 See supra note 38.
45

See

PUBLIC POLICY STUDY,

supranote 14, at 164 & 170 (contrasting

reciprocal arrangement providing services ancillary to brokerage
function, such as research, and give-ups made to "a broker who has
nothing
to do with the transaction").
46
Delaware Management, supranote 42.
47 See Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
Securities Industry Study, 93rd Cong. 61-62 (1973): Moran & O'Kelly,
supranote 22, at 67-70.
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48
the relationship between research and best execution.
The SEC rejected the view that "an adviser [was] ...
required to seek the service which carries the lowest cost"
and instead stated the adviser should consider the "full
range and quality of a broker's services which benefit the
account under management," including49 "information" and
"analysis" supplied by a broker.
But the SEC
contemplated use of such factors in assigning brokerage
only where it could be reasonably shown that the research
obtained contributed to the performance of the account
under management,5 0 a somewhat narrower approach
than was ultimately adopted in section 28(e).

D. THE 1975 SECuRITIES ACTS AMENDMENTS AND SECTION
28(e)'s SAFE HARBOR
The legislative history of section 28(e) provides a context
for understanding subsequent commercial and regulatory
developments and the continuing debate over soft dollar
practices. In connection with Congress's codification of the
abolition of fixed commissions in the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975,51 Congress added section 28(e) to
See FRANKEL, supra note 41, at 626 (indicating in context of
Investment Company Act that SEC's position shifted away from treating
48

research as form of compensation for purposes of that Act's section
to treating it as potential conflict of interest).
17(e)(1)
49
See, e.g., Policy Statement Regarding the Future Structure of
Securities Market, 37 Fed. Reg. 5286, 5290 (Mar. 14, 1972) ("In our
opinion, the providing of investment research is a fundamental element
of the brokerage function for which the bona fide expenditure of the
beneficiary's funds is completely appropriate, whether in the form of
higher commissions or outright cash payments.")
50 See Applicability of the Commission's Policy Statement on the
Future Structure of the Securities Markets to Selection of Brokers and
Payment of Commissions by Institutional Managers, Securities Act
Release No. 5250, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
178,776, at 81,631 (May 9, 1972): see also Exchange Act Release No.
11,203, supra note 40.
51 The 1975 Securities Acts Amendments marked the most significant
changes to the federal scheme of securities regulation since enactment
of the federal securities laws during the Depression. One provision of
the wide-ranging legislation was codification of the SEC's
administrative abrogation of fixed commissions at section 6(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1999).
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the Securities Exchange Act which concerns receipt of
research and brokerage services by investment advisers
from broker-dealers. This issue was of great significance in
light of legal and commercial uncertainty regarding
brokerage allocation and rebate practices as the securities
industry made the transition from a fixed commission
environment to a competitive commission regime. Section
28(e) was principally designed to address three related but
potentially divergent concerns: (i) overcoming possible
disruptions to securities markets in the transition to
deregulated commission rates; (ii) ensuring the continued
production and dissemination of financial research in
markets with competitive brokerage commissions; and
(iii) establishing bright-line standards that would preclude
the reemergence of abusive give-up arrangements.
The deregulation of commission rates rendered the issue
of duty to recapture largely moot. Instead, regulatory and
industry attention began to shift toward the duty of
investment advisers to obtain best execution in markets
with unfixed commissions, and the implications of that
duty for full-service firms which had traditionally bundled
execution and research in providing services to
institutional clients.5 2 The critical issue was whether an
adviser, consistent with the fiduciary obligations owed to
its clients, could direct brokerage to firms charging more
than the lowest commission, especially when brokerage
was directed in part on the basis of the firm's willingness
to provide research to the adviser. The answer directly
affected the way full-service firms conducted business.
The securities industry, for obvious reasons, opposed
abolition of fixed commissions. Not only would brokers
face greater price competition, but established brokers
feared that institutional customers with whom long-term
relationships had been developed would be forced to use
the broker that charged the lowest commission regardless
5

2See James F. Jorden, "Paying Up" for Research: A Regulatory and
Legislative Analysis, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1103, 1110-1114 (1975). As
Jorden further notes, enactment of ERISA in 1974 and rumblings by
OCC only served to heighten industry's concerns. Id. at 1115-16.
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of other aspects of the relationship such as execution
quality or research services.
In 1975, the principal form of soft dollar arrangement
involved proprietary research (that is internally-generated
research) provided by full-service firms to their clients.
These firms maintained significant research departments
as part of the multifaceted investment services offered by
such firms. Industry favored section 28(e) as a means of
partially insulating the way in which these firms
conducted business with institutional clients from the
53
In
effects of cut-throat commission competition.
would
firms
particular, the safe harbor ensured that such
be able to continue bundling execution services with
delivery of ancillary research and brokerage services.
The industry's argument - put forward principally by
the full-service firms - was premised on the unique
benefits obtained by investors through access to securities
research. 54 Unlike other forms of give-up arrangements,
research indirectly benefited advisers' clients. Moreover,
transition to a negotiated rate regime would entail
significant hardships for some advisers if research were no
53

Section 28(e) took shape out of watered-down provisions found in
earlier drafts of legislation that ultimately became the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975. In 1975, after the unexpected failure to enact
legislation in the preceding legislative session, a final effort was made to

pass comprehensive securities legislation. The principal vehicle for the
legislation - S. 249 - was amended shortly after its introduction to
create a proposed safe harbor: section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act. The proposed language was also incorporated in a substantially
similar form in the parallel House legislation - H.R. 4111. For a brief
overview of the salient features of the legislative history of the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1975, see Harvey A. Rowen, The Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975: A Legislative History, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 329 (1976).
Specific details of the legislative history relating to section 28(e) are
explored in HARVEY E. BINES, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT §§
9.02-9.03 (1978) as well as LOSS & SELIGMAN, supranote 40, at 2885-97.
5 See Hearings on S.249 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.
323 & 459 (1975) (hereinafter S.249 Hearings) statements of Donald B.
Marron ("Marron Statement"); William W. Graulty ("Graulty
Statement"); and Ray Garrett ("Garrett Statement").
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longer available from full-service firms. 55 The loser,
according to the industry, would have been the small
investment
adviser,
whose
costs
would
rise
disproportionately relative to larger investment advisers.
Finally, industry appealed to the need for greater
certainty regarding the legal implications of competitive
commission rates for investment advisers. Even if
investment advisers could reasonably argue that research
services should be considered in evaluating what
constituted best execution, the inherent uncertainty in the
area would militate against the commercial viability of
56
commission rates based in part on research services.
The SEC's position could best be described as agnostic.
The SEC gave its blessing to the proposed section 28(e),
notwithstanding the provision's effect of eliminating "the
necessity of tracing the imputed value of any specific
research to a specific account." 57 The SEC's position
acknowledged
"uncertainties" stemming from
the
transition to competitive commission rates on "the future
availability and quality of research and other services."5 8
While effectively conceding the force of industry concerns
regarding the necessity at that time for a soft dollar safe
harbor, the SEC nevertheless harbored misgivings
regarding the potential for abuse presented by such
arrangements. The SEC expressly indicated hope that, as
new patterns of money management developed, the need
for reliance on section 28(e) would decline. 59
The Congressional reports accompanying the legislation
recognized the need to have a more flexible definition of
best execution: one that encompassed execution quality
and receipt of research services. Thus, both the relevant
House and Senate committees affirmed that a primary
55 See Marron Statement, supra note 54, at 324 & 325; Graulty
Statement,
supra note 54, at 459, 467-68.
5
6 See Marron Statement, supra note 54, at 322 ('The confusion
should be ended and we believe the proposed amendment will resolve
this issue") & 324: Graulty Statement, supra note 54, at 459-60.
57 See Garrett Statement, supra note 54, at 202.
mId.
at 203 & 201.
5
9Id. at 203.
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purpose of section 28(e) was to codify the principle that a
fiduciary's duty to provide best execution did not require
fiduciaries to direct brokerage to brokers providing
execution for the lowest commission. On the whole, the
Senate appeared more solicitous than the House of
industry concerns. Its committee report explicitly noted
fears regarding industry dislocation resulting from
displacement of the then-existing fixed rate structure in
"supporting the cost of generating ... research" and the
potential disruption of the legitimate expectations of
broker-dealers and money managers if research and other
60
brokerage services were no longer available. In light of
these concerns, the Senate report expressed the hope that
terms of
the safe harbor would be construed liberally in
6
research and brokerage services encompassed. '
Congress, however, also exhibited caution in embracing
a safe harbor. This caution was most pronounced on the
House side where the committee report emphasized that if
the safe harbor proved unwise Congress and the states
would not be precluded from undertaking remedial
legislative action at a later time "as we gain experience in a
competitive rate environment."6 2 The Conference Report
stressed that section 28(e) would not be used to shield
arrangements,
reciprocal
and
give-up
abusive
emphatically stating "this bill will in no way permit [give63
ups to] return."
In retrospect, several factors concerning the legislative
history bear scrutiny. At the time of section 28(e)'s
enactment, Congress and the SEC believed that use of soft
dollar arrangements would not be extensive, that the safe
harbor would be confined principally to full-service firms
and that the market significance of such arrangements
would diminish over time. On each of these scores, their
expectations could not have been more wrong as will
become clear in the next section.
60S. REP. No. 94-75 69 (Apr. 14, 1975).
61 Id.
62

at 71.

H.R. REP. No. 94-123 95 (Apr. 7, 1975).

63 H.R. REP. No. 94-229 108 (May 19, 1975) (hereinafter Conference
Report).
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Another feature worth noting is that some of the reasons
for the safe harbor that appeared compelling in 1975 have
little force today. The period of transition ushered in by the
1975 Securities Acts Amendments has long since ended.
The completion of the adjustment to deregulated
commissions followed by rapid innovation in industry
products and technology have radically altered the
shape of the securities industry in the intervening
generation. These changes diminish the importance of
concerns expressed regarding the continued production of
financial research and the continued viability of small
investment advisers.
While the safe harbor also may have been necessary to
shield research
operations of full-service firms
temporarily, the market has long since adjusted to the
realities of deregulated commissions and rapid innovation
in financial research and products. Alternate providers of
securities research' have greatly multiplied 4 and fullservice firms would likely continue investing in research to
support retail and investment banking operations
regardless of section 28(e). Nor is a desire to shield small
investment advisers from the competitive effects of
deregulated commissions a sufficient basis for continued
maintenance of section 28(e). 65 The number of advisers

6 Statement
of Howard J. Schwartz ("Schwartz Statement"),
Oversight Hearings on the Future of the Marketplace - July 13, 1993
Focus on Soft Dollar Arrangements - Before the Subcomm. On
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. On Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong. 631, 645-47 (July 13, 1993) (hereinafter 1993
House Soft Dollar Oversight Hearings); see generally ALLIANCE IN
SUPPORT OF INDEPENDENT RESEARCH, REPORT ON THE PROVISION OF RESEARCH
SERVICES TO INVESTMENT MANAGERS (hereinafter 1991 ASIR INDEPENDENT
RESEARCH REPORT) reprinted in Practicing Law Institute, Securities

Portfolio Executions, Transaction-Based Compensation and Soft Dollar

Practices, in 44

CORPORATE LAW HANDBOOK

61 (1991).

65 Such sentiments are still expressed today. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM'N,
TRANSCRIPT OF ROUNDTABLE ON THE ROLE OF
INDEPENDENT INVESTMENT COMPANY DIRECTORS 192 (Feb. 23-24,
1999) (hereinafter 1999 SEC ROUNDTABLE) (brokerage official stating
that many advisers regard research obtained pursuant to soft dollar
arrangements as their "lifeblood").
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has greatly multiplied since 1975.66 Quite simply, if some
advisers are not able to survive commercially without the
permanent research subsidy afforded by section 28(e), it is
worth questioning whether they are in fact efficient service
providers.
Section
Other rationales, some of which are discussed 6in
7 Most of
retention.
harbor's
safe
the
for
IV, may argue
these center on efficient pricing of brokerage services
including research.6 8 But such rationales imperfectly track
the legislative intent of section 28(e). In order to achieve a
rebate
brokerage
toward
approach
coherent
the
question
to
arrangements, it may be necessary
continuing vitality of the legislative intent underlying
section 28(e).
6 Pursuant to section 203A of the Investment Advisers Act and rules
203A-1 through 203A-3 thereunder, responsibility for registration of
investment advisers is divided between federal and state authorities.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (1999); 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-1-3(1999). Federal
registration is required of several different classes of investment
advisers. The most significant of these classes numerically are
investment advisers having assets under management in excess of $25
million, investment advisers to a registered investment company,
pension consultants to employee benefit plans with aggregate assets
valued in excess of $50 million and certain investment advisers
affiliated with advisers required to register under this scheme. As of
early 1999, approximately 8,500 investment advisers were required to
register with the SEC under the federal registration scheme. See
Securities Uniformity; Annual Conference on Uniformity of Securities
Laws, Securities Act Release No. 7,664, 69 SEC Dkt. 1020 (Mar. 31,
1999). Another approximately 16,000 smaller investment advisers are
registered with the states. The large number of significant investment
as evidenced by the number of registered advisers
advisers under the federal scheme - indicates that the protection of advisers
should not be a paramount policy goal in shaping legal policy governing
brokerage accounts.
67
See Section IV.C.

68To some extent, such rationales may not even require the safe
harbor under section 28(e) since many concerns regarding fiduciary
obligations with respect to certain practices have been allayed by best
execution interpretations since 1975 which have provided considerable
guidance regarding the scope of an adviser's best execution obligations
in a deregulated commission environment. See discussion, supra
note 13.
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT BROKERAGE
REBATE PRACTICES
Contrary to the expectations of Congress and regulators,
soft dollar and other brokerage rebate arrangements have
burgeoned in a competitive commission environment. This
section provides an overview of brokerage rebate
arrangements commonly used today and in particular the
two dominant forms of rebate arrangements: soft dollar
arrangements
and
customer
directed
brokerage
arrangements.
Soft dollar arrangements that meet the requirements of
the safe harbor in section 28(e) 69 and customer directed
brokerage arrangements are widely employed because
they are not subject to the legal restrictions that would
otherwise stand as an obstacle to rebate arrangements. In
a section 28(e) soft dollar arrangement, the investment
adviser obtains an explicit or implicit rebate from the
broker-dealer in the form of research or brokerage
services. In a customer directed brokerage arrangement in
contrast, the advisory client, not the adviser, bargains with
the broker-dealer to receive a rebate. The client then
provides the adviser with instructions regarding allocation
of brokerage among brokers.
The two different types of rebate arrangements - soft
dollar rebates and customer directed brokerage represent competing approaches toward rebates. In a soft
dollar arrangement, the adviser directs the brokerage
while the advisory client performs that task (although
typically in conjunction with the adviser) in the customer
directed brokerage arrangement. The adviser is typically
the direct recipient of the rebate in a soft dollar
arrangement while the client is the rebate recipient in the
customer directed arrangement. As previously noted,
69

See 1986 SEC Soft Dollar Release, supra note 26 at 16004, 16011

(discussing scope of section 28(e) of Exchange Act);

Report of

Investigation in the Matter of Investment Information, Inc. Relating to

the Activities of Certain Investment Advisers, Banks, and BrokerDealers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,679, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,481, at 83,005 (Mar. 19, 1980)
(hereinafter Investment Information Investigative Report).
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customer directed brokerage arrangements do not entail
the agency or conflict of interest problems at the core of
soft dollar arrangements precisely because directed
brokerage rebates go directly to the advisory client and not
the adviser.
A. SOFT DOLLAR ARRANGEMENTS
Soft dollar arrangements provide virtually the only
legitimate avenue by which an investment adviser may
obtain rebates from clients' brokerage transactions.
Although we have described soft dollar arrangements in
general terms, the arrangements have evolved over time
into fairly intricate commercial arrangements. This
complexity stems from the fact that soft dollar
arrangements are a significant means by which brokers
compete for order flow from advisers. In many ways, an
understanding of soft dollar arrangements requires a basic
understanding of the process by which brokers compete.
Brokers compete for investment adviser directed order
flow based primarily on three factors: commission costs,
execution quality and provision of ancillary research and
brokerage services. The provision of research and
brokerage services is effected through soft dollar
arrangements. Brokers tailor their operations to exploit
advantages in competing with respect to one or more of
these factors. This process has led to the emergence of
roughly three different classes of brokers: full-service,
third-party and execution-only brokers. Two of these
classes - the full-service brokers and the third-party
benefits to advisers but on
brokers - provide soft dollar
70
somewhat different bases.
70The description of full-service and third-party brokers below is

highly stylized to emphasize the contrasting methods of doing business
between the two types of firms. In practice, the differences may be
somewhat grayer. For example, although full-service firms are identified
with proprietary research, many currently will supply independent
research and provide other soft dollar benefits to compete with thirdparty firms described below. See 1999 SEC ROUNDTABLE, supra note
65, at 172-91; Michael Scotti, Negotiating the Soft Dollars Market,
TRADERS MONTHLY,

Jan. 1995, at 22. By the same token, some third-
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Full-service firms - sometimes referred to as the "Street
firms" - were, as noted above, the principal proponents
for enactment of the soft dollar safe harbor. These wellcapitalized multiservice firms offer extensive trading
expertise and proprietary research capabilities. Because
these firms' trading operations are well-capitalized, they
can offer higher quality execution for difficult trades by
risking firm capital to minimize the market impact that a
transaction may have on trading costs and by working the
order. 7 1 These firms also generally employ analysts and
large research staffs to support not only trading but
underwriting and retail operations. 72 Full-service firms
party brokers internally generate some research, such as Lynch, Jones
& Ryan's redbook on retail activity.
"Testimony of David M. Silfen ("Silfen Testimony") & Anson M.
Beard, 1993 House Soft Dollar Oversight Hearings, supra note 64 at
711-715. Market impact refers to the effect that execution of a portfolio
transaction may have on the market prices obtained in connection with
the portfolio transaction. Id. Significant market impact is indicative of
poor execution quality and will adversely affect market performance.
See Carole Gould, It's Gnawing at Your Fund, and Now It Has a Gauge,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1999, § 3 at 7; Miles Livingston & Edward S. O'Neal,
Mutual Fund Brokerage Commissions, 19 J. FIN. RES. 273, 276 (1996).
Working an order refers to the ability of a firm with extensive trading
operations to secure best execution by using superior knowledge of
sources of market liquidity and market trading patterns and superior
access to different securities markets. See Silfen Testimony, supra
at 714.
Market impact is a real concern where order size is large and the issue
is less liquid (has a relatively low average daily trading volume). In such
cases, a full-service firm with more extensive trading operations may
block position. Block positioning involves the firm acting as principal to
purchase and hold part of a customer's position in selling the position.
Id. Portfolio managers tend to monitor execution quality with respect to
market impact because of the potential of market impact to affect
adversely investment performance. See 1999 SEC ROUNDTABLE,
supra note 65, at 168-69, 205.
72There are no regularly reported figures on the research budgets
of
full-service firms. An exchange in the 1993 House Soft Dollar Oversight
Hearing indicated that the research budget of Goldman, Sachs had
grown from $65 million in 1989 to "well north of $100 million in 1993."
Silfen Testimony, supra note 71, at 735. This number has probably
increased substantially since then and it is reasonable to believe that
Goldman, Sachs' budget is probably comparable to the research
budgets of the other leading investment banking firms, such as Merrill
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter and Salomon Smith Barney.
Because research produced by full-service firms must satisfy the
requirements of their different lines of business, its value for money
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provide advisers with proprietary research from analysts
as well as access to these analysts in return for order flow.
As might be expected, commission rates at full-service
firms are relatively high compared to commission rates at
firms which provide execution only. In directing brokerage
to a full-service firm with higher commissions, the
investment adviser seeks higher quality executions for its
client's difficult trades and soft dollar benefits in the form
of proprietary research. The full-service broker does not
break out the value of the soft dollar benefits it provides,
rather it offers its services on a bundled basis. In other
words, an adviser's clients will pay the same commission
regardless of the value the adviser attaches to the
proprietary research obtained from the full-service
firm. By bundling its services in this fashion, the soft
dollar benefit is never quantified as a portion of the
commission but rather remains as an implicit rebate of
undetermined value.
Third-party research brokers are the other type of broker
that offer soft dollar benefits. In third-party research
arrangements, research provided to an investment adviser
by the executing broker is not internally generated by that
broker (as is the case with full-service firms), but rather is
procured by the broker for the adviser. Thus, for example,
managers has been questioned from time to time. Recurrent anecdotal
evidence has appeared suggesting that significant quantities of
proprietary research materials generated by full-service firms are not
read by the recipients or are of little value. See Association of
Investment Management and Research, Adoption of AIMR Soft Dollar
Standards - Attachment 3: Soft Dollar Comment Letters - Major
Themes 18 (Dec. 1997) (comments from members suggesting "much
[proprietary research] is meaningless and thus thrown out"); Schwartz
Statement, supra note 64, at 648-50; Statement of Russell J. Brooks,
1993 House Soft Dollar Oversight Hearings, supra note 64, at 693 ('To
make matters more difficult, much of what [full-service] firms produce
has a sameness to it, no matter who produces it."); 1997 ERISA
ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note

3, at 12 (minority report noting

earlier study which showed that "portfolio managers read only about
30% of the research reports that they receive"): see also Gretchen
Morgenson, Market Watch.' So Many Analysts, So Little Analysis, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 1999, § 3, at 1. Indeed, the explosive growth of third
party brokers indicates an unsatisfied demand for research not
satisfied by the proprietary research products of full-service firms.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

35

Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 2

178

VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT

in a third party research arrangement, an investment
adviser earns soft dollar credits on commissions from
brokerage directed to a third-party broker. The broker
then arranges for the adviser to receive research from a
73
third-party research provider.

Brokers who specialize in providing third-party research
along with execution services operate in a fundamentally
different commercial fashion than the full service firms.
First, although third-party brokers bundle execution and
research services for delivery to clients, the cost of
producing the two services - execution and research -

is

clearly separable for the third-party broker since the
broker provides one service, execution, internally, and
provides the other, research, by procuring it from an
external source.
Second, third-party arrangements entail a more formal
understanding between the broker and the customer
regarding any soft dollar arrangement (although the
understanding typically does not take a written form). At
the outset of the relationship, the broker and investment
adviser will reach a non-binding understanding regarding
the adviser's informal commitment to direct a certain level
of brokerage commissions to the broker-dealer over a fixed
period of time, the commission rate and a conversion rate
reflecting the rate at which commission dollars will be
rebated in soft dollars. 74 This slightly more formal
73

While third-party research services are selected in consultation
with the adviser receiving the service, proprietary research provided by
full-service firms is distributed generally to clients on a relationship
basis. As a result, third-party research is frequently more specialized
than proprietary research from full-service firms and is typically
selected to meet the particular needs of the adviser.
74 The conversion ratio is typically quoted in terms of the amount of
commission dollars required to obtain a dollar's worth of soft dollar
credits. Thus, the lower the ratio the more advantageous for the
brokerage customer and the less advantageous for the broker, i.e., a
lower ratio means it takes fewer commission dollars to obtain a credit.
For example, 1.7: 1 - for every $1.70 in commissions the adviser would
receive one dollar of soft dollar credit - would be more favorable for
customers than a ratio of 4:1). 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT,
supra note 1, at 21-22. One provider of third-party research has
identified the following factors in determining the conversion ratio:
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arrangement contrasts with the implicit soft dollar rebates
provided by full-service firms. Although the full-service
firm may have an expectation regarding the amount of
brokerage commissions required to obtain proprietary
research, the full-service firm does not generally convert
before providing
commissions to explicit soft dollar credits
75
advisers with proprietary research.
The remaining class of broker - execution-only brokers
provides execution services without any soft dollar
rebate. Such brokers compete solely on the basis of
commission costs. Like the third-party broker, the
execution-only broker typically lacks the trading capital to
provide high quality executions for difficult trades, that is,
where the transaction size is large relative to the overall
liquidity of the security being traded. Nevertheless,
although I describe these brokers (as well as third-party
brokers) as providing only average quality execution, they
may provide best execution for a significant class of
transactions, such as transactions involving highly liquid
issues. As to these transactions, usually regarded as
easier or low-cost trades, execution quality may be as good
as that provided by any full-service firm even though the
full-service firm may have the capability to provide high
quality execution services. Investment advisers can exploit
these differences by routing low-cost trades to executiononly firms to save on commissions while routing difficult
trades to full-service firms to minimize market impact
costs. A relatively new brokerage niche, analogous to the
"Relationship size (Le., annual commission volume), Commission
flow/timeliness (Le., will client remain "ahead" with a positive
balance?), Trade characteristics (Le., average shares, commission rate,
etc.), Research bills (frequency, number, etc.)." See Paragon Financial
(visited July 20, 1999) <http://www.pfgi.com>.
Group
75
Another way to think about the full-service firm's approach is that it
provides advisers with research without metering the advisers' use of
the research. Thus, advisers receive a wide array of proprietary research
on a relationship basis and the research obtained is not tailored to an
adviser's specific needs. This approach has been dismissed by
customized research providers as "selling research by the pound" and
leaving clients with the task of "filter[ing] out only what they need..."
Letter to the editor from Russell J. Brooks, PENSION AND INVESTMENTS,
Feb. 3, 1992, at 12.
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execution-only broker, involves proprietary electronic
trading networks - sometimes referred to as ECNs or
ATSs (alternative trading systems) - such as Instinet.
These systems, which are being used increasingly by
money managers, provide an alternative low-cost means
for investment advisers and institutional investors to trade
which bypass soft dollar arrangements. 76
The principal features of these three different types of
brokerage are summarized in the following table and in
Diagram 1.

It is impossible to overstate the potential significance of electronic
trading systems on patterns of institutional trading. See GREENWICH
ASSOCIATES, ADvANCES AND ANOMALIES IN "NON-TRADmONAL" TRADING
A
REPORr TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE UNITED STATES (Apr.
1999)
(hereinafter GREENWICH ASSOCIATES NON-TRADITIONAL TRADING REPORT)
(noting "firestorm of institutional interest in nontraditional trading" and
finding that 70% of surveyed large institutions use such systems for
some trading in listed shares and almost 63% of total surveyed
institutions use such systems for some Nasdaq trading); See 1999 SEC
ROUNDTABLE, supra note 65, at 171, 172 (fund officials estimating
that one large mutual fund family uses electronic trading systems for
approximately 10-12% of all trades and another mutual fund complex
uses electronic trading systems for 10-15% of trades in managed funds
and up to 25% of trades in index funds); Rebecca Buckman and Aaron
Lucchetti, Wall Street Wired: Electronic Networks Threaten Trading
Desks on Street, WALL ST. J., at C1 (Dec. 23, 1998) (mutual fund family
uses electronic trading systems for 50% of its Nasdaq stock-trading
generating almost 40% saving). Some electronic trading systems will
actually offer soft dollar arrangements. See Instinet website (visited
July 22, 1999) <http://www.instinet.com> (explaining soft commission
services); Instinet Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, (pub. avail. Jan. 15,
1992) (section 28(e) safe harbor can be applied to brokers providing
electronic trading systems).
76
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B. CUSTOMER DIRECTED BROKERAGE ARRANGEMENTS
Customer directed brokerage arrangements, the
principal rebate alternative to soft dollar arrangements,
offer a means by which advisory clients can obtain rebates
generated from commissions on transactions from their
own account. 7 In a customer directed brokerage
arrangement the client enters into a brokerage
arrangement with a broker-dealer in return for rebates on
commissions generated from its account. The client will
then instruct its investment adviser to direct some portion
of that client's brokerage to the broker-dealer over a stated
period, such as a year, and the broker-dealer will provide
the agreed-upon rebate to the client bypassing the adviser
altogether. Customer directed rebates do not implicate
section 28(e), which is solely designed to address the issue
presented by an adviser's receipt of rebates on client
brokerage.
Commission recapture arrangements (illustrated in
Diagram 2) are a common example of directed brokerage
arrangements.7 8 Commission recapture programs differ
from soft dollar arrangements in that the rebate takes the
form of cash (in other words, a hard dollar rebate).
Because the customer is the recipient of the cash rebate,
no conflict of interest is present. In theory, the client
should be able to trade off execution quality for the rebate
in accordance with its own self-interest.

77

See 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16;
1997 ASIR SoFT DOLLAR PAPER, supranote 4, at 8-9: LEMKE & LINs, supra

1, at 5-9.
note
78
See Howard J. Schwartz, Presentation to the ERISA Advisory
Council Working Group on Soft Dollars and Commission Recapture
(Apr. 8, 1997) ("Schwartz Recapture Arrangement Statement"). For a
discussion of the broader issues from the perspective of a directed
brokerage proponent, see Kenneth L. Kahn, Pros, Cons on Directed
Brokerage, PENSION & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 15, 1997, at 40.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

41

Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 2

184

VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT

0

0

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol1/iss2/2

42

Franco: Rethinking Brokerage Rebate Arrangements: The Case for Collective

(VOL. 1:143 1999) RETHINKING BROKERAGE REBATE ARRANGEMENTS

185

A variation on commission recapture programs is an
expense reimbursement program. In an expense
reimbursement program, the customer directs brokerage
and commissions to a broker which pays for services
rendered to the customer directly - generally services
other than ordinary research services. In effect, customers
are allowed to recoup expenses that they would otherwise
directly incur in connection with the management of their
money. Moreover, under such a program, an advisory
client can receive reimbursement for expenses incurred by
the client that the client's investment adviser would not 7be
9
entitled to receive under the section 28(e)'s safe harbor.
Commission reimbursement and expense programs
resemble traditional soft dollar arrangements in the sense
that they are rebate schemes, but they also differ because
the client, rather than the investment adviser, is the rebate
recipient. As a result, conflict of interest issues are
generally eliminated and the arrangements are not subject
to the same conduct and disclosure requirements that
apply to soft dollar arrangements. This results in much
greater flexibility in structuring directed brokerage
arrangements than soft dollar arrangements. For example,
commission recapture arrangements, unlike soft8 0dollar
arrangements, may involve receipt of cash rebates.
79

A firm that regularly enters into expense reimbursement
arrangements enumerated the following types of expenses as
reimbursable providing reimbursement is authorized by the plan
documents: "actuarial expenses, consulting fees, accounting, legal fees,
conferences, custodial fees, publications." Lynch, Jones & Ryan, Inc.,
(visited July 21, 1999) <http://www.ljr.com>. Of these, custodial fees
alone would be reimbursable as a soft dollar brokerage service, provided
the other requirements of section 28(e) are met.
80
Two other expense arrangements are worth noting: expense cap
arrangements and expense offset arrangements. Expense cap
arrangements are potentially relevant to the discussion of rebate
arrangements. In an expense cap arrangement, the investment adviser
agrees (on a voluntary basis) to reimburse a managed account for
expenses exceeding a prescribed level. Where an expense cap exists,
soft dollar rebates in the form of brokerage services or a customer
directed brokerage arrangement which reduces the managed account's
expenses will also benefit the adviser directly by reducing the adviser's
potential liability under the expense cap. Thus, an expense cap can
alter an adviser's incentives regarding how rebate arrangements are
structured. See Payment for Investment Company Services with
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Directed brokerage arrangements, however, can present
problems for the investment adviser. The adviser's client in
such an arrangement (for example, a pension fund), rather
than the investment adviser, must, in effect, select the
broker. Customer selection may compromise the adviser's
fiduciary obligations to the client with respect to best
execution. 81 In such cases, the adviser will discuss with
the pension sponsor the need to reconcile best execution
and rebate objectives. Another controversy has been
retention of pension plan and investment consultants
through directed brokerage arrangements. 82
Brokerage Commissions, Investment Company Act Release No. 20,472,
[1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,420, at
85,625 (Aug. 11, 1994) (hereinafter 1994 Investment Company
Brokerage Arrangement Accounting Proposing Release).
Expense offset arrangements involve situations where the expenses of
an advisory client are reduced by agreeing to forego income that would
otherwise be derived from use of the advisory client's assets. Examples
include compensating balance arrangements where custodial fees are
reduced to reflect the custodian's economies of scale or securities
lending arrangements where the custodian is able to generate income
from lending portfolio securities of managed accounts. Although
expense offset arrangements represent a form of rebate, the rebate
differs from brokerage rebate arrangements in that there is no rebate on
a brokerage arrangement but rather a compensating benefit based on
some other relationship with the service provider. See Payment for
Investment
Company Services with Brokerage
Commissions,
Investment Company Act Release No. 21,221 (July 21, 1995) 60 Fed.
Reg. 38,918, 38,919-20 (July 28, 1995) (establishing final rule
amendments) (hereinafter 1995 Investment Company Brokerage
Arrangement Accounting Release); Payment for Investment Company
Services with Brokerage Commissions, Investment Company Act
Release No. 20,472, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,187 at 42,190 (Aug. 17, 1994)
(proposing rule amendments).
81 See ERISA Technical Release No. 86-1, supra note 27. Marshall E.
Blume, Soft Dollars and the Brokerage Industry, 49 FIN. ANAL. J. 36,
41-42 (Mar.-Apr. 1993) (noting survey of advisers reflects significant
concern regarding execution quality in case of directed brokerage
arrangements).
82 The controversy arises from an apparent conflict of interest for
consultants in being paid pursuant to a directed brokerage
arrangement and advising pension plans about the use of directed
brokerage arrangements. Concerns in this area were specifically
highlighted in the 1997 ERISA ADviSORY COUNCIL REPORT, supranote 3,
at 12-13 - Recommendations Involving Plan Sponsor Guidance A-F
(advocating increased attention to potential conflicts created by
financial arrangements between consultant and brokerage firms). For
similar expressions of such concern, see Gary W. Findlay & M. Steve
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C. BROKERAGE REBATE ARRANGEMENTS IN CURRENT MARKET
PRACTICE

Brokerage rebate arrangements today are a common
feature in transactions on behalf of managed accounts.
The market significance of rebate arrangements is
confirmed by transaction volume, dollar value of
transactions and figures indicating relative use by money
managers. 83 Some estimates indicate that third-party
arrangements exceeded $1 billion in commissions in 1996,
although more conservative estimates put the figures at
approximately 3/4 of that.84 Estimates have consistently
shown that more than 90% of money managers use soft
dollar arrangements for listed equity securities.85 Thirdparty brokerage transactions constituted 12% of all
commissions from a cross-sectional sample of investment
Yoakum, In Pursuitof Objectivity in Investment Consulting,PLAN SPONSOR
MAGAZINE, Nos. 1996, at 66; Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and
Pension Benefit Plans, Working Group on Soft Dollars and Commission
Recapture (Aug. 17, 1997): two exhibits submitted by (i) Harold S.
Bradley, 1994 Mutual Fund and Investment Management Conference:
Soft Dollars and Other Portfolio Issues and (ii) Independent Fiduciary
Services, Outline of Testimony: Fiduciary Issues Regarding Investment
Consultants that Provide Brokerage; Silfen Testimony, supra note 71,
at 711.
83 This situation was recently confirmed in the 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT
DOLLAR REPORT, which contains a wealth of information about actual
industry practices and details the pervasive use of such arrangements.
See supranote 1.
84 1998 SEC SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (noting more
conservative estimates by Greenwich Associates from 1996). Recent
estimates indicate that total soft dollar commissions in domestic equity
transactions have flattened out over the past two years in the same
range while trading volume has increased significantly. GREENWICH
ASSOCIATES NON-TRADITIONAL TRADING REPORT, supranote 76, at vi & 14. It
should be noted that Greenwich Associates figures combine soft dollar
and directed brokerage commissions together. The relative flattening
out stands in contrast to the significant and steady increase in soft
dollar commissions from a decade ago. Figures from 1989 indicated
third-party arrangements commanded from $460 million in
commissions and by 1991, $585 million. See Silfen Testimony, supra
71, at 708.
note
85
See 1997 ASIR SOFT DOLLAR PAPER, supra note 4, at 4; 1998 SEC
STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 37. In other types of securities trading,
such as trading in OTC equity and fixed income securities where dealer
markets are traditional, soft dollar transactions are less widely used.
See discussion infra note 189.
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advisers examined by the SEC staff.8 6 Using the average
conversion ratio found by the SEC staff (1.65: 1), 87 the
value
for soft dollar benefits
from third-party
arrangements alone could range anywhere from $440
million to $588 million annually. A true measure of the
magnitude of soft dollar benefits, of course, would need to
include the portion of commissions directed to full-service
brokers to obtain proprietary research and brokerage

services.
The SEC Staffs recent report shows significant
disparities in use of soft dollar arrangements between
small investment advisers who service retail accounts and
large advisers that manage institutional accounts. The
small advisers use soft dollar arrangements more
extensively as a proportion of their commission trades; soft
dollars constitute a higher percentage of small advisers'
operating expenses; and the ratio of soft dollar rebates to
total advisory fees is far greater for small advisers versus
88
large advisers.
86

See 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 42.
Figures from Greenwich Associates indicate that such figures are more
characteristic of very large money managers that generate commissions
in excess of $5 million per annum. GREENWICH ASSOCIATES NONTRADITIONAL TRADING REPORT, supra note 76, at 15. In commissions for

listed securities and for somewhat smaller money managers, the
percentage of commissions represented by soft dollars ranges between
20 to 40% of commissions. Id The discrepancy in estimates stems from
differences in the relevant pools used for comparison. Use of soft dollars
appears greatest in the most liquid markets such as NYSE trading and
is much smaller in less traditional markets, such as electronic trading
systems.
87 The SEC staff actually found that from its sample of 75 third-party
brokers that brokers on average provided a conversion ratio of 1.7:1
(1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supranote 1, at 22) and from its
sample of 285 advisers that advisers on average received conversion
ratios of 1.6:1. I have used the mid-point of these two samples 1.65:1. Of course, the conversion ratio is negotiable and so will vary
among arrangements.
88 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 42-43
(reporting, based on a large sample of investment advisers, that small
advisers use over 50% of commissions to earn soft dollar arrangements
while large advisers used only 8.3% of their commissions for that
purpose, that soft dollars constitute less than 5% of large advisers
operating expenses and a much smaller fraction of operating income
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Directed
commission arrangements
are another
substantial source of rebates with an estimated value of
$90 million. 89 Surveys have consistently shown that
directed arrangements are used by 1/3 to 1/2 of all public
pension plans, corporate pension plans and endowments
to direct anywhere from 20% to 1/3 of their commissionbased trading. 90
The vast amount of soft dollar benefits obtained by
investment advisers is in the form of research, construed
for regulatory purposes permissively to include a wide
range of research benefits, such as reports (company,
industry, market and general economic), news, computer
equipment and pricing information. Currently, over 1800
vendors of independent research products make their
services available through third-party brokers. 9 1
The pervasiveness of rebate arrangements is further
reflected in specialization of third-party brokerage firms
and the resources that they devote to marketing such
arrangements. The SEC Staff Report notes that some
whereas small advisers reported appreciable rebate income as a fraction
of 8client
fees).
9
GREENWICH ASSOCIATS NON-TRADITIONAL TRADING REPORT, supra note
76, at vi. Due to inconsistent industry usage, it is not clear whether this
figure encompasses the entire universe of directed rebate arrangements
or is limited solely to commission recapture arrangements. The 1998
figure shows a slight reduction from 1997 when Greenwich Associates
estimated the amount to be approximately $95 million.
90 See GREENWICH ASSOCIATES, How FUNDS ARE COPING WITH UNCERTAIN
MARKET at 72 (Feb. 1999) (annual study of the investment practices of
tax-exempt funds in the United States) (showing figures for 1994 to
1998); see also LEMKE & LINS, supra note 1, at 9 (citing BENNETT &
KusTRA, MARKET COMMENTARY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING A
CHANGING INDUSTRY, in THIRD ANNUAL PENSION EXECUTIVE'S PROGRAM ON
SOFr DOLLARS 19 (1994)). Generally larger funds in all classes of taxexempt funds are more likely to direct than smaller funds. GREENWICH
ASSOCIATES, supra.Public pension funds use directed arrangements as

an off-budget means of augmenting resources available to the fund's
administrative staff that otherwise face state or local governmentally
imposed budgetary constraints. See 1997 ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 3, at 32-33 (summary of testimony of Steven
Wallman, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n).
91 As of 1994, one advisory firm had compiled a list of approximately
1800 vendors of soft dollar services. Harold S. Bradley, supra note 82
(presentation exhibit).
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brokerage firms devote staffs of a dozen or more sales
representatives to market soft dollar arrangements. 92 The
largest comnission recapture firm serves almost 700
institutional investors. 93 Third-party firms must engage in
elaborate commercial recordkeeping, tracking order flow
well as soft
from investment advisers and their clients as 94
dollar and directed brokerage credit balances.
Brokerage rebate arrangements, apart from the key
elements summarized here, can easily become more
intricate in a commercial setting. For example, one type of
transaction that has caught regulator attention is the socalled step-out transaction.9 5 A step-out transaction
involves use of two brokers in a single transaction.
Typically the principal executing broker is requested by
the investment adviser on behalf of the client to step-out
some portion of a large trade after execution. In steppingout, the primary executing broker in effect surrenders the
commission on the portion of the transaction that is
stepped out, and typically each broker will be responsible
for clearance and settlement as to their portion of the
92 See 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supranote 1, at 27. Such
programs are aggressively marketed not only by sales forces, but now
also on the Internet as well. See, e.g., Knight-Trimark Group, Inc.
(visited July 21, 1999) <http://www.knight-sec.com>; Lynch, Jones &
Ryan, Inc. (visited July 21, 1999) <http://www.ljr.com>; Paragon
Financial Group (visited July 21, 1999) <http://www.pfgi.com>:
1999)
Thomson Institutional Services, Inc. (visited July 21,
<http: //www.thomsoninstitutional.com>.
93
See Schwartz Recapture Arrangement Statement, supra note 78.
Directed brokerage arrangements are concentrated among pension plan
clients. Interestingly, mutual funds are not significant users. Compare
1999 SEC ROUNDTABLE, supra note 65, at 161 (Vanguard fund family
regularly directs sub-advisers to use directed brokerage to reduce fund
expenses) with id. at 167 (T. Rowe Price fund family prohibits traders
from using directed brokerage arrangements).
9 In the case of soft dollar arrangements where soft dollar benefits
may be advanced by the broker, customer balances may be either
positive or negative and may be carried forward year to year. See 1998
SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supranote 1, at 29.
95
See 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-39;
1999 SEC ROUNDTABLE, supra note 65, at 207-09 (representative
from major full-service institutional broker noting increased
importance of step-out transactions).
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transaction. 96 In a directed brokerage arrangement, stepout transactions may be used as a means of satisfying an
advisory client's informal commitment to provide
commissions to the broker that receives the step-out
portion of the trade in return for rebate benefits to the
97
advisory client.

Perhaps the most important feature of brokerage rebate
arrangements is their alleged effect on brokerage
commissions. In the wake of deregulation of commissions
in 1975, average commissions dropped from roughly 71
cents a share to approximately 11 cents a share. 98 By the
early 1990s commission rates were approximately 6 cents
a share and have remained in that range for full-service
and third-party brokers. 99 The lack of any further
See Lee A. Pickard, SEC Examines Soft Dollar Practices and
Compliance by Investment Advisers, INSIGHTS, vol. 11, no. 3, at 3 (Mar.
1997). Step-outs are an outgrowth of legitimate correspondent give-up
practices. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., CONSTITUTION AND RULES
§ 2138, Rule 138 (Oct. 1998). The significance of such practices is
underscored by rule changes to the NYSE's overnight comparison
system to facilitate electronically step-out transactions among clearing
members. See New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 29,492 (July 26,
1991), 56 Fed. Reg. 36,855 (Aug. 1, 1991).
97Step-out transactions may be viewed as a device aimed at
issues.
The
elaborately
and
rebate
unbundling
execution
choreographed step-out appears to be aimed at reconciling best
execution obligations and efforts to use rebates for services that could
not be obtained from the executing broker. The first broker enables the
investment manager to meet best execution concerns while the second
broker provides the advisory client with a favorable rebate opportunity.
See Scotti, supra note 70, at 27.
98
See Schwartz Statement, supra note 64, at 637; 1997 ASIR SOFT
DOLLAR PAPER, supranote 4, at 19.
99 Id.; 1998 SEC SoFt DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. A
Greenwich Associates analysis has documented a gradual reduction in
average commissions on listed domestic equities between 1994 and the
expected average in 1999 from approximately 6.1 cents per share to 5.3
cents per share (which appears to reflect the effects of competition
provided by non-traditional trading systems). See GREENWICH
ASSOCIATES NON-TRADITIONAL TRADING REPORT, supra note 76, at v. The
staff of the SEC has indirectly indicated concern regarding the apparent
stickiness in commissions paid by advisers in light of the recent
dramatic reductions in commissions paid by retail brokerage
customers. The staff recently initiated a sweeping review of how funds
seek best execution and attempt to minimize brokerage costs. See
Aaron Lucchetti, SEC Probes Funds' Commissions, WALL ST. J., C1
96
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reduction in commission rates is surprising for two
reasons. Execution costs for brokers have declined with
increased volume and greater reliance on technology.
Moreover, the advent of electronic trading systems has
seen commissions for relatively small retail customers
drop well below the 6 cent per share level paid by advisory
clients.10 0 This is particularly significant since until
recently retail transactions have been subject to much
higher conmmission costs.
IV. BROKERAGE REBATE ARRANGEMENTS:
ECONOMIC AND POLICY ISSUES
Brokerage rebate arrangements evidence purposeful
economic conduct by brokers, investment advisers and
even advisory clients. Market practices are shaped
predominantly by the economic incentives of these key
participants, the participants' access to information and
monitoring costs and competitive forces. Existing
regulation with respect to rebate arrangements is based on
a partial recognition of these economic factors but, as we
will see in subsequent sections, it is also unduly rigid and
stands as an obstacle to realizing a more coherent
economic approach to regulation of such arrangements.
While the flaws in current legal policy are examined in
subsequent sections, that analysis rests on an
understanding of the basic economic factors contributing
to brokerage rebate arrangements.
Soft dollar and other brokerage rebate arrangements are
shaped predominantly by two economic considerations:
(i) the principal-agent relationship that exists between
the investment adviser and advisory clients and
(Sept. 16, 1999). Such a review, following so closely on the heels of the
1998

SEC

STAFF SOFT DOLLAR

REPORT,

supra note

1,

evidences

continuing doubts by the SEC staff in the area of advisory brokerage
arrangements.
100 Carrie Lee, Making the Trade -

How to Pick, WALL ST. J., JUNE 14,

1999, at R8 (showing brokers offering commission prices to retail
investors of under $.02 a share for transactions in excess of from 1,000
to 5,000 shares).
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(ii) competition among brokers for order flow from managed accounts. These elements and their implications for
public policy are described below.
A.

THE ECONOMICS OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

Economic analyses of agency relationships provide a
rigorous approach to understanding the effect of rebates
on the investment adviser/advisory client relationship. 101
Agency problems arise in the economic sense from three
conditions: (i) delegation of decision-making by one party
(the principal) to another (the agent); (ii) the principal's
inability to observe directly the conduct of the agent in
discharging its responsibilities on behalf of the principal;
and (iii) an inherent divergence between the principal's
interests and the agent's incentives in carrying out tasks
on behalf of the principal. The divergence between the
principal's interests and the agent's incentives stems from
a number of factors, most notably the different economic
rewards enjoyed by the principal and agent in connection
with the agency relationship. 102 Divergence in interests of
the principal and agent alone, however, would not be a
101D. Bruce Johnsen applies the insights of the economic theory of
agency to soft dollar arrangements in Property Rights to Investment
Research: The Agency Costs of Soft Dollar Brokerage, supra note 4.
Professor Johnsen relies on this analytic framework, drawing on
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling's classic article: Theory of
the Firmv ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976) in which Jensen and Meckling applied agency
theory concepts to the theory of the firm. Within the last generation, the
economic theory of agency has developed important insights into the
sophisticated
increasingly
using
relationship
principal-agent
mathematical techniques. For a reasonably accessible discussion and
review of the economic literature in this area, see Kenneth J. Arrow, The
Economics of Agency, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS

(John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
102
When economists note that an agent's and principal's economic
interests will diverge, they do not mean that the agent will invariably
put its own interests ahead of the principal's. After all, the agent will
recognize that conduct that does not appear faithful or efficient to the
principal will eventually lead to termination of the relationship. Rather,
economists focus on deviations in the standard of care and urgency that
the agent may exercise in the conduct of the principal's affairs relative
to the care and urgency the principal would wish exercised on its own
behalf. The degree of divergence will depend on factors previously
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source of problem but for the fact that principals cannot
monitor the actions of their agents costlessly to ensure
faithful and efficient service.
It is in the economic interests of both principals and
agents to minimize so-called agency costs, that is, the
costs associated with the agency relationship attributable
to the divergence between the principal's interests and the
agent's incentives. From the principal's perspective, the
agent will not act with optimal efficiency in carrying out its
delegated tasks and from the agent's perspective,
minimization of agency costs will allow the agent to
command higher compensation from its principal.
Economists who have analyzed the problem of efficient
agency relationships have noted strategies for minimizing
agency costs.103 One is monitoring of the agent by the
principal and the other is bonding performance by the agent.
Each of these strategies entails costs for the principal and
agent, respectively. Thus, a principal will incur monitoring
costs up to the point where the marginal return from
monitoring in terms of improved performance by the agent
offsets the principal's marginal monitoring costs. At some
point, the marginal costs of monitoring will exceed marginal
losses from the agent's sub-optimal performance and the
principal will accept such losses willingly rather than incur
additional monitoring expenses.
Bonding refers to any action taken by the agent to signal
credibly its faithfulness and reliability to its principal. In
practice, agents find many ways to signal faithfulness
credibly,
whether
through
guarantees,
business
reputation or investments in capital resources needed to
serve clients. These actions induce reliance by clients (the
principals) by signaling to the principal the agent's belief
that it will be able to recoup these costs through superior
performance as an agent. As with monitoring costs of the
principal, however, an agent will willingly incur such
enumerated, such as relative economic rewards, monitoring costs and
information.
103.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 101: Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firn, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
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bonding costs only to the extent that his marginal returns
in terms of enhanced agency compensation exceed the
marginal costs of bonding.
As previously noted, the relationship between an
investment adviser and its clients is one of agency. Clients
retain investment advisers precisely because of the clients'
lack of expertise in financial markets. Because knowledge
of financial markets is both specialized and costly to
acquire, advisers have decided advantages over their
clients in evaluating execution quality of brokers and
implementing cost-effective execution strategies in
choosing among brokers.
The rational advisory client must consider the economic
consequences of brokerage rebates. Receipt of a rebate,
such as a soft dollar inducement, increases the potential
divergence between the adviser's incentives and its clients'
interests in directing brokerage: the adviser is likely to be
marginally less diligent in seeking best execution for its
client and marginally more likely to accelerate or increase
trading in a client's account. These concerns, as noted
above, are addressed by applicable legal principles
designed to curb misconduct by agents, including
investment advisers.
Another strategy to constrain the adverse consequences
of rebates is for advisory clients to monitor the actions of
the investment adviser. While investors may face
significant costs in evaluating the effect of soft dollar
arrangements on their expenses, there are low-cost
proxies for monitoring. Clients may monitor expenses
directly. Alternatively, they may indirectly gauge the
effects of the soft dollar arrangement by monitoring
investment performance because performance reflects
both any expenses associated with the soft dollar
arrangement as well as any benefits from improved
investment performance resulting from investment adviser
access to additional research.
Disclosure requirements, which impose standardized
methods of calculating performance, offer a low cost
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means of monitoring investment performance.10 4 Mutual
fund performance disclosure is augmented by readily
available third-party services, such as Lipper or
Morningstar, which provide rankings with respect to
performance of publicly offered investment funds.10 5 In
addition there are a number of fee-based third-party rating
services which evaluate the performance of money
managers. 0 6 While it is unclear how sensitive advisory
clients are to higher expenses and the potential for
diminished overall performance as a result of higher
expenses, investor access to such information serves as a
constraint on egregious rebate abuses. 107
04

Item 21 of Form N- IA, 17 C.F.R. § 274.1 IA; Registration Form
Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies, Investment
Company Act Release No. 23,065, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 86,013 (Mar. 23, 1998) (hereinafter 1998 Adopting Release
for Form N-IA).
"0 See
Morningstar
(visited
May
26,
1999)
<http://www.momingstar.com>;
Lipper
(visited May
26,
1999)
<http: //www.lipperweb.com/home/frbottom.html>.
106 See, e.g., Dalbar, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, (pub. avail. Mar. 24,
1998) (no action relief sought by firm providing survey research of
investment managers); Stalker Advisory Services, SEC No-Action Letter,
(pub. avail. Jan. 18, 1994) (no action relief sought by investment
adviser with respect to rankings prepared by independent organization
that verifies investment performance of advisers).
107 A repeatedly expressed concern is that investors, whether from
lack of understanding or other reasons, pay insufficient heed to fund
expenses in making investment decisions. See U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm'n Press Release: SEC Introduces New "Mutual Fund Cost
Calculator"(visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http: //www.sec.gov> ("SEC research
suggests that most of the nation's 77 million mutual fund investors
don't know how much they're paying for their funds."); Remarks of Paul
Roye, Director of the Division of Investment Management, U.S. Sec. and
Exch. Comm'n, Media Briefing on Mutual Fund Cost Calculator (Apr. 6,
1999)("[There is a gap between the widespread availability of mutual
fund cost information in the fee table and investors' ability to use that
information effectively."); Karen Damato, How Investors Failed to Note A
Fund Benefit: A Cut in Fees, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1999, at C I (noting
that investors do not appear to be sensitive to savings of less than one
percentage point in current bull market): Judith Burns, SEC to Take
"Wait-and-See" Approach to Mutual Fund Fees, D.J. Newswire, July 6,
1998 (noting SEC official who believed "few investors pay any attention
to [fees]"). However, contrary evidence exists as well. See Richard A.
Oppel, Jr., Fund Expenses: They're Going Down, Down, Down;
Conventional Wisdom is Belied by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
1999, at § 3, at 11 (noting certain mutual fund experts have observed
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B. THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETING FOR ORDER FLOW FROM

MANAGED ACCOUNTS

Broker rebate arrangements provide a means for brokers
to compete for order flow from managed accounts. 108 This
competition exists at two different levels. As noted, three
different classes of brokers compete for order flow from
managed accounts: full-service firms, third-party brokers
and execution-only brokers. Within these classes, brokers
compete against one another by trying to provide better
execution and services at lower cost than the other brokers
within that class. Competition among the three different
classes of brokers is more interesting for our purposes for
what it reveals about rebate arrangements. We have
previously described the essential features of each class of
broker (summarized in Table 1). The combination of these
features advances the economic interests of each class of
broker in competing for order flow.
Prior to deregulation of commissions in 1975, fullservice firms were the dominant form of brokerage firm.
This fact is hardly surprising given the widely held
perception that fixed commissions were well above
competitive levels. As a result, full-service firms competed
with one another through non-price competition (such as
providing enhanced execution quality for the same
commission rate) or through research and give-ups
(implicit price discounts).
In a negotiated commission environment, full-service
firms have continued to provide high quality executions
but charge a relatively high average commission (albeit a
commission that is much less than the former fixed
commission rates). In return for order flow, full-service
firms provide clients general access to the firm's
proprietary research. Two questions come to mind: (i) why
do full-service firms provide execution and research on a
trend among investors to "migratle] toward lower-cost funds and lowercost families").
108 See Blume, supra note 81, at 39 ('Ihe existence of soft dollars
[including directed brokerage arrangements] has a significant impact
on the allocation of brokerage to different types of brokers.")
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bundled basis (that is, why do they not charge separately
for execution and research) and (ii) why do they generally
charge a uniform commission rather than negotiating each
commission based on the difficulty of the transaction?
Economic principles provide some guidance in
answering these questions. To determine an appropriate
commission in the institutional brokerage market, the fullservice firm faces an intricate pricing problem that entails
two distinct features. First, the pricing scheme must take
into account that the firm produces multiple products (or
more accurately, services), that is, investment banking,
research, brokerage, proprietary trading and market
making. 10 9 For example, firm research regarding the
computer industry may be relevant both to advising
institutional brokerage customers and to securing
investment banking work in the computer industry.
Second, the same research can be provided virtually
costlessly to many clients (in other words research has
zero marginal costs when provided to each additional
client after the first). Third, the services produced by the
full-service firm are used by clients with very different
demand characteristics and, in the case of certain markets
being served such as the institutional brokerage market,
price discrimination strategies may be feasible. 110
10

9 As a result, the firm may have both common fixed and variable
costs with respect to different lines of its business. The firm must
apportion any common costs across its lines of business subject to
certain economic constraints. The most important constraints are those
represented by price competition from firms that cater to institutional
brokerage exclusively (and thus who may have very different cost
functions) and the fact that the full-service firm's own cost function
probably increases over the relevant range of operation (Le., there are
decreasing returns to scale and so the industry is not one that is likely
to give rise to a natural monopoly). See WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY
OF NATURAL MONOPOLY, 37-42 (1982). As discussed in the text below, the
full-service firm experiences significant economies of scale in providing
research to customers since once the research is produced it can be
disseminated to an unlimited number of customers. This fact, however,
does not convert the full-service firm into a natural monopoly since the
decreasing returns experienced by full-service firms in other parts of
their business outweigh the economies that exist with respect to
research.
0

"1

See

LouIs PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 5 (1983)

noting that price discrimination is typically defined as selling the same
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As a multiproduct firm, full-service brokerage firms face
a challenge in setting competitive prices and covering costs
across their various lines of business. The commissions
charged by a full-service firm, which are generally high
average uniform commissions, reveal the firm's view of its
optimal pricing strategy. 11' The full-service firm does not
charge high average uniform commissions for routine
execution services alone, but rather seeks to bundle its
provision of execution services with other services.
Specifically, the full-service firm bundles high quality
execution services with general access to its proprietary
research services. This bundling strategy contrasts with
other possible pricing strategies, such as unbundling
(charging separately for) execution and research or
bundling execution services of average quality with
research provided on a metered basis. "12
good to different consumers at different prices. In a thorough
examination of the issue, Professor Phlips explains, however, that this
definition needs some updating in light of more sophisticated
contemporary commercial practices involving multiproduct firms and
differentiated products. Id. at 6-7. Thus, in his view, price
discrimination is more properly defined as encompassing sale of one or
more varieties of a product or service to two different buyers at different
net prices (Le., prices that differ by more than any cost differential in
producing or providing the different varieties of the product or service).
Id. at 6.
' If using a price discrimination strategy in the institutional
brokerage market, the profit-maximizing full-service firm will choose a
commission or commission scheme where marginal revenue from each
group of investors equals marginal cost. Id. at 4. The multiproduct
character of the full-service firm will affect the optimal strategy for price
discrimination to the extent that certain of the firm's fixed and variable
costs are common costs shared across different lines of business. In
such cases, allocation of the variable costs may affect the imputed
marginal costs for the full-service firm in supplying research to the
institutional brokerage market which, in turn, will affect the optimal
pricing strategy for price discrimination purposes. In addition,
allocation of the fixed cost will require the firm to meet certain revenue
objectives in each market. Given the complexity of the problem, there
may be no stable competitive equilibrium. See SHARKEY, supranote 109,
at 37-42.
112 There are several different types of price discrimination. The fullservice firm's pricing strategy reflects a form of imperfect price
discrimination known as second-degree price discrimination where the
seller seeks to identify discrete groups of purchasers with different
demand characteristics and charge each group a different price. Such
groups frequently are determined by self-selection as in the case of
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The full service firm's approach to pricing and bundling
of its services is indicative of a subtle form of price
discrimination. Customers, regardless of their specific
execution and research needs, pay the same commission.
The firm is in effect making customers with lower cost
trades and significant research needs pay a premium for
execution relative to customers with higher cost trades
and making customers with higher costs trades but
modest research needs pay a premium for research
relative to those with significant research needs. Both
types of customers may potentially pay more in aggregate
than if the individual services of execution and research
(and the different types of research materials) were each
priced separately.1 3 In addition, the full-service firm's high
average commission may enable it to earn a greater profit
from some customers than others, for example on
transactions involving highly liquid securities that entail
little execution risk. 114
airline passengers who pay different rates for first and economy class.
See PHLIPS, supranote 110, at 12-16.
Bundling of services and different products is commonly used to
effect a discriminatory pricing strategy. The full-service firm engages in
bundling of services at two levels: (i) execution services and research are
bundled in that proprietary research is available only to those using the
firm to effect trades and (ii) research materials are bundled by providing
a stream of materials without regard to the particular research needs of
the customer. See id. at 156-57, 165-66, 176-83 (describing block
booking, commodity bundling and non-linear pricing strategies). Cf.
Roy Kenney and Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.
LAW & ECON. 497 (1983): GEORGE STIGLER, A NOTE ON BLOCK BOOKING IN
THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 165 (1968).
113 This bundling enables the full-service firm to derive the maximum
amount of profit from each group of customers and thereby extract
greater consumer surplus from its customers than if the two
components - execution and research - were priced separately.
14
1 of course, imposition of a high average commission also results
from uncertainty regarding what the actual costs of execution will be.
For example, a broker that block positions with a volatile thinly-traded
issue may realize unusually high execution costs. Notwithstanding this
potential, the price of the issue may actually remain fairly stable in a
transaction and the broker will realize a profit since the actual
execution costs will not exceed the high average commission. The use of
high average commissions in such cases merely compensates the fullservice firm for the added execution risk associated with the transaction
and should not be considered price discriminatory. However, as
explained in the text there are other respects in which the high average
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The effectiveness of this price discriminatory strategy
appears to be enhanced by the fact that the research
bundled with the trade execution directly benefits the
investment adviser - an agent - while the commission is
paid by the agent's principal, namely the advisory client.
The bundling of execution and research reduces the
likelihood that advisory clients with low cost trades will
migrate to lower cost brokers that provide execution only
because the adviser - charged with responsibility for
selecting the broker - derives a separate benefit from the
research.
The execution-only broker provides a different, and far
simpler, package of services: average quality executions for
a lower commission. Customers with demanding trades
may fare better with a full-service broker since the average
quality execution for a particular transaction may result in
significant market impact costs that exceed any savings
realized on the lower commission. However, customers
with undemanding trades (for example, a moderate sized
trade in a highly liquid issue) may fare better with the
execution-only broker since execution quality will not be
greatly affected but the client will pay a smaller
cominssion.
The difference between the full-service firm and the
execution-only broker in such circumstances will be
the value of the full-service broker's research and the
execution-only broker's lower commission. In theory, the
full-service firm should be used only if the value of
the research outweighs the higher commission cost.
However, in practice, the full-service firm may be selected
even when this is not the case because of the different
incentives of the investment adviser and the adviser's
clients. The adviser derives a benefit from the research but
does not directly share in the benefit derived from reduced
commission costs. In such circumstances, the adviser may
select the full-service firm over the execution-only broker
even though the advisory client is served better by the lowcommission charged by full-service firms may be regarded as price
discriminatory.
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priced package of services offered by the execution-only
broker.
The third-party broker pursues an intermediate
competitive strategy: it charges a higher average
commission that is comparable to the full-service firm,
provides an average quality execution comparable to the
execution-only firm, but provides specialized research
according to a cost-based formula in conjunction with
executions (that is, converting a fraction of every
commission dollar into soft dollar credits which entitle the
investment adviser to obtain research products of
equivalent value). By virtue of this intermediate strategy,
the third-party broker competes with the full-service firm
not in terms of price but rather in terms of providing a
different mix of research and execution quality. This
strategy enables the third-party broker to compete
effectively against the full service firm in situations where
the execution-only firm encounters difficulties. In effect,
the third-party broker offers average quality execution and
high quality research relative to the full-service firm which
offers high quality executions and average quality
research. The adviser must evaluate the trade-off between
execution quality and research quality rather than (as with
the execution-only broker) between lower commission
costs on the one hand and research and execution quality
benefits on the other.
At first blush, it may seem puzzling that the third-party
broker is able to offer superior research relative to the fullservice firm given that the full-service firm may spend
enormous amounts on research staffs and typically makes
a larger quantity of research available to customers
whereas the third-party broker must go out and purchase
research from third-party research providers and allocates
such research on a cost-based formula. One explanation
may be that the full-service firm provides internallygenerated research which is created not solely for the
firm's investment adviser clients, but for all of the firm's
lines of business. The quality of the research may be
diluted because it must meet the needs of the full-service
firm's different lines of business such as investment
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banking as well as brokerage advice. Of course, the fullservice firm could arrange to obtain research from a thirdparty research provider but in doing so it would lose
whatever cost advantages it gains from generating its own
research to service its different lines of business.
The third-party broker also has the capability of
competing against the execution-only broker through
customer directed brokerage arrangements. In such cases,
the third-party broker offers commission recapture or
expense reimbursement benefits to advisory clients, in lieu
of third-party research to the adviser, to counter the low
average commission of the execution-only broker.
Commission recapture or expense reimbursement
effectively reduces the commission paid by the advisory
client and permits the recapture firm to compete with the
execution-only broker as well.
C. PUBLIC POLICY AND BROKERAGE REBATE ARRANGEMENTS

The economic factors discussed above - the agency
relationship between investment adviser and client and
competition among brokers for order flow from managed
accounts - provide significant insight into the economic
dynamics of brokerage rebate arrangements. Armed with
these insights, we can begin to evaluate the policy issues
associated with rebate arrangements.
1. The Wisdom of Brokerage Rebate Arrangements
An obvious question is whether rebate arrangements of
the sort described above are desirable or harmful from a
public policy perspective. In other words, do such
arrangements work against the interests of the clients of
investment advisers or against the collective interests of
society as a whole? The answer actually implicates two
very different lines of analysis: how should brokerage
services be priced and, if priced using a rebate, who should
get the rebate?
Rebate arrangements in practice reduce the effective
price received by someone selling a product or service
since the seller's earnings are reduced by the amount of
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the rebate. A rebate reflects the producer's perception that
a lower effective price for the rebate recipient is
commercially warranted. The lower price may be
warranted in the producer's mind for any number of
reasons. As one example, transactions with customers
receiving rebates may induce a greater volume of
transactions, thus enabling the seller to reduce costs by
taking advantage of scale economies. Alternatively, the
seller may recognize that there are groups of customers
with different demand characteristics making price
discrimination profitable provided that it is feasible to offer
the two groups of customers different prices. 115 Volume
discounts or preferred-customer discounts are wellestablished commercial practices that serve legitimate
economic purposes from the seller's perspective.
A broker's use of rebates or discounts is consistent with
such economic purposes. A steady flow of orders may
allow brokers to take advantage of economies of scale (or
as we have seen in the case of full-service firms, economies
of scope) and may serve to minimize costs associated with
particular transactions by forging long term client
relationships (for example, by conserving time in arranging
for a transaction or verifying client expectations in
execution of the order). It also permits the broker to
minimize the risk associated with pricing on a transactionby-transaction basis where there are difficulties in
assessing the true costs of execution which may vary from
trade to trade. The costs of negotiating commissions on a
per trade basis might be significant. Brokers in such
situations may have a better idea of the overall costs of
trading on a long-term basis (where specific transactional
15 The key elements of a price discrimination strategy were discussed
in the preceding section. One aspect of the discussion that was not
emphasized concerns the existence of certain conditions which enable a
producer to implement a price discrimination strategy. Phlips identifies
four such conditions: "practical barriers to resale of the producers'
goods, difference in the intensity of the demand of consumers, a
mechanism for sorting consumers, according to intensity of their
demand, and the existence of monopoly power in the weak sense of the
word, namely that the producer does not face a perfectly elastic demand
curve." PHLIPS, supra note 110.
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risk may tend to average out) than on a trade-by-trade
risks
basis. A rebate allows a broker to reflect the reduced
6
associated with a long-term trading relationship.li
The more problematic side of a rebate is from the
purchaser's perspective and may depend on several
factors. A rebate reduces the effective price of a good or
service from the purchaser's perspective only if the
purchaser is the rebate recipient. In a soft dollar
arrangement where the investment adviser rather than the
client is the rebate recipient, the rebate does not reduce
the effective cost of the commission paid by the advisory
client, at least from the client's perspective. Indeed, the
great question posed by rebates is whether they increase
overall agency costs of the client by influencing an
adviser's exercise of judgment on behalf of the client.
The problem presented by a rebate arrangement thus is
not the rebate itself, but rather more accurately, who is
receiving the rebate. After all, rebate arrangements may be
an efficient way of pricing brokerage services from the
broker's perspective. But rebate pricing raises special
concerns where it permits investment advisers to
appropriate the value of the rebate in derogation of the
client's interests. It is necessary to consider whether
rebates in the form of research paid to advisers on the
commissions of clients are necessarily adverse to those
clients' interests.
2. The Incentive Alignment Hypothesis
In an intriguing analysis, Professor D. Bruce Johnsen
argues that soft dollar arrangements may actually promote
efficient agency relationships.1 7 His argument rests on the
contention that traditional agency critiques of soft dollar
arrangements overlook an equally important dimension of
Principal trades as opposed to agency trades entail an added
element of risk for dealers. In principal trades, the dealer trades against
its customer and thus the dealer's mark-up (in contrast to a
commission) and trading spread must reflect the possibility that the
customer with whom the dealer is trading has better information than
the1 dealer.
7
Johnsen, supra note 4, at 91-104.
1 16
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the agency relationship, the potential of investment
managers to shirk on investments in research (that is,
invest less than what clients rationally would spend if
acting on their own behalf).1 8 According to Professor
Johnsen, soft dollar arrangements offer a low-cost
mechanism for advisory clients to overcome this
underinvestment
problem. "19
By subsidizing
an
investment manager's use of research, soft dollar
arrangements compensate for the tendency of manager's
to otherwise underinvest in research, thereby serving to
align more closely the interests of advisory clients and
advisers. Professor Johnsen dubs his theory as the
20
"incentive alignment hypothesis."
The incentive alignment hypothesis, while underscoring
the fact that soft dollar arrangements potentially may
benefit advisory clients indirectly, is not very plausible. In
most soft dollar arrangements, the investment adviser
reserves the right to use such arrangements without
committing to their use. The advisory client seldom, if ever,
actually directs or even encourages use of soft dollar
arrangements: Under the incentive alignment hypothesis,
one should expect the contrary, namely that clients would
either mandate the use of or seek out advisers that employ
soft dollar arrangements.
The incentive alignment hypothesis also rests on the
premise that investment advisers have an incentive to
underinvest systematically in research.' 2' Systematic
"8 Id. at 95-96.
,,90 Id. at 97-98.
12 Id. at 78-79, 91-92.
121 This underinvestment theory is directed at the issue of optimal
investments in research by private actors rather than socially optimal
investments in research. There is a considerable body of economic
theory which suggests from society's perspective, rules that encourage
private investment in securities research do not enhance social welfare,
even if individuals may privately gain from such activity, because it
leads to overinvestment in such activities for society collectively. See
Jack Hirshleifer, The Privateand the Social Value of Information and the
Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 Am. ECON. REV. 561 (1971) (exposition of
the basic problems of overinvestment and underinvestment); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717 (1984) (application to securities
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underinvestment is a particular risk where clients face
significant costs in monitoring the conduct of advisers. If
the costs of monitoring performance were negligible, an
investment adviser would make the appropriate
investments in research, even though costly, since it
would otherwise risk losing advisory clients that are
vigilant. 122
While investors may face significant costs in evaluating a
particular investment adviser's actual expenditures on
research, there are low-cost proxies for monitoring
23
investments in research as discussed above. 1 Indeed the
law). This concept forms the basis for Pozen's critique of section 28(e) in
Pozen, supra note 3.
From society's perspective, securities research entails both
productive and wasteful activities. It is productive to the extent that it
improves asset pricing in capital markets so that new capital is directed
to its most productive use. See generally Marcel Kahan, SecuritiesLaws
and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977
(1992). It is wasteful, however, in that it involves a great deal of largely
duplicative effort to produce securities research on the part of market
participants and investors as they scour markets for underpriced
investment opportunities. Although securities research may result in
private gains among market participants and investors, it does not
necessarily lead to corresponding improvements in the precision of
prices in capital markets. There is a considerable body of opinion that
argues that singling out securities research for subsidization is unwise
social policy. Thus, assuming a social welfare perspective, it might well
be the case that society should adopt rules that discourage
subsidization of private securities research, such as the soft dollar safe
harbor, even if investment advisers are prone to underinvesting in
research from the perspective of their own clients. However, in
analyzing Professor Johnsen's argument, I will focus exclusively on
private incentives and evaluate whether investment advisers are likely
to underinvest in research from the perspective of advisory clients.
122 If monitoring of performance is sufficient to induce optimal levels
of investment in research, subsidization of securities research through
soft dollar arrangements may lead to overinvestment in research from a
purely private investment perspective - that is private investment in
securities research would be greater than what fully informed clients
and investment advisers would choose with costless bargaining and
monitoring. If soft dollar arrangements subsidize research, and advisers
are already equating the marginal costs and marginal benefits of
securities research, permitting soft dollar arrangements would induce
even greater investments in research - research in excess of optimal
levels from a private bargaining perspective.
13 These include mandatory disclosure regarding performance in
some cases, standardized performance measures and third-party rating
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underinvestment theory itself presupposes a discernible
relationship between private investment retums from
securities research and research expenditures. 124 If, as one
would hope, superior research translates into superior
investment performance, then investment performance
should provide a useful proxy for investment in research.
Thus, clients may have the ability to monitor investments
by advisers in research indirectly by monitoring
investment performance of portfolio managers and
accounts. If underinvestment leads to inferior reported
services. See text and notes accompanying notes 105-06. Empirical

studies of mutual fund investor behavior support the view the advisory
clients are sensitive to investment performance, although these studies
also reveal that investor behavior does not follow a simple pattern and is
affected by other factors as well. See, e.g., Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano,
Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. Fin. 1589 (1998) (empirical
analysis suggesting that investors appear to give disproportionately
greater weight to superior past performance in purchasing mutual
funds than to inferior past performance in determining whether to sell
their fund investments and that search cost factors tend to exaggerate
this asymmetrical behavioral response); cf. Lu Zheng, Is money smart?
A study of mutualfund investors'fund selection ability, 54 J. Fin. 901
n. 1 (1999) ("It is well-documented that investors chase past positive
performance and that performance persists on a short term basis."
(collecting citations)) (presenting statistical evidence of short-term
"smart money" effect in which investors move their own funds to
mutual funds that will outperform in the short-run).
Other factors also serve to address the risk of systematic
underinvestment in research. Institutional money mangers will
generally have to compete for business from large pension funds by
demonstrating that they are capable of managing the client's money.
Such a demonstration invariably will involve descriptions of the
qualifications of their portfolio managers and analysts as well as other
resources employed in managing assets. This process frequently
involves evaluation by outside investment management consultants as
well. To some extent, retail advisory clients may be able to free ride on
this research by using funds whose advisers also advise pension funds.
124 If such a relationship did not exist, it would be impossible to
conclude that an adviser was underinvesting in research. In other
words, underinvesting in research necessarily presupposes that
additional investments in research will yield positive private economic
returns. One early critic's advocacy of repeal of section 28(e) and
criticism of soft dollar arrangements in general was premised on the
view that private securities research did not yield positive economic
returns for clients and thus that payment of research out of client funds
should give rise to a presumption of a breach of fiduciary duty, unless
the adviser could actually show that the research economically
benefited the client. See Pozen, supra note 3, at 927, 932-33, 934-35.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol1/iss2/2

66

Franco: Rethinking Brokerage Rebate Arrangements: The Case for Collective

(VOL. 1:143 1999) RETHINKING BROKERAGE REBATE ARRANGEMENTS

209

investment performance, performance disclosure will in
turn discourage shirking on investment expenditures.1 25
Even if there were pervasive underinvestment in
research by investment advisers, it does not follow that
soft dollar arrangements would provide an efficient means
of addressing the problem. Professor Johnsen reaches a
different conclusion by arguing that soft dollar
arrangements subsidize research, encouraging marginal
investments in research which absent the subsidy would
not be undertaken. 126 This argument, however, assumes
that soft dollar rebates are used to purchase additional
units of research or in other words that the soft dollar
subsidy affects an adviser's decision-making at the
margin. Not only need this not be the case, but it actually
seems unlikely in many cases. The reason is that many
advisers frequently will substitute soft dollar credits to
accomplish research expenditures that they would have
are themselves reasonably transparent and have a direct
effect on reported performance. It is therefore reasonable to ask why, if
reported performance is sufficient to deter an adviser from
underinvesting in research, it does not create similar incentives for
advisers to allocate soft dollars toward reduction of the expenses of the
managed account and thereby boost reported performance. One
explanation might be that investors are less sensitive to modest
differences in performance attributable to variations in expenses than
to potentially significant variations in performance based on investment
decisions. See Erik Sirri, Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, Investment
Company Institute, Conference on Economic Developments & Issues in
the Mutual Fund Industry, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 16, 1998) (audiotape
available from the Investment Company Institute) (discussing
(i) observation that investors have difficulty in evaluating the effect of
fund expenses on investment performance because over short periods
the random noise effects on investment performance figures frequently
outweigh the relatively small-order magnitude effects of expenses and
(ii) illustration using reasonable assumptions to show that a 75 basis
point difference in annual expenses between two funds with common
investment objectives would likely not be apparent to an investor that
solely studied net performance figures alone for a decade or two and
that a 10 basis point difference might not be apparent for more than
100 years). In contrast, it appears anecdotally that investors are
extremely sensitive to the effect of expenses on performance in the case
of money market funds and broad-based index funds, funds where
control of expenses rather than investment decisions have a decisive
on relative fund performance.
effect
26
1 See Johnsen, supra note 4, at 95-100.
125 Expenses
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made in any event. In other words, the rebate will not
necessarily subsidize research at the margin and could
just as easily be used to subsidize either fixed costs
associated with research or so-called inframarginal units
of research - research inputs that would have been
purchased in any event. In either case - subsidization of
fixed research costs or of research that would have been
procured in any event - the rebate obtained from soft
dollar arrangements would not actually increase total
investment in research because the rebate would not affect
marginal costs in the range relevant for determining the
level of investment in research. 127
From an agency law perspective, it does not appear that
soft dollar arrangements will necessarily be the most or
even a particularly efficient way to subsidize research as
opposed to other methods. For example, the client could
enter into an explicit agreement with the investment
adviser to subsidize some portion of the adviser's research
directly. 128 Soft dollar arrangements, at best, are a crude
metering
device
for
remedying
any
systematic
underinvestment in research. There is no reason to believe
that the amount of the subsidy, based as it is on a
127 Diagrammatically, Professor Johnsen's subsidization argument
boils down to this: subsidization of research based on commissions
derived from portfolio executions will essentially result in a parallel
downward shift in the adviser's marginal cost function relative to
marginal costs in the absence of a soft dollar arrangement. If costs and
returns are graphed as a function of research inputs (as Professor
Johnsen does in his article, supra note 4, at 113), it might well turn out

that the rebates do not affect marginal costs but only the fixed costs of
research or alternatively the costs of specific research inputs. In the
former case, the rebate would reduce average costs (for example, the
adviser is able to buy a personal computer) but not marginal costs. In
the latter case, the shape of the marginal cost curve may be affected
over a particular range of inputs, but may not affect the marginal cost
function continuously (Le., soft dollar rebates may result in a kinked
marginal cost curve but not necessarily a downward parallel shift in the
curve). As a result, there is no assurance that soft dollar rebates will in
any way effect the adviser's decision making since it may not change the
point where marginal costs equal marginal benefits (Le., the subsidy
will not affect the level of research).
'28 See Pozen, supra note 3, at 964-66 (discussing likelihood
of
alternative compensation arrangements for advisers in event that
section 28(e) were repealed).
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relationship between portfolio executions and research, is
calibrated in an economic sense to bring about optimal
levels of research from the perspective of advisory

clients. 129
Moreover, there is no guarantee under the safe harbor
that rebates resulting from commissions paid by one client
result in research specifically calculated to aid that client.
One client's subsidy may actually contribute to an
investment adviser providing additional research to
another client.1 30 The relationship between portfolio
executions and systematic underinvestment in research
thus appears too attenuated to conclude plausibly that
soft dollar arrangements provide an efficient remedy for
any systematic underinvestment in research.
Only limited empirical evidence is available and
although it weighs against the incentive alignment
hypothesis, it is not decisive. Agency analyses assume that
informed bargaining by a principal and agent will lead to
arrangements that enhance the efficiency of the agency
relationship. Accordingly, if the incentive hypothesis were
correct and soft dollar arrangements promoted efficient
agency relationships, advisory clients would opt for more
efficient rebate arrangements if given a choice. The rise of
customer directed arrangements, however, provides
powerful evidence of the preference of certain advisory
clients for customer directed rebate arrangements over
129 Professor Johnsen argues that the fixed relationship between the
rebate and commissions is likely to curb excessive research since the
inducement is tied to portfolio executions. See Johnsen, supra note 4,
at 98-99. This fixed relationship exists, however, only in the case of
third-party arrangements. Moreover, while undoubtedly portfolio
turnover constrains the size of the subsidy received by the adviser, its
effect at the margin is likely to be entirely fortuitous.
130 The adviser has no obligation to account for the benefits resulting
from one account as long as the benefit is reasonable in relation to the
value derived by all accounts under management. In other words, soft
dollar rebates earned from trading in one account can and frequently
are used to subsidize research benefits to other accounts. The use of
soft dollar arrangements to effect cross-subsidies among accounts casts
further doubt on their use as a means to redress underinvestment
concerns.
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soft dollar arrangements.13 ' In other words, at least some
advisory clients prefer to capture brokerage commission
rebates directly (either in hard cash or in the form of
expense reimbursement) in lieu of subsidizing investment
adviser research through soft dollar arrangements
negotiated by the adviser.
This fact is particularly striking since the use of
customer directed brokerage arrangements tends to be
concentrated among a limited segment of advisory clients:
clients who possess unusual bargaining power such as
pension plans. The bargaining power derives both from the
inherent attractiveness of clients with large asset bases
and from the ability of such clients to absorb the
transaction costs of independently negotiating such
arrangements.' 32 The prevalence of customer directed
brokerage arrangements to facilitate commission or
expense recapture in the private pension segment of the
investment management industry stands in contrast to
the prevalence of soft dollar arrangements in the
predominantly retail segment of the industry (mutual
funds and management of non-institutional client
accounts). That larger institutional clients negotiate rebate
arrangements that are fundamentally different from the
rebate arrangements that prevail in the retail segment of
the industry suggests that the absence of bargaining
power
and
choice,
rather
than
systematic
underinvestment in research, is the driving factor in many
soft dollar arrangements.
The fact that small investment advisers which service
retail accounts use soft dollar arrangements more
extensively than advisers that service institutional
accounts is further evidence against the incentive
131 Professor Johnsen recognizes the potential significance of advisory
client preference for commission recapture arrangements. See
Johnsen, supra note 4, at 106. He suggests that differences in
utilization of soft dollars between managers of defined benefit and
defined contribution plans might provide a test of the incentive
alignment hypothesis.
132 The larger asset-base of certain institutional clients enables'
those
clients to take advantage of economies of scale and spread the costs
associated with negotiation and monitoring.
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alignment hypothesis. While not necessarily inconsistent
with the incentive alignment hypothesis, these results fit
more naturally with the view that, absent the ability to
monitor adviser conduct closely, soft dollar arrangements
are more likely to influence an adviser's exercise of
discretion in ways that do not advance the interests of
clients. Once again, client bargaining power and
systematic
than
rather
costs,
transaction
underinvestment in research, seem to be more important
in explaining the different rates of utilization of soft dollar
33
arrangements. 1
There is, however, one piece of evidence that provides
support for the basic thrust of the incentive alignment
hypothesis namely that soft dollar arrangements have
spurred new forms and greater use of more diversified
research products. The proliferation of third-party
research vendors since introduction of the soft dollar safe
34
harbor in 1975 has been nothing short of staggering.1
Before deregulation of commissions, it is probably fair to
say that full-service firms dominated the supply of
research products to the investment management
industry and in many ways effectively dictated the form of
research available. While full-service firms continue to be a
major source of research to the investment management
industry, third-party vendors are now a significant
alternative source of research not only in terms of amount
but also in terms of variety.
3. Other Theories
The incentive alignment hypothesis reflects the view that
advisory clients must subsidize research by investment
advisers in order to ensure adequate levels of investment
research. As such it is merely one of several possible
For variation in use of soft dollar arrangements by investment
adviser size, see supra note 88. Of course, it is possible to reconcile
these results with the incentive alignment hypothesis by postulating
that small adviser cost functions are far more sensitive to changes in
the marginal costs of research and that expected marginal returns from
research for small advisers is greater than for larger firms and that
133

these differences account for the huge disparities in utilization rates.
134 See supranote 9 1.
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theories that seek to justify rebate, and implicitly
bundling, arrangements. At least three other objectives
have been offered to justify rebate or bundling
arrangements: (i) facilitating joint production of brokerage
and research services and high quality brokerage
execution by full-service firms; (ii) promoting greater
competition among full-service and third-party firms; and
(iii) protecting small investment advisers.
Full-service firms, by bundling execution services and
research, seek to exploit economies of scope from their
different lines of business.135 The bundled services, as
noted, embody an implicit rebate arrangement. Section
28(e) makes regulatory allowance for such implicit rebate
arrangements, thereby enabling the firm to exploit
strengths and efficiencies in research derived from its
other lines of business. In effect, the regulatory policy
behind section 28(e) permits the full-service firm to spread
the cost of its research operations among its different lines
of business.
Brokerage rebate arrangements, by permitting fullservice firms to better compete for order flow, also tend to
promote continued supply of high quality execution
services to the marketplace. It may be that services such
as block positioning that are required to deliver the highest
quality executions would become prohibitively expensive
and would disappear if full-service firms were required to
compete with execution-only brokers on the basis of
comnissions alone. Indeed, full-service firms in the earlier
part of the decade strenuously challenged third-party soft
dollar arrangements on grounds that such arrangements
impaired the ability of full-service firms to use order flow
from low cost executions to cross-subsidize high quality
execution services (block positioning). 136
A second justification for bundling relates to the ability
of third-party brokers to compete with full-service firms. A
-5 See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
See Silfen Testimony, supra note 71, at 713-15; Statement of Paul
G. Haaga, Jr., 1993 House Soft Dollar Oversight Hearings, supra note
64, at 740,766-68 ("Haaga Statement").
136
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frequent refrain from critics of brokerage rebate
arrangements is a proposal to compel unbundling of
execution

and

research

services. 137

Compulsory

unbundling would have dramatic implications for
competition involving full-service and third-party brokers
depending on how the proposal is actually framed. One
proposal would be for unbundling by all firms, full-service
and third-party firms, thus requiring full-service and
third-party firms to price their research services separately
from execution services. Such an unbundling proposal, of
course, is essentially another way of advocating repeal of
section 28(e). Indeed, compulsory unbundling would not
only eliminate the protection afforded by the safe harbor,
but would also prohibit bundling altogether.
Another form of compulsory unbundling proposal - and
what is typically meant when compulsory unbundling is
discussed is directed specifically at third-party
arrangements. Under the proposal, third-party providers
would be required to separate the pricing of execution and
research. This would effectively eliminate safe harbor
protection for third-party arrangements. The third-party
broker is clearly capable of pricing the services separately
since it provides execution services internally and only
procures externally research services for distribution to
clients. However, requiring compulsory unbundling of
execution and research by third-party firms would
adversely affect the ability of third-party firms to compete
with full-service firms since advisers only could obtain soft
dollar benefits from the latter and would be required to
purchase third-party research from their own, rather than
client, funds.
It is important to distinguish between the policy effects
of permitting bundling and prohibiting bundling.
Permitting bundling allows full-service firms to take
37

See 1999 SEC ROUNDTABLE, supra note 65, at 168 (SEC official
posing question regarding desirability of SEC initiatives to encourage
unbundling); Keith P. Ambachtsheer, The Soft Dollar Question: What is
the Answer, 49 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 8 (Jan.-Feb. 1993) (urging consideration
of compulsory unbundling as means of eliminating efficiencies
introduced by brokerage rebate arrangements).
1
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advantage of economies of scope and to price their services
in a way that they perceive to be advantageous. Allowing
other firms, such as third-party firms, to bundle services
enables such firms to compete more effectively with fullservice firms. Prohibiting bundling only by third-party
firms, in contrast, blocks competition and has the effect of
8
protecting full-service firms. 13
A final form of subsidization is reflected in the view that
permissive attitudes toward soft dollars enable small
investment advisers to compete with large advisers.
Although permissive in character, such a rationale is
problematic too because it fails to explain what advantages
advisory clients obtain from policies which promote the
ability of small advisers to compete with larger advisers. If
small advisers promote more competitive markets, there of
course would be an advantage. But adopting policies solely
for the sake of enabling a competitor to survive, without
any corresponding efficiency justification, seems dubious.
If small advisers are in fact more dependent on soft dollar
arrangements and, as a result, are more susceptible to
influence in their brokerage allocation decisions, this
suggests a cause for concern rather than a rationale that
supports permissive attitudes toward soft dollar
arrangements.
138 From a policy perspective, the issue raised by such limited
compulsory unbundling proposals is whether advisory clients are better
off if (i) the third-party and full-service firms compete with one another
in providing soft dollar rebate arrangements (thereby bringing about a
greater range of choice in research products and greater competition for
full-service firms) or (ii) only full-service firms are permitted to offer soft
dollar arrangements (thereby potentially reducing use of soft dollar
arrangements and sharpening price competition between full-service
and other brokers).
Initiatives other than compulsory unbundling proposals also may
have differing effects for full-service and third-party firms. For example,
several years ago as part of the 1993 Soft Dollar Oversight Hearing, fullservice firms urged significantly enhanced disclosure in connection
with soft dollar arrangements. See Silfen Testimony, supra note 71, at
719-722. Many believed that the purpose of the proposal was to
disadvantage third-party firms competitively relative to full-service

firms.
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4. Competition and Rebates
The use of brokerage rebate arrangements has also
shaped competition in the securities industry in terms of
competition among investment advisers, among brokers
and among providers of research and ancillary brokerage
services. Competition has been affected in three areas:
(i) competition with respect to commission rates;
and
(ii) competition among investment advisers;
(iii) competition on rebate arrangements.
Brokerage rebate arrangements directly affect the way in
which brokers compete with one another on the basis of
commissions. An oft-repeated criticism of soft dollar
arrangements is that such rebates discourage direct
competition on the basis of commission rates. In contrast,
there appears to be vigorous competition in terms of soft
dollar and directed rebate arrangements (that is, the
amount of rebate provided for a given level of commission
139
and usually referred to as the conversion ratio).
Rebate competition undoubtedly substitutes in some
respects for vigorous competition on commission rates.
That competition as to rebates may substitute for
competition on commission rates is not to say, however,
that rebate competition is as desirable in the eyes of
advisory clients as commission competition. Quite clearly,
it depends on whether advisory clients place a greater
value on reduced commissions or enhanced soft dollar
rebates (including indirect benefits generated by such
rebates) and whether competition in one area is likely to be
more vigorous than in another. The overriding issue is
whether fully-informed advisory clients, if given a choice,
would opt for a regime of soft dollar and directed brokerage
139 For the argument that soft dollar arrangements discourage price
competition, see supra note 99 and infra note 160 showing relative
stability in institutional brokerage commission rates at full-service
firms over the last decade and simultaneous decline in retail
commission rates to rates roughly comparable to those for institutional
investors. Concerning competition in terms of soft dollar and directed
rebate arrangements, see 1997 ASIR SOFT DOLLAR PAPER, supra note
4, at 9.
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rebate arrangements (and the benefits and detriments that
0
may entail) rather than reduced commission rates. 14
The agency problem inherent in the typical rebate
context lends credence to the concern that soft dollar
competition is an imperfect substitute for commission rate
competition. The investment adviser may push more
aggressively for greater soft dollar benefits (which directly
benefit the adviser) by pursuing a less aggressive posture
on commission rates (which shifts to the advisory client
the costs of the rebate).14 ' Such a dynamic would in fact
lead to the type of market behavior observed - fairly stable
commission rates and intensive negotiation regarding soft
dollar benefits.
The client may be especially vulnerable to less than
diligent bargaining by the investment adviser with respect
to commission rates because of the client's limited ability
to monitor the trade-offs relating to the soft dollar
arrangement. 142 As the rebate level becomes larger and
140The former
might well be the case if Professor Johnsen's
hypothesis is right and soft dollar arrangements lead to a more efficient
agency relationship between the adviser and the advisory client. If soft
dollar competition is a perfect substitute for commission competition,
one would expect that the economic costs of the advisory relation for
clients would be roughly the same in return for the same investment
performance.
14 That is not to say of course that the adviser is entirely indifferent
to
commission rates. Advisers will be sensitive to commission rates to the
extent that clients are able to monitor and evaluate the effects of soft
dollars on commission costs. As discussed in Section IV.A., however,
the underlying premise of any agency theory of soft dollar arrangements
presupposes that clients are not unusually sensitive to the effect of soft
dollar arrangements on reported expenses.
142The client does not even observe directly the commissions paid
(although they are reflected in investment performance), and will
generally be unaware of the underlying soft dollar conversion ratio or
the amount of the soft dollar benefit obtained by the adviser. In other
words, the soft dollar arrangement lacks transparency from the client's
perspective. Thus, even if it appears the commission paid corresponds
to a prevailing market rate, the commission may reflect radically
different underlying soft dollar rebate levels. Moreover, evaluating
investment performance on a short-term or intermediate-term basis
may be difficult due to random market factors that affect investment
performance. See Mark Hulbert, "Why Top Returns Are Not in the
Stars," N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 1999, at 36 (Money and Business Section)
(discussing predictive deficiencies of rankings prepared by rating
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larger as a percentage of the commission, approaching as
noted above nearly 50% of the commission rate, rebates
are more likely to appear to be affecting the terms of
competition with the adviser and broker merely allocating
among themselves the benefits of artificially high
commissions at the clients' expense.
Another issue is the effect of rebate arrangements on
competition among investment advisers, especially in
terms of the advisory fees paid by clients. One possibility is
that, to the extent that advisers are receiving excess
compensation in the form of soft dollar rebates due to
excessive commissions, the compensation premium
enjoyed by advisers (or as economists say, economic rents)
will be eroded by other forms of competition that arise as
advisers compete to earn the premium. For example,
advisers may reduce their investment advisory fees. 143 This

result, however, presupposes that the pricing of
investment advisory fees is competitive, that is, that
clients are price sensitive and advisory fees reflect
significant price elasticity. 144
services) 'The problem with the popular rating systems is that they do a
poor job of distinguishing between adviser skill and mere luck". Id. In
addition, the adviser may use discretion to allocate research benefits in
a way that tends to mask their impact - for example, allocating a
priority to research resources for underperforming funds.
higher
143
See Johnsen, supra note 4, at 91; 1999 SEC ROUNDTABLE, supra
note 65, at 212 (fund director noting that soft dollar benefits obtained
by adviser are evaluated in connection with reviewing the advisory fee).
But see, Livingston & O'Neal, supra note 71 (presenting empirical
results casting doubt on whether higher soft dollar commissions
substitute for lower expense ratios in the form of reduced management
fees) (the study does not control for market impact costs).
investment advisory fees may be affected by competitive
'While
forces, there are reasons to doubt whether broad segments of the
investment management market could be described as perfectly price
competitive with respect to fees. These reasons include: (i) differentiated
products that are difficult to compare except over an extended time
horizon; (ii) the existence of widely different investment advisory fees
charged by different providers for products that seem similar and use of
different investment advisory fee schedules by the same provider for
different clients: (iii) industry practices involving long-term affiliated
advisory relationships (as in the case of fund families with an affiliated
adviser); and (iv) well-established fiduciary principles that defer to the
discretion of investment company boards in considering factors other
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If, on the other hand, it appears that the market for
investment management services does not exhibit the
characteristics of a perfectly competitive market and
investment advisers obtain excessive benefits from soft
dollar arrangements, the excess costs to a client incurred
in connection with the rebate arrangement will not be
offset by diminished investment advisory fees. Moreover,
even if rebate arrangements encourage advisers to reduce
their advisory fees to offset any compensation premium
earned, it does not follow that advisory clients will be
indifferent to payment of excessive commissions. The
reason is that reductions in advisory fees to compensate
for above-normal advisory profits earned from soft dollar
economic
the same
will not generate
benefits
portfolio
as
lower
consequences for advisory clients
expenses. In sum, there is no reason to believe that
competitive forces with respect to investment advisory fees
will return excessive benefits earned on client portfolio
transactions to clients in a way that will leave advisory
clients as well-off as reduced fees.
Finally, there is an issue of competition in structuring
rebate arrangements, that is the way brokers package
their services to investment advisers and their clients.
There is little direct evidence bearing on advisory clients'
preferences as between soft dollar and directed brokerage
arrangements and that fact is of potential concern since an
overriding issue should be what would clients choose if
they were fully informed and bargaining costs were
145
minimal.
than investment advisory fees in approving an investment advisory
contract.
One area where there does appear to be significant price competition
is in the area of money market funds and broad-market index funds,
where the product and services are largely homogenous. Investment
advisory fees and expenses are the principal distinguishing factor
among competing funds. But the very reasons that make money market
and index funds so competitive on fees and expenses go a long way to
explaining why fees associated with other investment accounts may be
less price competitive.
145 See Johnsen, supra note 4, at 91 & n. 78.
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Under the current regulatory scheme, the only
significant competition to soft dollar rebate arrangements
is from directed brokerage arrangements. One possible
explanation for such limited rebate competition, of course,
is that soft dollar arrangements are perceived as more
attractive in the marketplace than other potential
arrangements. In other words, soft dollar arrangements
have vanquished competing alternatives. However, there is
another explanation for the pervasiveness of soft dollar
arrangements. Soft dollar arrangements survive because
of legal and practical obstacles that effectively block
competing rebate arrangements that might be more
attractive to investors.
Greater competition with respect to rebate alternatives
could give clients more influence over the rebate
arrangements employed by investment advisers. At the
very least, a greater range of alternatives would provide a
more meaningful opportunity for clients to reveal their
preferences as to such arrangements. Offering clients a
greater range of choices regarding rebate arrangements
effectively accomplishes the same objective as enhancing
bargaining power: clients in effect will bargain by voting
with their feet.
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V. THE UNSATISFACTORY STATE OF THE SOFT
DOLLAR SAFE HARBOR
The core of section 28(e) is its safe harbor. Section
28(e)(1) establishes an exception to agency and fiduciary
law principles as applied to investment advisers: it permits
an adviser while acting as agent for a client to retain
rebates in the form of research or brokerage services
derived from commissions paid by the client, provided the
commissions paid by the client are not unreasonably
excessive. Not surprisingly, the safe harbor's conditions as
construed by the SEC effectively dictate the way in which
most soft dollar arrangements are currently structured.
The safe harbor consists principally of two distinct
conditions, each of which must be satisfied: (i) an adviser
is permitted to retain a rebate only if the rebate consists of
research and brokerage services (the "benefit retention"
principle) and (ii) the adviser may have its client pay higher
commissions in connection with such soft dollar
arrangements only if the excess commission is reasonable
under the circumstances (the "reasonableness" principle).
Although the fundamental guideposts of the safe harbor
are fixed by statute, the SEC performs an integral role in
construing the bounds of the safe harbor. The SEC's
interpretive approach has been shaped largely by
pragmatic concerns rather than policy. Because the safe
harbor was the product of a legislative compromise to
secure passage of the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments,
the SEC generally has construed the provision narrowly, 4
giving literal effect to the language of the compromise,
without necessarily rationalizing its contours in terms of a
consistent policy. The staffs approach undoubtedly
reflects uneasiness in permitting conduct that would
otherwise be viewed as violative of basic agency and
fiduciary law principles, but also is tempered by sensitivity
See, e.g., Investment Information Investigative Report, supra note
69, at 83,010 ("the Commission believes that the section should be
construed in light of its limited purposes."); see also DOL (Charles
Lerner), SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 79,499, at 77,535 (July 25, 1990).
146
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to issues of commercial and administrative feasibility. The
SEC, however, has been less successful in articulating
how overarching policy objectives, such as efficiency,
fairness or the interests of advisory clients, are served by
its interpretive positions.
It is appropriate to question whether the safe harbor as
construed embodies a coherent rebate policy. This section
discusses the principal features of the safe harbor and
why, despite the scrupulous efforts of regulators to apply it
in a consistent fashion, the safe harbor has failed to
produce a regime of efficient rebate arrangements.
A. THE REASONABLENESS PRINCIPLE AND THE PAYING UP
PARADOX
Soft dollar arrangements, absent the safe harbor's
reasonableness principle, would arguably violate the
investment adviser's best execution obligations if an
adviser caused its client to pay a higher commission to
execute a transaction in connection with a soft dollar
arrangement than the advisory client would have paid
absent the arrangement. 47 Section 28(e)(1), however,
expressly authorizes the adviser to pay a higher
commission with its client's funds to obtain research and
brokerage services, but imposes constraints on how much
of a commission the adviser can cause its client to pay. The
excess amount paid relative to "the amount of commission
another ... broker ... would have charged for effecting [the]
transaction" may not exceed the reasonable value of the
research and brokerage services obtained by accounts
under the adviser's management.148 When an adviser
147See discussion in Section II.B. regarding the specific legal
violations.
148Specifically, section 28(e)(1) provides: an adviser may pay a
commission
in excess of the amount of the commission another ...

broker...

would have charged... [if the adviser] ... determineIs] in good faith
that such amount of commission was reasonable in relation to the
value of the brokerage and research services provided.., viewed in
terms of either that particular transaction or his overall
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causes its client to pay a higher commission, the adviser is
commonly described as "paying up."
In theory, the reasonableness standard would appear
easy to apply. Suppose an investment adviser uses a
broker that charges a commission of $.06 per share and
directs to the broker transactions involving approximately
100,000 shares. Another broker provides brokerage
services of comparable quality on an execution-only basis
and charges $.03 a share. Under the reasonableness
standard of section 28(e), the adviser must receive
research that provides at least $3,000 worth of value to the
managed accounts.
This illustration suggests that the reasonableness
standard is a quantifiable standard that lends itself to
routine and mechanical application. The standard,
however, is difficult for regulators to enforce strictly since
it presupposes knowledge of the amount by which the
investment adviser is paying up, or equivalently,
knowledge of a benchmark commission rate, namely the
commission another broker would have charged for
executing the transaction on terms affording the client
comparable execution quality. For example, in the
illustration above, we assumed that the benchmark
commission rate was $.03. In practice, however,
knowledge of the benchmark commission is at best
difficult to discern.
Presumably when Congress referred to the amount of
commission another broker would have charged for
effecting the transaction, it intended that the reference
point for a benchmark commission rate be the lowest
available
commission
absent
the
soft
dollar
responsibilities with respect to the accounts as to which he
exercises investment discretion.
15 U.S.C. § 78 bb(e)(1) (1999).
The standard, tempered as it is by concepts such as "good faith" and
"reasonable relation," is generally permissive. Although permitted to
pay a higher commission, the adviser is not permitted to compromise
best execution in other respects. See 1986 SEC Soft Dollar Release,
supra note 26, at 16011.
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arrangement. 14 9 Investment advisers will seldom be able to
canvass the market for the lowest commission rate each
time they seek to execute a trade on behalf of a client and
thus as a practical matter any determination regarding the
appropriate benchmark rate must be based on a
discernible pattern regarding available commission
rates. 150 In addition, as discussed in a preceding section,
execution quality may vary as a function of commission
rates, that is, a broker who provides lower quality
executions is more likely to charge lower commissions.
What constitutes an execution of comparable quality is
notoriously difficult to define, but assuming that problem
is overcome, some adjustment should be made to the
benchmark commission to reflect quality differences. In
theory, then, the benchmark commission should be the
lowest known commission rate for an execution of
comparable quality.
49

The SEC has correctly insisted that paying up should be evaluated
based on the established rates of the low-cost, rather than the averagecost, provider for executions of similar quality. See 1998 SEC STAFF
SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. There is reason to be
somewhat skeptical whether such determinations are in fact being
made. For example, one representative from a full-service firm opined at
an SEC roundtable that the customers to whom the firm provided thirdparty research were not paying up because the customers paid no more
than the standard commission charged by the full-service firm to other
institutional clients who received free research. See 1999 SEC
ROUNDTABLE, supra note 65, at 174. Obviously comparing the thirdparty brokerage commission rate to the full-service commission
brokerage rate is appropriate only if the full-service commission
brokerage rate is the lowest available commission rate to obtain an
execution of comparable quality.
15 The SEC has long recognized that best execution need not be
determined on an order-by-order basis, but rather may be determined
based on a periodic review of execution quality. See 1986 Soft Dollar
Release, supra note 26 at 16011. This fact merely underscores the
illusory quality of the reasonableness standard since it appears to have
presupposed a benchmark rate determined on an order-by-order basis.
There are other potential pitfalls faced by regulators in establishing a
benchmark rate. For example, quoted commission rates may differ from
commission rates that could be obtained through aggressive
negotiation. But unless an adviser is inclined to use the broker, such
negotiation will never take place.
1
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The reasonableness standard modifies conventional
notions of best execution in two respects. Section 28(e)
treats research provided to investment managers as a
factor that money managers may consider in discharging
their best execution obligations.151 This approach,
however, appears to be a product of industry custom
rather than any necessary link between research and
execution (that is, at most research is ancillary to
execution services, but the two nevertheless remain
separable).15 2 If brokerage execution and research are
viewed as independent, then the safe harbor permits the
adverse
certain
balance
to
adviser
investment
consequences to overall execution quality against receipt
of research benefits. For example, in the illustration above,
the adviser is able to cause its client to incur an extra
$3,000 in execution costs because the execution costs
generate $3,000 in research benefits to the adviser.
The paying up standard also departs from best
execution principles in a less obvious way. It does not
require strict tracing of benefits to the account that bears
3 Instead, by permitting the
the commission costs. 15
approach is echoed in the SEC's interpretive
best execution. As applied to an investment
regarding
positions
adviser's decision in directing brokerage for clients, the SEC has
indicated that best execution also encompasses "the value of research
provided... and the [broker's] responsiveness to the money manager."
1986 SEC Soft Dollar Release, supranote 26, at 16011.
152 See supra note 45.
153 Section 28(e)(1) expressly authorizes the adviser when paying more
than the lowest available commission to consider the value of brokerage
and research services "in terms of either that particular transaction or
his overall responsibilities with respect to the accounts as to which he
exercises investment discretion." Abandonment of strict tracing is a
practical necessity in order to have a workable standard. Trade-bytrade accounting would be impossible since research benefits may be
shared by more than one account and the benefit to any particular
account may not be quantifiable. The safe harbor, however, is
unusually broad in its endorsement of the principle since in theory the
standard does not require a showing of any benefit to a particular
account, even if that account is the sole source of commissions for the
soft dollars used to purchase the research. More sophisticated fund
managers are, of course, free to impose stricter limits on use of
brokerage to obtain research. See 1999 SEC ROUNDTABLE, supranote
65, at 163 (noting that in the rare instances in which officials from
151This statutory
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investment adviser to weigh benefits to all accounts under
management, the safe harbor implicitly endorses use of
commissions from one account to cross-subsidize other
accounts.15 Returning to the illustration above, the
100,000 shares in transactions may have come equally
from two accounts, A and B. The research, however, may
only benefit Account A. Thus, although Account B has
incurred $1,500 in excess execution costs, the benefit
flows only to the adviser and Account A.
From a policy perspective, the safe harbor's
reasonableness standard is flawed. The safe harbor
assumes that a valid benchmark rate can be ascertained.
In many cases, however, the benchmark figure may
overstate the commission that would have been charged
by another broker to execute the transaction, thereby
understating the actual amount paid up in connection
with the soft dollar arrangement. First, collective use of
soft dollar arrangements may in fact lead to inflated
industry-wide commission rates. If the prevalence of soft
dollar arrangements leads to inflated industry-wide
benchmark commission rates, 55 it is clear that the
operational standard designed to measure the amount of
paying up will actually underestimate the collective56effect
of soft dollar arrangements on client commissions. 1
Second, the reasonableness standard's benchmark
requires a comparison of the soft dollar commission to
adviser authorize sub-adviser to select broker providing third-party
research, it requires that research services benefit particular fund).
154 See 1998 SEC STAFF SoFT DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
'55 Benchmark commission rates of brokers may be artificially inflated
to the extent that an adviser is able to use an inappropriate benchmark.
For example, an adviser could assert that brokers with lower
commission rates would not offer comparable execution quality.
Moreover, to the extent that advisers are successful in preventing
execution-only brokers from competing for brokerage business from
managed accounts, execution-only brokers are discouraged from
competing aggressively on the basis of price.
'5 In such circumstances, the true economic cost of paying up is as
follows: the excess amount paid over the amount another broker would
charge plus the amount by which the other broker's charge is inflated
over what would be charged in the absence of soft dollars altogether.
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what the investment adviser would pay in the absence of a
soft dollar arrangement. But the soft dollar arrangement
typically involves an informal commitment by the adviser
to direct trades in a given volume (for example, $100,000
in commissions). The informal commitment thus affords a
separate benefit to the broker which may warrant a lower
commission. The correct comparison should not be to the
commission that would be paid in the absence of the soft
dollar arrangement but rather to the commission that
would be paid if the adviser were willing to make a similar
informal commitment without receipt of any soft dollar

rebate. 157
These defects are manifest in the frequently made
assertion that no paying up in the statutory sense occurs
in connection with many soft dollar arrangements, even
though the broker provides a soft dollar rebate to the
investment adviser.15 8 This result is paradoxical from an
economic perspective unless the benchmark commission
rate is inflated or involves comparison to an inappropriate
benchmark commission rate. The broker's willingness to
offer a rebate, whether explicit or implicit, signals that the
commission rate if charged for execution alone would
generate surplus profits - that is the broker would earn
above-normal profits. Obviously no broker would willingly
pay a rebate on commissions that yielded only a
157This as a rule is not done since advisers generally do not negotiate
cash rebate arrangements. However, some idea of the difference
between the lowest available rate and the lowest effective rate in a cash
rebate arrangement can be gleaned from commission recapture
arrangements. The effective commission cost to the client in a recapture
arrangement (the commission less the recaptured amount) may be less
than the lowest available commission rate and if so, then, in theory at
least, that effective rate rather than the lowest available commission
rate should be employed to determine whether other commissions

offering similar execution quality involve paying up.
5 See, e.g., In the Matter of Kingsley, Jennison, McNulty & Morse,
Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 1396, 55 SEC Dkt. 2064 (Dec. 23, 1993)
(holding that Investment Advisers Act was violated notwithstanding
finding that adviser had not caused client to "pay up"); 1999 SEC
ROUNDTABLE, supra note 65, at 164. (Vanguard Fund official noted
that some sub-advisers for Vanguard managed funds do enter into soft
dollar arrangements, but asserting that arrangements do not involve
paying up).
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competitive return (since payment of the rebate reduces
the effective commission to an amount less than the
competitive return). If, however, a broker charges a
commission that yields surplus profits (assuming the
broker provided trade execution and no more), the broker
will offer rebates willingly to induce more business at that
commission rate to garner greater surplus profits. 159
The reasonableness standard thus merely assures that
the excess portion of any commission (as measured
against an established benchmark commission rate) does
not exceed the value of benefits conferred. It does not
foster competition or implement policies that encourage
reduced commissions or added value to the advisory
client. It sets a floor for conduct and not much more. That
floor may be extremely liberal from the perspective of
advisers where there is no rigorous check on the
benchmark commission rate.
Although there is little question that the deregulation of
commission rates brought about a more competitive
commission rate structure, the SEC generally has been
content to rely on market forces to keep commission rates
low.160 Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the SEC has
seldom challenged the reasonableness of commission
rates in connection with research soft dollar
arrangements. While conduct regulation as practiced by
the SEC is effective in attacking clearly abusive situations,
it seems less well-suited as a strategy for promoting
enhanced competition among brokers.
159 See Haaga Statement, supranote 136, at 760-63 ("Brokerage firms
can be expected to understand their cost structures and to act
rationally and in what they perceive to be their economic best
interests.").
160 See Schwartz Statement, supra note 64, at 636 (noting decline
from 11.5 cents to 6.2 cents in commission rates from shortly after
deregulation in 1977 to early 1993). Recently, however, the SEC staff
indicated that it intends to probe more deeply into the relatively high
brokerage commissions of advisers, and especially into whether adviser
order routing decisions serve to minimize client costs and provide
clients with best execution. See supra note 99.
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B. THE BENEFIT RETENTION PRINCIPLE
The other significant condition imposed by the section
28(e) safe harbor is that it permits investment advisers to
retain research and brokerage service rebates. Whether a
particular arrangement comes within the safe harbor
turns in large measure on the meaning of research and
brokerage services; an arrangement that involves rebates
for services other than research or brokerage services is
not eligible for safe harbor treatment. SEC positions
regarding permissible products and services under the
safe harbor illustrate the practical problems for regulators
in trying to oversee rebate arrangements and the tension
between rebate arrangements that are permissible and
rebate arrangements that are efficient.
Shortly after section 28(e) was enacted, the SEC issued
its first of two interpretive statements regarding the safe
harbor. The first statement embraced an unusually
narrow definition of research: research for purposes of
section 28(e) did not include so-called generic research
services - "readily and customarily available and offered
to the general public on a commercial basis" - such as
subscriptions to financial newspapers of general
circulation. 1 1 In the SEC's view generic research, in
contrast to specialized research, was not the type of
research Congress had intended to protect in permitting
receipt of research services.16 2
161See Interpretations of Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Use of Commission Payments by Fiduciaries, Exchange Act
Release No. 12,251, 11975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,407, at 86,081 (Mar. 24, 1976) (hereinafter 1976 SEC Soft
Dollar Release) (narrowly defining research).
162 The SEC relied on language in the Conference Report (supranote
63) that at best is ambiguous to infer that Congress had not intended to
extend the safe harbor to arrangements involving generic research. The
report language, however, did not expressly distinguish between generic
and specialized research. ("[There appear to have been an increasing
number of arrangements under which fiduciaries have been procuring,
among other things, newspapers, magazines and periodicals, directo-

ries, computer facilities and software .

.

. The Commission does not

believe that Section 28(e) would apply to arrangements of this type." Id
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The SEC's interpretive approach evidenced its
predilection for strict construction of the safe harbor. The
safe harbor should be used, under this view, to address
the specific types of research concerns that had been
identified at the time of the safe harbor's enactment. It
should not be used to shelter soft dollar arrangements
designed merely to reimburse an investment adviser for
expenses it likely would have incurred in the ordinary
course of its business.
The SEC recognized in time, however, that this narrow
original interpretation was untenable. Such a restrictive
approach could not be reconciled with the safe harbor's
statutory language since the safe harbor does 3not
distinguish between generic and specialized research. 16 In
addition, industry lacked reliable means of distinguishing
between generic and specialized research and as a result
the staff was inundated with requests for interpretive

guidance.

16

Perhaps more importantly, distinguishing between
generic and specialized research does not advance any
meaningful policy goals, other than construing the safe
harbor restrictively. Although there is some intuitive
appeal to the assumption that an investment adviser is
more likely to obtain something in the case of specialized
research that it would not have purchased but for the
brokerage arrangement, this generalization is not a
reliable foundation for policy. There is no reason to believe
that generic research is any more or less beneficial for
clients than specialized forms of research, since the
adviser has an incentive to be cost-effective in purchasing
research, regardless of whether it is generic or specialized.
In short, it is difficult to see how the interests of investors
or clients of investment advisers would be advanced by a
policy that distinguished between rebates involving
specialized as opposed to generic research.
163 See
IC Id4

1986 SEC Soft Dollar Release, supra note 26, at 16005.
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To its credit, the SEC adopted a new, more workable
standard: research is whatever "provides lawful and
appropriate assistance to the money manager in the
performance
of
his
investment
decision-making
responsibility." 165 The standard is noteworthy because,
unlike the discarded distinction between generic and
specialized research, it cedes a larger measure of
discretion to
soft dollar participants
to devise
advantageous arrangements, subject to the minimum
requirements of the safe harbor. Such an approach is
more hospitable to the view that regulatory objectives may
best be served in some instances by giving participants
greater latitude in establishing the terms of rebate
arrangements.
The SEC approach to treatment of mixed-use products
further illustrates the virtues of a flexible approach.
Mixed-use products are those that might serve both a
research and non-research function. To the extent that
such products are obtained in connection with a soft dollar
arrangement a problem arises: when is receipt of such
products permitted under the safe harbor?
165 Id
The AIMR Soft Dollar Guidelines contain an arguably more
restrictive definition of research: "services and/or products provided by
a Broker, the primary use of which must directly assist the Investment

Manager in its Investment Decision-making Process." 1997 AIMR SOFT
DOLLAR GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis supplied) (capitalized
words are terms defined in the AIMR guidelines). Unlike the more

generally phrased SEC standard, the AIMR Guidelines underscore the
need for a direct nexus between the service or product and investment
decision-making by the manager. The SEC, however, in applying its
own "lawful and appropriate assistance" standard through the
examination process, is able to ensure that the relationship between the
service or product obtained and the manager's investment decisionmaking is not too attenuated. The recently completed SEC staff report
provides a wealth of detail regarding the types of products made
available to clients under this standard. See 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT
DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-32, Appendices C and D.
Occasionally, it has been suggested that the SEC provide a list of
approved products. See 1997 ERISA ADVISORY COUNSEL REPORT, supra
note 3, at 9 (recommendations to the SEC). The proposals - so-called
"Un-American Activities lists" - have received a cool reception from the
SEC and industry sources. See Vineeta Anand, Good, Bad News on Soft
Dollars, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Dec. 22, 1997.
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The answer given by the SEC is relatively
straightforward: it all depends on the purpose the product
serves in the hands of the investment adviser. If the
product or service serves more than one purpose (such as
a personal computer), the adviser must allocate the
product's cost between permitted research and brokerage
166 Soft dollar credits
services and non-permissible uses.
can be used to fund only that portion of the product's cost
actually used for research or brokerage services.
Admittedly the SEC's approach involves some practical
difficulties. There is no way to allocate a mixed-use
product between research and non-research functions
with complete precision, but it is possible to use
reasonable methodologies in making such allocations. Not
surprisingly, the SEC's recently completed sweep report,
which involved extensive examination of adviser soft dollar
area of
practices, identified mixed-use products as an
1 67
What is
chronic deficiency in terms of recordkeeping.
significant about the SEC's flexible approach, however, is
that it encourages an adviser to put rebate credits to their
best use and thus enhances the potential efficiency of the
soft dollar arrangement for both the adviser and its client.
C. TRANSACTIONAL LMTATIONS ON STRUCTURING REBATE
ARRANGEMENTS

The evolution of soft dollar commercial practices has
also engendered close scrutiny regarding the manner in
which soft dollar arrangements are structured. SEC
and formalistic
both flexible
evidence
positions
interpretive approaches. As I will argue, those SEC
Mixed-use
'6 1986 SEC Soft Dollar Release, supra note 26, at 16,006.
allocation presupposes that the product is properly classified in the first
instance as research at least for some purposes. A product that is not
itself research at least for some purposes should not be subject to a
mixed-use allocation even though the product may be linked indirectly
with facilitating the research process, for example a word processor. See
1997 AIMR SOFT DOLLAR GUIDELINES 19 (Appendix B - Soft Dollars
Permissible Research Guidance).
167

See 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at

24, 32-35.
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positions evidencing a flexible interpretive approach are
more desirable generally since they tend to promote more
efficient rebate arrangements. In contrast, formalistic
approaches are largely problematic since they do not tend
to advance a coherent economic objective.
1. Third-Party Research Arrangements
The SEC's relatively accommodating position with
respect to soft dollar arrangements involving research
provided by third parties exemplifies sound administrative
practice.
As
discussed
previously,
third-party
arrangements refer to rebate arrangements in which the
executing broker procures research services provided to
the investment adviser, but does not produce the research
itself. Thus, in a third-party research arrangement, the
broker applies the soft dollar rebate to purchase research
for the adviser from a third-party research provider.
Although third-party arrangements existed when section
28(e) was enacted, such arrangements were not a
motivating consideration for section 28(e) and their status
was uncertain in the wake of the new safe harbor.1 6The
safe harbor itself does not explicitly address third-party
arrangements and questions arose whether and under
what circumstances such arrangements were consistent
with the safe harbor.
The SEC took a permissive view and has consistently
indicated that third-party research arrangements may
come within the safe harbor, if the safe harbor's "provided
'6 Compare 1986 SEC Soft Dollar Release, supra note 26, at 16,007
("Prior to the elimination of fixed commission rates, a variety of
techniques were employed that permitted money managers to purchase
third party research with brokerage commissions.") with Schwartz
Recapture Arrangement Statement, supra note 78, at 646 ("A new
method of competition for institutional order flow began to emerge in
the 1975-1976 period where some broker-dealers perceived that the
provision of independent research under standards of high
accountability would attract widespread acceptance in the financial
community."): Hoch Reid & Perez Ehrich, Paying up for Services, 9 THE
REVIEW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 928, 930 (1976) (noting legal
uncertainty about status of third-party arrangements after enactment
of section 28(e)).
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by" condition (discussed below) is also satisfied. 169 As the
SEC recognized, even though the safe harbor's language
could be read to exclude such arrangements, such a
construction would not be desirable because of its
competitive impact. If only research internally generated
by broker-dealers were permissible, full-service firms
would have an enormous advantage in competing against
that did not generate proprietary
broker-dealers
7 0 Since enactment of the safe harbor, usage of
research.
third-party arrangements has increased dramatically, in
large part due to the SEC's accommodative position. 171
The strength of the SEC's approach toward third-party
research arrangements is that it is rooted in economic
considerations regarding the benefits of competition. The
SEC recognized that fostering competition among brokers
argued for a more flexible interpretation of section 28(e)
since section 28(e) itself had grown out of a broader
initiative to encourage competition through deregulation of
commission rates. Such an approach is desirable because
it looks to the interests of advisory clients as the guiding
policy consideration in evaluating specific rebate
practices.
2. Brokerage Services and Third-Party Providers
The SEC has taken a less accommodating view with
respect to permitting third-party brokers to provide
brokerage services, such as custody, through a third-party
16 See 1986 SEC Soft Dollar Release, supranote 26, at 16,007; In the
Matter of National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 17,371, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 82,705, at 83,847 (Dec. 12, 1980) (hereinafter Papilsky Rules
Release)(approving NASD's Papilsky rules): 1976 SEC Soft Dollar
Release, supra note 161; Bankers Trust Company, SEC No-Action
Letter (pub. avail. Jan. 7, 1977).
,70 See 1986 SEC Soft Dollar Release, supra note 26, at 16,007.
17 See Julie Rohrer, Soft Dollars: The Boom in Third-Party Research,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1984, at 73 (cover story); 1991 ASIR

INDEPENDENT RESEARCH REPORT,

supra note 64, at 68-75. The exact

figures are open to some dispute, although there is general agreement
that third-party arrangements grew dramatically throughout the
1980s. CompareSchwartz Statement, supranote 64, at 636, with Silfen
Testimony, supra note 71, at 699.
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provider, that is by someone other than the executing
broker or a legitimate correspondent broker. The SEC has
traditionally insisted that the safe harbor authorizes the
investment adviser's receipt of brokerage services, in
contrast to research services, only from a person acting as
an executing broker. 172 This result is not easily reconciled
with the SEC's permissive policy toward third-party
research arrangements. The statutory language does not
distinguish between brokerage services and research
services in a manner that supports a distinction between
research and brokerage services provided by a third
party. 173
The SEC's strict approach appears to rest on two
considerations. The legislative history accompanying
enactment of section 28(e) evinces Congress's emphatic
rejection of give-up arrangements. 7 4 Third-party custody
arrangements appear to raise the specter of prohibited
give-ups from the SEC's perspective more directly than
third-party research arrangements. A related concern is
172The SEC has permitted sharing of commissions in cases involving
correspondent brokerage arrangements involving broker-dealers that
perform substantive functions in the execution process. Compare
Becker Securities Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,641, at 86,620 (June 28,
1976) (sharing permitted when recipient performed clearing and other
execution services for introducing broker) with Data Exchange
Securities, SEC No-Action Letter, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,016, at 77,546 (May 20, 1981) (declining to
grant no action relief to sharing with introducing broker-dealer that
provided non-brokerage services to adviser). See also LEMKE & LINS,
supra
note 1, at 77-81.
173 A distinction between research and brokerage services has been
made by regulatory authorities in one other context: the NASD's
Papilsky Rule - NASD Conduct Rule 2740. See NASD Regulation
Interpretive Letter to Lee A. Pickard Re: Interpretive Guidance Under
NASD Rule 2740 and IM-2740 (Dec. 9, 1997) (generally prohibiting
broker-dealers from participating in giving or obtaining selective
discounts (not including bona fide research, but including bona fide
brokerage services) in connection with fixed price offering except as
consideration for services rendered in distribution).
17 4 See Conference Report, supra note 63, at 71 ("The provisions
[section 28(e)] have no application whatsoever to a situation in which
payment is made by a money manager to one broker or dealer for
services rendered by another broker or dealer.")
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the SEC's construction of the safe harbor's provided by
requirement. As discussed below, the SEC strictly requires
that third-party services be provided by the broker-dealer
meaning that the broker-dealer either be the source of the
service or integral to its procurement. Third-party
arrangements invariably involve broker-dealers providing
services in the procuring sense. Procuring brokerage
services, however, unlike procuring research, may raise
questions from the SEC's perspective about the brokerdealer's capacity to provide best execution in the first
place.
The distinction between third-party research and thirdparty custody arrangements is not very compelling from an
economic perspective. The rationale for permitting thirdparty research arrangements is to favor constructions of
section 28(e) that unambiguously advance advisory
clients' interests by promoting more efficient rebate
arrangements. This argument should be no less
persuasive in analyzing third-party custody arrangements
than with respect to third-party research arrangements. If
it is reasonable to conclude that the interests of clients
may be better served when investment advisers use thirdparty research arrangements, the same logic dictates that
third-party arrangements may create efficiencies in
delivery of custodial services due to increased
specialization that ultimately benefits the advisory client.
There does not appear to be any greater risk of abuse
associated with a third-party custody arrangement than
third-party research services. Indeed, to the extent that
custody arrangements are used to reduce costs that
clients would ultimately bear, they seem to involve a more
advantageous form of rebate for clients than research
arrangements. Even where the brokerage service rebate is
used to reduce expenses that the investment adviser is
contractually obligated to provide, the adviser should
rationally want to select a third-party arrangement over a
proprietary arrangement only if the service offered by the
third-party provider is cost-effective in serving the needs of
the adviser and the advisory client. Advisory clients do not
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benefit from interpretations that require the adviser to use
exclusively broker-dealers that are able to offer a full
complement of brokerage services internally.
3. Provided By
As indicated above, the SEC has strictly construed the
safe harbor in determining whether research and
brokerage services are provided by the executing broker or
merely paid for by the executing broker. According to the
SEC, the safe harbor applies to arrangements in which the
broker has a significant role in providing (as is the case
with full-service firms) or procuring the service (as is the
case of third-party firms) but excludes situations in which
the broker merely pays for the services that the investment
adviser independently has obligated itself to pay. 175 Thus,
section 28(e)(1) is not satisfied where an investment
adviser procures research from a third party and merely
forwards an invoice to the executing broker for payment.
In the SEC's view, this latter situation involves discharging
the adviser's own contractual commitments to obtain
research services rather than the legitimate receipt of
research services provided by a broker-dealer as permitted
by the safe harbor. The practical effect of this
interpretation is to require executing brokers to perform a
primary, although as the SEC has made clear not an
exclusive, 176 role in the procurement of research as part of
a third-party arrangement.
75

See 1986 SEC Soft Dollar Release, supranote 26, at 16,007; Fund
Monitoring Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 11979 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,913, at 81,148 (Sept. 28, 1978).
176The SEC has made clear that the provided by requirement is not
meant to exclude advisers from involvement in selecting research. 1986
SEC Soft Dollar Release, supra note 26, 16,007; Papilsky Rules Release,
supra note 169. In addition, the broker's role in procurement need not
include participation in delivery itself. Thus, the adviser may receive
research directly from the third-party provider under section 28(e),
provided the broker, and not the adviser, incurs the contractual
obligation to pay for the research. See Gilder, Gagnon & Co., SEC NoAction Letter (pub. avail. July 4, 1987), Boston Institutional Services,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (pub. avail. July 20, 1977).
'
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From a policy perspective, the reasons for requiring that
soft dollar arrangements be structured in this way appears
to entail confusion regarding three different potential
concerns: (i) use of soft dollars by an adviser to discharge
an investment adviser's contractual commitments; (ii) the
use of soft dollars to pay for ineligible products or services
through give-ups; and (iii) the use of soft dollars to enable
advisers to make independent discretionary purchases of
research without substantial broker-dealer involvement in
the procurement of research. Concerns as to possible
abuses with respect to the first two situations appear
warranted, while concerns regarding abuses in the third
situation may be overstated.
Where an executing broker pays for services that the
adviser is already contractually committed to purchase, a
clear conflict of interest exists between the adviser and its
client. The risk is that the adviser's judgment in directing
brokerage is more easily compromised, thereby depriving
advisory clients of best execution. 177 In such situations,
the adviser understandably may be tempted to put its own
economic interests ahead of the interests of its clients.
Thus, one function of the provided by requirement is to
ensure that any contractual commitment relating to
providing research runs from the broker to the provider
.and that the adviser is free of conflicts of interest owing to
contractual commitments.
The second situation raises concerns arising out of the
abuses associated with give-ups. If the investment adviser
is able to direct payments to persons where the brokerdealer has no substantial involvement, there is a greater
risk that payments may be used for an improper purpose
- to obtain services other than research and brokerage
services. The requisite involvement of the broker-dealer
acts as a check against such abuses. Thus, another way of
looking at the provided by requirement is that it drafts
177

Fund Monitoring Services, Inc., supra note 175, at 81,149.
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broker-dealers to perform a gatekeeper function
ensuring adviser compliance with the safe harbor.17 8

in

The third situation where the provided by requirement
has been invoked barring arrangements where
investment advisers could use soft dollar credits to make
independent discretionary purchases of research - is far
more difficult to justify. This scenario is similar to one
aspect presented in the SEC Investment Information
Investigatory Report where the SEC indicated its view that
such an arrangement was not eligible for safe harbor
treatment. 79 As described in the Report, a vendor of
securities -research services allowed advisers directing
brokerage to any one of a number of brokers to earn soft
dollar credits that could be used to purchase research
services. 180 The broker-dealers were otherwise uninvolved
with the adviser's selection of research services. The SEC
concluded that the arrangement was not eligible for the
safe harbor because "the brokers did not 'provide'
services" as required by section 28(e).1 81
Certain aspects of the arrangement were clearly
troublesome under the principles discussed above. For
example, investment advisers could run negative balances
with the vendor and in effect create open-ended
contractual commitments to direct brokerage to the
participating brokers.182 But the SEC also seemed to
indicate that such an arrangement would not meet section
28(e) even where the adviser ran only positive soft dollar
credit balances (in other words, had already earned soft
dollar credits) which the adviser sought to use without
178 This gatekeeping rationale is at the heart of the SEC's
repeated
statements that broker-dealers may be liable for aiding and abetting
securities law violations involving soft dollar arrangements. See
Investment Information Investigative Report, supra note 69, at 933-34;
1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supranote 1, at 19.
79
1 See Investment Information Investigative Report, supranote 69, at
930-32.
180 Id. at 927-28.
181Id. at 932.
82
1 Id. at 928 n.7.
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18 3 This situation
further involvement of the broker-dealer.

did not raise the contractual commitment problem found
in the first situation nor the gatekeeping problem in the
second situation since the vendor presumably could
establish reasonable procedures ensuring that all
purchases of research would be paid out of positive soft
dollar balances and only permit purchases of research to
be delivered prospectively.
One argument for prohibiting such 'vholesale" soft
dollar arrangements is that the arrangements fail to meet
the formal requirements of section 28(e). But such a
position misses the larger point that such a restriction is
not good policy because it is inconsistent with the goal of
promoting more efficient rebate practices. From an
efficiency perspective, there is little reason to draw
distinctions between services independently selected by
the investment adviser that will be delivered prospectively
and services selected through the collaborative efforts of
the broker and the adviser that will be delivered
prospectively. Construing the provided by standard to
prohibit advisers from directly selecting research
needlessly mandates a high degree of bundling in
designing and structuring rebate arrangements. This
bundling, however, has real costs. Mandating greater
collaboration between the broker and adviser ensures
higher negotiation costs in connection with the soft dollar
arrangement and potentially distorts adviser decisionmaking. Although the broker may seek to provide advisers
with low-cost high quality research options, there is no
reason to believe that brokers will do a better job than
advisers in selecting research options. Thus, while the
provided by requirement serves to curb certain abusive
practices described in the first two situations, it may also
inadvertently serve to diminish the potential efficiency of
soft dollar arrangements such as those described in the
third situation.

1

8Id. at 928, 931-32.
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4. Principal Transactions
The SEC has also resolutely declined to construe the
safe harbor as encompassing soft dollar rebates on
principal trades (as opposed to agency trades). 184 Principal
trades, unlike agency trades, generally involve payment of
a mark up on the price of the security rather than receipt
of a commission for the transaction. Congress did not
explicitly consider the issue of principal trades in enacting
the safe harbor. 185 The safe harbor's language refers to
"commissions" paid but not to mark ups
and
commissions, as noted, are the hallmark of an agency
trade.18 6 The statutory provision, however, was amended
before enactment to refer to "dealers" as well as "brokers",
creating some ambiguity regarding the intent of Congress,
since dealers almost invariably mark up or down a
security without receipt of any commission. 18 7
'8 See DOL (Charles Lerner), supra note 146 (noting that soft dollar
arrangement involving transactions in fixed income securities and
financial futures ineligible for safe harbor). CompareHoenig & Co., SEC
No-Action Letter, 11990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,639, at 77,895 (Oct. 15, 1990) (noting that soft dollar arrangement
not eligible for safe harbor where it involved transactions involving
payment of commission-equivalents
but where broker-dealer
nevertheless acted as a principal) with Instinet Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,290, at
77,144 (Jan. 15, 1992) (soft dollar arrangement eligible for safe harbor
even though it involved principal transactions since facilitating brokerdealer acted exclusively in an agency capacity). Although the Lerner
letter is from the SEC's Division of Investment Management, it was
expressly ratified by a vote of the SEC.
185 Although observers recognized the potential issue, the status of
arrangements involving principal transactions was not directly
addressed in the legislative history of section 28(e) since principal
transactions mark ups were not altered by deregulation of
commissions. See Reid & Ehrich, supra note 168, at 931.
186 See DOL (Charles Lerner), supranote 146, at 77,534.
187 Reid & Ehrlch, supra note 168, at 931. In addition, in approving
the NASD's Papilsky Rule, see Papilsky Rules Release, supranote 169,
the SEC tacitly accepted the legitimacy of soft dollar research rebates in
connection with securities offerings that by definition involved principal
transactions. See In the Matter of National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,371 [1980 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,705, at 83,847 (Dec. 12, 1980) (approving
NASD rule). In any event, because principal transactions are not eligible
for the safe harbor, soft dollar arrangements in connection with
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While the SEC's position may be justified as a matter of
statutory construction, it is not clear that the statutory
language forecloses a contrary position. The different
treatment of principal and agency trades, however, is
troublesome from a policy perspective. Did Congress
consciously consider the difference between soft dollar
rebates on commissions as opposed to mark ups? Is there
a greater risk of abuse on mark ups as opposed to
commissions? Are there sound reasons why soft dollar
arrangements should be permissible when trading IBM (an
exchange-listed security) but not when trading Microsoft
(a Nasdaq-listed security)? 18 8 While the SEC has alluded to
the fundamental difference between agency and principal
trades and more specifically commissions and mark ups,
there is no clear economic explanation of why the
difference between a principal trade and an agency trade
supports treating rebates on agency trades differently from
9
rebates on principal trades.18 Such distinctions only
contribute to the complexity of administering rebate
arrangements and offer little benefit to advisory clients,
unless one believes that deterring soft dollar rebate
arrangements in general is a desirable policy.

As soft dollar arrangements have continued to flourish
and proliferate, the SEC's principal focus in construing the
safe harbor has remained on rooting out potential abuses
rather than rationalizing market practices or fostering
principal transactions will typically require tracing of the soft dollar
benefits on an account-by-account basis since cross-subsidization of

research among accounts, absent section 28(e), may violate specific
fiduciary prohibitions under ERISA or the Investment Company Act or
would likely be viewed as a breach of the adviser's fiduciary obligations
(unless the adviser obtains the prior consent of the affected advisory
clients). See 1997 AIMR SoFr DOLLAR GUIDELINES, supranote 1, at 11.
18 The formulation overstates the situation slightly since failure to
comply with section 28(e) is not itself a violation of the federal securities
laws. But the underlying point remains valid, namely, is there any basis
in policy for treating the one transaction as eligible for safe harbor
treatment and the other as not?
189 In contrast, rebates on principal transactions are permitted in
connection with directed brokerage arrangements.
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more efficient rebate arrangements. Soft dollars and
directed rebate arrangements have spawned a variety of
intricate commercial practices. The complexity and variety
of the practices seem driven only remotely by the
underlying economic interests of advisory clients.
Applicable legal requirements and interpretations appear
as important, if not more so, in shaping the complex
commercial practices observed. Although SEC safe harbor
interpretations adhere to the original political compromise
reached in 1975, they are too seldom tied to explicit
policies aimed at advancing the interests of advisory
clients. In part, this may reflect the inherent limits of
statutory language, the drafters of which did not anticipate
the way in which soft dollar practices would evolve, but it
also may reflect a failure by the SEC to respond to the
policy challenges posed by soft dollar arrangements.
VI. THE UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS OF REBATE
DISCLOSURE POLICY

In addition to its role administering the safe harbor, the
SEC possesses extensive authority regarding disclosure
with respect to all rebate practices, including soft dollar
practices. 90 The requirements for an effective disclosure
program with respect to rebate arrangements has been a
subject of debate since section 28(e) was enacted.' 9 1
90 See Exchange Act section 28(e)(2) (rule-making authority in
connection with policies and practices regarding the payment of
commissions); Investment Advisers Act section 204, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4
(1999) (rule-making authority regarding preparation and dissemination
of reports by investment advisers); Investment Company Act sections 8
and 24, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8, 24 (1999) (rule-making authority regarding
disclosure in connection with registration of investment companies and
their securities).
191Shortly after section 28(e) was enacted, the SEC proposed a rule rule 28e2-1 - that would have required advisers to provide clients with
annual reports regarding soft dollar practices. See Disclosure of
Brokerage Placement Practices By Investment Managers, Exchange Act
Release No. 13,024, [1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 80,185
(Nov. 30, 1976). That proposal was never adopted and the issue
remained unresolved until 1979 when the SEC adopted separate rule
proposals concerning adviser and investment company disclosure that
incorporated scaled-down disclosure requirements relating to soft
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Although disclosure has proven an effective tool in policing
serious abuses by investment advisers, enhanced
disclosure has had limited effect in actually promoting
more efficient rebate practices. The SEC's many disclosure
requirements have not led to either vigorous competition
enhanced
or
arrangements
brokerage
regarding
bargaining power for the vast majority of advisory clients.
Thinking about disclosure from a functional perspective
provides some insight as to why enhanced transparency
has not translated into significant competitive benefits for
advisory clients. Disclosure regarding soft dollar
arrangements serves two potentially beneficial functions
for advisory clients: an investor protection function and a
economic evaluative function. Disclosure promotes
investor protection by facilitating the ability of clients to
monitor the activities of an investment adviser and making
clients aware of possible conflicts between their interests
and the interests of their investment adviser. Disclosure of
conflicts identifies areas where clients need to be more
vigilant in assessing an adviser's conduct. Thus disclosure
of a soft dollar arrangement should in theory put clients on
notice of a need for monitoring with respect to brokerage
expenses and rebates.
Disclosure requirements aimed at investor protection
have principally taken the form of providing clients with
qualitative information regarding the nature of rebate
practices and the kinds of services obtained by investment
advisers. 9 2 Such information has only marginal effects on
dollar practices. See Disclosure of Brokerage Placement Practices By
Certain Registered Investment Companies And Certain Other Issuers,
Investment Company Act Release No. 10,569, 11979 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,924, at 81,179 (Jan. 30, 1979).
9The principal qualitative disclosure requirement for advisers
concerning soft dollars is Item 12 of Part II of the adviser's Form ADV.
The Form as it relates to brokerage arrangements principally requires
advisers to describe the product and services provided to the adviser if
receipt of such products or services is a factor in selecting brokers and
in determining the reasonableness of commissions. An adviser must
also disclose whether services so obtained are used to benefit all
accounts or only those that were the source of the commissions used to
obtain the services. Under the brochure rule (Investment Advisers Act
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competition since it does not provide the kinds of
quantitative information necessary for comparisons. These
disclosure requirements (and the related task of
recordkeeping) also serve an investor protection function
by aiding in the enforcement of conduct requirements.
Allegations of disclosure violations relating to rebate
practices are common in enforcement actions involving

soft dollars. 193
Disclosure serves an equally important economic
evaluative
function
by providing investors with
information relevant to selection of and negotiation with
investment advisers. Certain types of disclosure may
facilitate evaluation and comparison of advisers by clients
and thus sharpen competition among investment advisers.
If soft dollar arrangements are perceived as economically
disadvantageous for clients, clients may take their
business elsewhere. Disclosure may also improve the
ability of clients to bargain with advisers. A client, for
example, should in theory seek some form of offsetting
benefit (such as a slightly reduced advisory fee) in return
rule 204-3), an adviser must provide clients with such disclosure in a
written disclosure statement. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3 (1998).
Advisers generally will provide the relevant portion from the Form ADV
itself and thus the disclosure will be broadly applicable to all clients,
although in some cases the adviser may choose to provide more
narrowly tailored client-specific qualitative disclosure if a more narrow
range of practices are pursued with a particular client.
A mutual fund's board of directors typically receives the adviser's
Form ADV disclosure, but the Form ADV disclosure would not be
supplied to shareholders of the fund. Nevertheless disclosure
requirements under the Investment Company Act ensure similar
qualitative disclosure of such arrangements regarding brokerage
allocation practices, including factors affecting brokerage selection and
the reasonableness of commissions paid in the fund prospectus. Such
disclosure, however, may be relegated to the Statement of Additional
Information and therefore need be provided to prospective investors
only if the investor requests it. See 1998 Adopting Release for Form
N-1A, supra note 104, at 80,264.
193
Kinsley, Jennison, McNulty & Morse, Inc., Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 1396, 55 SEC Dkt. 2070 (Dec. 23, 1993) (SEC decision);
DeMarche Associates, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1392
(Nov. 23, 1993) (consent to order instituting proceedings, making
findings and imposing sanctions).
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arrangements.

to the adviser's
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use of soft dollar

Two types of information are potentially useful to
advisory clients for purposes of engaging in evaluating use
of soft dollar arrangements by investment advisers:
accounting information reflecting the effects of soft dollar
arrangements on overall performance and expenses, and
transactional information relating to an adviser's use of
such arrangements. Soft dollar and other brokerage
arrangements will affect reported performance and
expenses for managed accounts in several ways. Mutual
94
fund accounting provides an illustration of these effects. 1
Commissions paid by each fund are reflected in the cost
basis of the fund's investments.1 95 Soft dollar rebates do
not alter the accounting for commissions, that is, no
adjustment is made to the cost basis of the investments. In
addition, soft dollar rebates in the form of research
services will not reduce reported total expenses or even net
expenses, since the beneficiary is the adviser rather than
96
the advisory client. 1

1 In addition to generating annual financial statements, a mutual
fund must have accounting systems in place which enable the company
to redeem securities at current net asset value - the market value of
the mutual fund's shares calculated at the close of business each day
by taking the market value of all the securities owned plus all other
assets, subtracting all liabilities and then dividing by the number of
shares outstanding. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(a)(1) (1999) and 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.22c-1 (1999).
195 See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),
Investment Companies Committee, Accounting Standards Division,
Exposure Draft Proposed Audit and Accounting Guide Audit of
Investment Companies V 2.41 (Sept. 22, 1998) (hereinafter AICPA
Exposure Draft) (visited Aug. 5, 1999) <http://www.AICPA.org>.
'9 Under recently adopted rule amendments (rule 6-07 of Regulation
S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.6-07 (1998)), mutual funds are required to include
the expenses paid under brokerage/service and expense offset
arrangements in total expenses reported in the statement of operations.
The total expenses are then reduced by the total amount paid under
such arrangements and the remainder is the net expenses. If the
mutual fund directly negotiates with the broker, the cost of the services
is the amount negotiated, or if a mutual fund cannot readily determine
the cost of the services, the mutual fund must make a good faith
estimate of the amount it would have paid if it had contracted for the
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Accounting for commission recapture brokerage
arrangements differs slightly from the accounting
treatment for soft dollar arrangements. Where an advisory
client negotiates and receives a rebate, the cash rebates
will be reflected as a reduction in the cost basis of the
managed account's investments and thus offset the effect
on portfolio investments of the higher commissions that
may have been
paid. Expense
reimbursement
arrangements are treated differently. The expense
reimbursement rebate does not result in an adjustment to
the cost basis of the portfolio's investments. The
reimbursement, however, will reduce reported net
expenses, that is total expense net of credits. Because the
reimbursement does not affect cost-basis or total expenses
it does not alter a firm's reported expense ratios (since the
reimbursed expenses must still be included in total
expenses) nor reported yield since yield is calculated using
total expenses. 197
Investment companies that are identical in all respects,
except that one company uses soft dollar arrangements in
its portfolio transactions and the other uses an expense
reimbursement arrangement in its portfolio transactions
will not differ in reported expense ratios or yield. This
result is puzzling since it would appear that clients are
unambiguously better off with the expense reimbursement
arrangement, assuming execution quality is not otherwise
affected. 198
Investment
companies
that
employ
commission recapture arrangements as opposed to
services directly in an arms-length transaction. See also 1995
Investment Company Brokerage Arrangement Accounting Release,
supra note 80, at 38,918.
'97 See Instruction 7 to Item 21(b)(2) of Form N-IA.
98 One celebrated critic of mutual funds expenses describes
commissions paid on portfolio transactions because they are
capitalized costs - as "invisible costs." See John C. Bogle, BOGLE ON
MUTUAL FUNDS: NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR,

201-06

(1994). If anything, the accounting treatment for soft dollar
arrangements ensures that the costs of such arrangements are even
more hidden. See 1997 ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supranote 3,
at 32-33 (summary of testimony of Steven H. Wallman, Commissioner,
U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n) (criticizing existing accounting treatment
of soft dollar arrangements).
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expense reimbursement arrangements will actually be
able to report a slightly higher yield since the cost basis of
the portfolio will be less than the cost basis of either the
portfolio that uses soft dollar arrangements or the portfolio
99
that employs expense reimbursement arrangements.
These results underscore the potential significance of
accounting conventions in influencing indirectly choice of
brokerage arrangements.
The other kind of economically relevant information for
advisory clients is transactional information relating to
brokerage arrangements. Such information differs from
the accounting information discussed above in that it
focuses solely on economic information relevant to
brokerage arrangements themselves rather than the
economic effects of the arrangements on the managed
account's overall reported performance and expenses.
Transaction information in theory can be either clientspecific or firm-wide (that is, reflecting an investment
adviser's experience with respect to all of its managed
accounts). Client-specific information might consist of
average commissions paid for brokerage depending on the
type of rebate arrangement or the value of the soft dollar
benefits obtained by the adviser with respect to the client's
brokerage. Firm-wide transactional information might
provide the client with information as to how its brokerage
arrangements compare with other of the firm's clients.
Thus, it might include whether one client's average
commissions are greater than another, and soft dollar
arrangements are more common for some clients than
others. To some extent, the significance of either form of
disclosure - transactional information or accounting
information - depends on what kind of information is
most relevant to clients in ultimately selecting brokers.
Interestingly, with respect to disclosure designed to
facilitate economic evaluation by advisory clients, the SEC
has relied principally on requirements regarding
'9 This follows since the amount of recapture will be applied to reduce
the cost of investments.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

107

Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 2

250

VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT

disclosure of accounting information rather than
transactional information. Indeed, even modest efforts to
introduce
transactional
information have largely
floundered. 20 0 In 1995, the SEC issued an ambitious rulemaking proposal that would have imposed significant
transactional disclosure requirements on investment
advisers with respect to soft dollar arrangements. 20 1
Among the types of information that would have been
required of advisers was an extensive breakdown of each
adviser's brokerage allocation by broker and category of
brokerage arrangement (execution-only, full-service and
customer directed). Detailed finn-wide information
regarding adviser practices would have enabled individual
clients to monitor more precisely their treatment by a
particular adviser relative to the treatment of other clients
and would also have facilitated comparisons across
advisers regarding brokerage arrangements.
The SEC ultimately declined without comment to adopt
the rule proposal, in part reflecting intense industry
opposition. Giving clients ready access to detailed
quantified firm-wide information regarding brokerage
arrangements would undoubtedly have carried the
potential advantage of engendering competition among
investment advisers since advisers would realize that
2

00 In 1995, the SEC introduced a requirement pursuant to which
funds were required to disclose average commissions in the financial
highlights table.
See 1995 Investment Company Brokerage
Arrangement Accounting Release, supra note 80, at 38,921-22. That
requirement was eliminated in 1998 as part of the SEC's disclosure
simplification initiative for investment companies. See 1998 Adopting
Release for Form NI-A, supranote 104, at 13,936.
201 See Disclosure by Investment Advisers Regarding
Soft Dollar
Practices, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1469, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,488, at 86,218 (Feb. 14,
1995). The rule proposal was in part the outcome of fierce lobbying
efforts by competing groups of broker-dealers providing soft dollar
services - proprietary research firms and third-party research firms.
Proprietary research firms felt that adviser disclosure regarding
brokerage allocation practices at the firm-wide level would reveal the
economic effects of third-party arrangements. The rule proposal was
crafted to avoid tilting disclosure toward one camp over another but was
unprecedented in terms of the level of detail that would be required of
advisers using soft dollar services.
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clients would be able to evaluate the adviser's brokerage
practices at very low cost. Detailed disclosure, however,
also entailed significant disadvantages over and above the
significant costs that would have been borne by firms in
providing such disclosure. Mandated disclosure could well
have actually discouraged price competition since
competitors would be privy to significant information
regarding other competitors' brokerage practices.
Extensive disclosure regarding commission and rebate
levels could well have had the counterproductive effect of
diminishing the incentive to cut commissions or increase
rebates if advisers and brokers knew that such
information would be disclosed. Similarly advisers might
seek to become price followers rather than leaders, if it
were clear that price advantages, once disclosed, would be
quickly available to all. Thus, although the SEC's proposal
might have spurred genuine competitive benefits for
advisory clients, it also risked significant competitive
harms.
Given the various approaches toward disclosure policy,
why has disclosure proven relatively ineffective in
regulating rebate practices? Two related reasons may offer
an answer. The first is that clients have difficulty using
accounting information that they receive to differentiate
meaningfully among investment advisers on the basis of
20
brokerage expenses and managerial performance.

2

The

accounting treatment of soft dollar arrangements is
perhaps most relevant to its effect on the bottom line,
something clients monitor much more closely than
expenses. The overall effect of rebate arrangements on
reported performance, however, appears to be fairly small.
Moreover, the addition of extensive transactional
disclosure requirements, even if adopted by the SEC,
would not remedy this problem. It is reasonable to
question whether such information in the hands of a large
segment of advisory clients would enable those clients to
bargain more effectively with their investment advisers.
202

See supra notes 107 & 142.
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detailed
transactional
The
relationship
between
information and overall account performance may be too
attenuated to permit clients to use such information in a
cost effective manner.
The second explanation for why current disclosure may
not be effective in bringing about more efficient rebate
arrangements is that advisory clients do not perceive
significant differences among the alternative rebate
arrangements in terms of their choice of investment
adviser. The lack of strong client sentiment regarding
the
arrangements
diminishes
current
brokerage
significance of disclosure. As discussed below, clients may
perceive
pass-through
cash rebate arrangements,
accompanied by modest disclosure requirements, as
materially different and therefore permitting such
arrangements may engender more meaningful negotiation
between adviser and client.

VII. AN ALTERNATE REGULATORY APPROACH:
COLLECTIVE CASH PASS-THROUGH REBATES
Congress and the SEC envisioned an environment in
which commission rates would be set through negotiation
and the interaction of market forces. Soft dollar
arrangements were not intended to alter that vision, but to
exist within it. Although soft dollar arrangements and
other brokerage rebate arrangements have not foreclosed
competition, they do appear to have altered the dynamics
of competition. In particular, soft dollar arrangements,
which are not very transparent and which entail
significant monitoring costs for advisory clients, have
become the dominant form of rebate arrangement. This
development has also pushed competition with respect to
institutional brokerage toward service competition and
away from price competition. The sole meaningful rebate
alternative - customer directed rebate arrangements - is
feasible only for a limited range of clients. While the
current regulatory approach toward brokerage rebate
arrangements has curtailed abusive rebate practices, it
has been notably unsuccessful in promoting vigorous
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competition as a means of controlling brokerage expenses
of managed accounts.
The problem of brokerage rebates, viewed from the
perspective of clients, is not merely one of potential
misconduct by an investment adviser or even inadequate
disclosure. An equally important issue is the absence of
alternative brokerage rebate arrangements to compete
with soft dollar arrangements. Policies aimed at
encouraging brokerage rebate alternatives could lead to
more efficient rebate practices and promote competition.
In this section, one such alternative rebate practice - a
collective cash pass-through rebate arrangement - is
described. Permitting use of collective pass-through
rebates would face some regulatory and practical obstacles
which are addressed in this section. The following section
explains the policy rationale that makes such an approach
desirable.
A. DESIGNING A COLLECTIVE CASH PASS-THROUGH REBATE
ALTERNATIVE

In a cash pass-through arrangement, the investment
adviser or an account established by the adviser would be
used as a conduit for cash rebates from brokers to
advisory clients. 20 3 A pass-through rebate arrangement in
2
03The

image of the adviser acting as a conduit is intended
conceptually rather than literally. Generally advisers do not act as
custodians for their clients' funds. Thus, one of the practical issues
described below is how to structure a conduit mechanism so that the
adviser itself never actually is in possession of client funds.
Pass-through rebates have been discussed in the analogous context
of payment for order flow. Payment for order flow is a practice in which
market makers and exchange specialists compensate broker-dealers for
routing customer orders (providing order flow) to the market maker or
exchange. See Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No.
34,902, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,444,
at 85,849 (Oct. 27, 1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 55,006 (Nov. 2, 1994)
(hereinafter Payment for Order Flow Adopting Release); Payment for
Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 33,026, [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,234, at 84,536 (Oct. 6, 1993), 58 Fed. Reg.
52,934 (Oct. 13, 1993) (hereinafter Payment for Order Flow Proposing
Release); see also Payment for Order Flow Committee, National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Inducements for Order Flow: A
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this sense closely resembles a commission recapture
arrangement. In a cash pass-through arrangement, as in a
commission recapture arrangement, the advisory client is
Report to the NASD Board of Governors (1991) (commonly referred to as
the "Ruder Report"). Such practices were the source of considerable
controversy in the early part of the decade, but have diminished in
importance somewhat as minimum quotation variations in auction
markets, and bid-offer spreads in dealer markets, have narrowed. See
Michael Barclay, William G. Christie, Jeffrey H. Harris, Eugene Kandel
& Paul Schultz, The Effects of Market Reform on Trading Costs and
Depths of Nasdaq Securities, 54 J. FIN. 1 (Feb. 1999) finding that quoted
and effective spreads in Nasdaq market have fallen dramatically in wake
of recent reforms to market trading practices).
One proposal with respect to the payment for order flow would have
required broker-dealers to make mandatory the duty of the order
routing broker to pass-through to their customers any payments for
directing order flow. See Petition for Rulemaking of Midwest Stock
Exchange Re: Payment for Order Flow Practices (May 21, 1990)
(petitioning for rule amendments that would require broker-dealers
receiving payment for order flow from market makers to remit payments
to customers), withdrawn, Letter from J. Craig Long, Vice President,
General Counsel and Secretary, MSE (currently the Chicago Stock
Exchange (CHX)), to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm'n, (Oct. 29, 1991) (withdrawing petition). The SEC considered a
proposal to require mandatory pass-through of payments to customers
but subsequently rejected that approach in favor of a disclosure rulemaking initiative. See Payment for Order Flow Proposing Release, supra
at 52,941 (seeking comment on pass-through alternative): Payment for
Order Flow Adopting Release, supra at 55,011 n.42 (rejecting passthrough alternative).
Although the pass-through proposal in the context of payment for
order flow is analogous to what is proposed here, there are obvious
differences as well. In the payment for order flow context, the passthrough proposal would have redirected existing cash rebates from
order routing broker-dealers to their customers. In the soft dollar
situation, the pass-through proposal would enable advisory clients to
obtain a cash rebate in lieu of a soft dollar rebate to advisers. Second,
the pass-through proposal in the payment for order flow context would
have been mandatory, while the pass-though arrangement proposed
here would be entirely voluntary and would rely on competition among
advisers for implementation. Third, one reason why a pass-through
proposal was not adopted in the order flow context was the difficulty of
allocating the rebate back to individual customers. A pass-through
solution was not feasible both because such arrangements were not
negotiated on a per share basis and because of the absence of systems
for making such allocations. Many soft dollar arrangements, especially
those involving third-party providers, in contrast, would lend
themselves to allocation because of the way transactions have been
structured and general familiarity with allocation issues in the
investment management industry.
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the rebate recipient. The pass-through arrangement
clearly contrasts with a soft dollar arrangement wherein
the adviser receives and retains non-cash benefits in the
form of research or brokerage services.
The pass-through arrangement, however, also differs
from a directed brokerage arrangement in that the
investment adviser serves as a conduit for rebate
payments from brokers to advisory clients. This distinction
is of modest significance in the case of a pass-through
arrangement administered on an account-by-account
basis. In the commission recapture arrangement, the
broker sends the rebate directly to the advisory client,
while in the pass-through arrangement it must go through
an intermediate account before being forwarded to the
advisory client. The main difference is that in a passthrough arrangement the adviser, rather than the advisory
client, is responsible for finding the broker to whom the
trades are directed whereas in most commission recapture
arrangements the client directs order flow to the recapture
broker, albeit in consultation with the adviser.
The investment adviser's conduit status, however, is
particularly
significant
when
the
pass-through
arrangement is administered collectively on behalf of
clients. A collective pass-through arrangement would be
structured analogously to an individual pass-through
arrangement, except in one important detail: the passthrough rebate would be based on trading coming from
any or all accounts under management and thus would be
administered on a collective rather than an account-byaccount basis. The basic structure of the arrangement is
shown in Diagram 3. In the collective pass-through
arrangement, the adviser would route orders from several
different managed accounts to the same pass-through
broker which then would distribute a cash rebate back to a
pass-through account established by the adviser. The
proceeds from the pass-through account are then
allocated back to the several managed accounts.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

113

Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 2

VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT

256

4
C

0O

*-

co
U

Mal

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol1/iss2/2

114

Franco: Rethinking Brokerage Rebate Arrangements: The Case for Collective

(VOL. 1:143 1999) RETHINKING BROKERAGE REBATE ARRANGEMENTS

257

The pass-through arrangement relieves the passthrough broker of the significant recordkeeping associated
with servicing the account. Although the investment
adviser assumes additional recordkeeping obligations, the
adviser has strong incentives to structure a pass-through
arrangement on behalf of its own clients. The collective
pass-through arrangement allows the adviser to retain
control of the order allocation process, which is
surrendered in whole or in part in a recapture
arrangement. More importantly, in a collective passthrough arrangement on behalf of all or a large group of
clients, the adviser can avoid the problem of having to
break up similar client orders and routing them to
different brokers. In other words, in a collective passthrough arrangement, the adviser can bunch orders
without compromising the ability of individual clients to
receive a cash rebate.
On its face, a cash pass-through rebate administered on
an account-by-account basis would not appear to present
any legal problems. The SEC has indicated that such an
arrangement is presumptively permissible under the
federal securities laws, assuming the rebate goes from the
broker to the customer. 2° Cash rebates, however, are not
particularly attractive to market participants from a
business perspective for two reasons. A pass-through
rebate transfers potential benefits from the adviser's
pocket to the client's pocket. Self-interested advisers
understandably prefer soft dollar arrangements to passthrough arrangements, all else being equal. In addition,
administration of a cash pass-through on an individual
client basis would be extremely expensive for all but the
most substantial institutional client. The adviser and
204

See Investment Information Investigative Report, supranote 69, at
928 n.5 ("there [is] no legal impediment to the recapture of cash for the
beneficial owners of securities.").
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broker would need to track with precision which trades
20 5
from which accounts were entitled to a rebate.
A collective pass-through arrangement is designed
principally to address the potential expense issue
associated with a pass-through arrangement. A collective
pass-through arrangement would be far easier to
administer at the advisory level than a pass-through
arrangement administered on a client-by-client basis
because of the greatly diminished tracking burden at the
adviser level. Moreover, a collective
arrangement
represents a more attractive brokerage vehicle from the
perspective of brokers in terms of potential order flow. If
such arrangements were permissible, some advisers might
perceive an advantage to offering such an option (perhaps
as an alternative to clients that have sought out directed
brokerage arrangements). Other advisers might be
persuaded to offer such an option by clients.
There are a number of issues relating to the design of a
cash pass-through arrangement. Advisers that provide
clients a pass-through rebate option would still be subject
to best execution obligations. As a result, some standard
analogous to the reasonableness standard applied in
connection with soft dollar arrangements would also be
required in the case of a pass-through arrangement. The
reasonableness standard, however, should be modified in
two respects when applied to pass-through arrangements.
First, an adviser should be able to pay up - pay a greater
commission - only if the cash rebate equals or exceeds
the commission by which the commission with the passthrough rebate exceeds the commission that would
otherwise have been paid by the adviser. This test can be
applied with greater precision than the reasonableness
test used for soft dollar arrangements because the actual
20 6
value of the rebate - its cash value - will be known.
20

5A pass-through arrangement on an individual basis is essentially

equivalent to an adviser entering into a directed brokerage arrangement
on behalf of its clients and directing the benefit to the client.
2

06 In third-party arrangements, advisers generally know the cost of
the research since brokers generally "charge their customers the same
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Second, the modified reasonableness standard should
be applied on an account-by-account basis. In other
words, any determination regarding the reasonableness of
a pass-through arrangement must be made in terms of the
cost and expected benefit to each participating account.
Specifically, the investment adviser should be required to
make a reasonable determination that any "paying up" by
a particular account does not exceed the value of the passthrough rebate obtained by that account. Such an
approach differs from the reasonableness standard
applied in the soft dollar context where the benefit from
any rebate is measured on the basis of the aggregate
benefit to all accounts under management rather than on
an account-by-account basis.
Inherent in the concept of a pass-through arrangement
and the reasonableness test described above is the need
for equitable procedures in apportioning cash rebates
back to managed accounts. More than one set of
apportionment principles is conceivable and it would be
necessary to develop a consensus on principles governing
fair and equitable methods of allocating rebates. The most
obvious allocation scheme would be to allocate the passthrough benefit in accordance with each client's
proportionate contribution of commissions toward the
rebate.
Such an allocation method, however, is not the only
conceivable fair and equitable method. Other factors might
affect the method of allocating the rebate. For example,
suppose a particular client could participate in a directed
brokerage arrangement on more favorable terms than
participating in a collective pass-through arrangement
prices for products/services as they were charged by the vendor" and
only rarely engage in "bumping," that is charge a premium for the third-

party product or service over its cost from the vendor. See 1998 SEC
STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPoRT, supranote 1, at 25. But knowing the cost of
a third-party product or service is different from the value "in terms of
that particular transaction or [the adviser's] overall responsibilities with
respect to the accounts as to which he exercise investment discretion,"
as required by section 28(e). In the pass-through arrangement, there is
no need to ascertain the true value of a rebate since it is in cash.
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with other clients. In order to induce the favored client to
participate in the collective pass-through arrangement, it
may be necessary to allow that client to receive a slightly
greater proportion of the rebate under the collective
arrangement. Similarly, the costs of executing securities
trades may and probably do vary depending on types of
security traded, a security's issuer and transaction size.
Thus, a portfolio that generates low-cost trades - trades
in highly liquid issues where the trade is not unduly large
- might be a more valuable source of commissions than a
20 7
portfolio consisting of more thinly traded issues.
Fair and equitable allocation schemes should be viewed
as falling within a range of acceptable practices but need
not generate a single industry-wide model. Investment
advisers should have some discretion in establishing and
negotiating appropriate ones, provided they can offer a
justification regarding the fairness and equity of the
scheme employed. In any event, any allocation scheme
should be appropriately disclosed to advisory clients.
Assuming an investment adviser arrives at a fair and
equitable apportionment standard, there will be problems
in applying the standard in practice. Payment of
commissions would seldom be synchronous with payment
and allocation of rebates. For example, broker-dealers
frequently provide soft dollar rebates in advance of
expected brokerage transactions while commission
recapture arrangements typically involve post-transaction
rebates.
Presumably
a
collective
pass-through
arrangement would be structured in a similar manner to a
commission recapture arrangement, that is the rebate
would follow the brokerage transactions giving rise to the
rebate.
207 Arguably the fairest method of apportioning the rebate would
somehow reflect the marginal value the broker-dealer attaches to the
order flow from each account. But such information will seldom, if ever,
be available to the investment adviser and indeed the broker-dealer may
only have a rough idea of the relative value of different order flow
streams.
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The investment adviser may encounter difficulties in
apportioning the rebate among accounts. For example, a
client may terminate its relationship with an investment
adviser after commissions are incurred but before the
broker pays the rebate (assuming it is paid after brokerage
commissions have been incurred). The potential lack of
synchronicity between the adviser's receipt of the rebate
and the payment of the commissions that resulted in the
rebate may complicate the calculation of the net asset
value of the client's account, but the calculation issues
raised by a pass-through arrangement are not more
intractable than other types of accounting estimation
issues that arise regularly in managing investment
20 8
accounts.
The mechanics of the pass-through arrangement
represent another issue wholly distinct from the
apportionment principle employed in connection with the
pass-through arrangement. The apportionment principle
determines how the rebate proceeds will be allocated
among advisory clients. The mechanics of the passthrough arrangement concern how rebate proceeds are
208 Section 22(c) of the Investment Company Act establishes a
rigorous methodology for the pricing of redeemable securities, Le.,
computing net asset value, of investment companies. Although
applicable only to registered investment companies, the accounting
procedures are analogous to the types of accounting procedures that
would be required to value virtually any managed account. See 15
U.S.C. § 80a-22(c) (1999).
A mutual fund's net asset value is the market value of the mutual
fund's assets, less the value of its liabilities, divided by the number of
shares outstanding. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE ("IC"), 1997
MuTuAL FUND FAcT BOOK 110 (37th ed. 1997). The SEC requires funds to
calculate "current net asset value" daily which includes "calculations,
whether or not recorded in the books of account, made substantially in
accordance with [SEC requirementsl, with estimates used where
necessary and appropriate." Rule 2a-4(a), 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a)
(1998) (emphasis added). Expenses and income "need not be reflected
if, cumulatively, when netted, they do not amount to one cent or more
per outstanding share." Rule 2a-4(b), 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(b) (1998).
Mutual funds account for miscellaneous expenses that vary year to year
by estimating expenses and accruing the estimated expenses over the
relevant account period. The estimated accruals are then reconciled
against the actual expenses incurred. See AICPA Exposure Draft, supra
note 195, at 158.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

119

Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 2

262

VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT

paid to clients. Investment advisers typically do not
exercise custody over client funds because of the
significant regulatory burdens to which they are subject in
the event that they do provide custody. 20 9 Since an
adviser's receipt of rebate payments as a conduit for its
clients would constitute custody of client funds, the passthrough would need to be structured to avoid actual
custody. One possibility would be for the broker to
distribute to managed accounts participating in the
collective pass-through arrangement their proportionate
share of the rebate proceeds. Another, and perhaps more
realistic scenario, would be for the adviser to advise the
custodian of its clients' accounts regarding allocation of
rebate proceeds delivered by a broker to the custodian.
The tax and accounting treatment of the pass-through
amounts will also affect the feasibility of pass-through
arrangements. Commissions typically are treated as
capital expenses and thus affect basis or net proceeds, but
not current expenses. If clients actually receive the rebates
in the form of discrete payments, there is a risk that the
pass-through payments might be deemed income to the
client with possible tax ramifications. However, rebates
effectively reduce capital expenses associated with the
purchase and sale of securities. Because rebates reduce
the costs paid to acquire securities, the better view would
appear to be that they should be treated similarly to
2 10
commissions and therefore capitalized.
B. ELIMINATING LEGAL OBSTACLES TO COLLECTIVE
PASS-THROUGH REBATE ARRANGEMENTS

As indicated above, pass-through brokerage rebate
arrangements are not employed frequently in the
marketplace. While commercial considerations may have
209 See
Investment Advisers Act rule 206(4)-2,
17 C.F.R.
§ 275.206(4)-2 (1999) (relating to custody or possession of funds or
securities of clients).
210 In addition, the investment adviser will incur costs in connection

with administering the pass-through arrangement. This issue is dealt
with below in the text and notes accompanying note 226, infra.
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much to do with this, restrictions under federal and state
law also serve to discourage pass-through rebate
arrangements administered on a collective basis. Section
28(e), of course, does not apply to collective pass-through
arrangements. In the absence of any safe harbor
protection, the collective pass-through arrangement must
avoid triggering any of the federal or state law restrictions
regarding brokerage rebates discussed earlier as well as
2 11 As a result there is
restrictions on joint transactions.
some basis for uncertainty about the legal status of such
arrangements and that uncertainty may well discourage
arrangements
pass-through
collective
of
use
commercially.
There are two areas that potentially could present legal
obstacles to collective pass-through arrangements under
current law: (i) restrictions on joint transactions and (ii)
general fiduciary obligations.
1. Joint Transaction Restrictions
Both the Investment Company Act, which is applicable
to registered investment companies, and ERISA, which is
generally applicable to employer-sponsored benefit plans,
contain specific restrictions relating to joint transactions,
that is transactions involving participation by more than
one managed account of a money manager. A collective
pass-through arrangement, to the extent that it involves
directing brokerage from several different managed
accounts, could be characterized as a joint transaction. In
the pass-through arrangement, the investment adviser
manages advisory clients' interests collectively. Such
pooling carries at least the possibility of benefiting some
clients at the expense of others.
Section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act and rule
17d- 1 thereunder prohibit joint transactions among
affiliates of an investment adviser except as permitted by
the SEC. 2 12 The owners of accounts managed by a common
See textual discussion in Section II.B. supra.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1999) and 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-I (1998)
respectively.
211

212
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investment adviser may be deemed affiliates of affiliates for
purposes of section 17 of the Investment Company Act,
even if the funds and accounts are otherwise
unaffiliated. 21 3 If investment companies participate in
transactions jointly (in this case brokerage is directed
jointly) with other managed accounts in connection with
the pass-through rebate arrangement, the rebate
arrangement could be characterized as a joint transaction
which, absent SEC approval, would violate section 17(d)
and rule 17d- 1 thereunder.
In considering whether to grant exemptive relief, by rule
or
order,
permitting
otherwise
prohibited joint
transactions,
the
SEC
evaluates
whether
such
arrangements are consistent with the provisions, policies
and purposes of the Investment Company Act and whether
the participation of the investment company "is on a basis
different or less advantageous than that of other
participants." 2 14
Cash
pass-through
arrangements
involving investment companies thus may overcome the
restrictions created by section 17(d) and rule 17d-1 in one
of two ways. A determination could be made that the passthrough arrangement is not a joint transaction for
purposes of rule 17d- 1 or, if it is, that the SEC should
nevertheless authorize such joint transactions because
they are consistent with the policies and purposes of the
Act.
Although the SEC has traditionally taken a broad view of
what constitutes a joint transaction, 215 it has exhibited a
213

See, e.g., SMC Capital, SEC No-Action Letter, [1995 Transfer

Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,049. Section 2(a)(3) of the
Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1999) (defining
affiliated person).
214 Rule 17d-1(b), 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1(b) (1998).
215The SEC has been subjected to heated criticism with respect to
rule 17d-l's overbreadth and the absence of clear standards. See R.
James Gormley, On the Same Side of the Table: Is Investment Company
Act Rule 17d-1 Partly Invalid?,20 SEC. REG. L.J. 115 (1992); Joseph W.
Bartlett & Stephen P. Dowd, Section 17 of the Investment Company Act
- An Example of Regulation by Exemption, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 449
(1989). The SEC's Division of Investment Management evidenced
sensitivity to these concerns in its comprehensive 1992 report. See Div.
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more cautious view in the context of aggregated orders
216
(commonly referred to as bunching of orders). A passthrough arrangement is analogous to brokerage
arrangements involving bunching of orders. As with
bunched orders which are aggregated to secure the best
execution for orders collectively, the pass-through
arrangement would permit aggregation of orders for
routing purposes to secure the most favorable brokerage
arrangements. Accordingly, the staff could well take the
view that section 17(d) is not applicable to the passthrough arrangement, provided any investment companies
participate on terms no less advantageous than those of
any other participant. The pass-through arrangement,
however, might be distinguished from bunching of orders.
Aggregating or bunching of similar orders - the sale of the
same issuer's shares by several accounts - is employed to
ensure that orders are executed on the same basis.
Although the pass-through arrangement ensures that the
cost of executing different orders will be on the same basis,
there is no guarantee that the broker offering the most
favorable brokerage arrangement in terms of execution
costs will be equally suited to afford best execution to
orders involving securities of different issuers.
In other words, the no-action letters regarding bunching
of orders merely state that there is no rule 17d- 1 problem
when 500,000 shares of Stock A from five different
managed accounts are sent to a broker at one time as
Protecting Investors: A
Half Century of Investment Company Regulation, ch. 12, at 478-480,
482-85, 488-99 (May 1992). To date, the SEC has not adopted any
sweeping revisions of rule 17d-1. The staff, however, has used the noaction letter process to moderate some of the rule's potential for
overbreadth, as evidenced by some of the letters described below as well
letters.
as2 other
16
See SMC Capital, supra note 213 ("agree[ing] that the mere
aggregation of orders for advisory clients, including a registered
investment company, would not violate section 17(d), provided that the
investment company participates on terms no less advantageous than
those of any other participant."); accord Pretzel & Stouffer Chartered,
SEC No-Action Letter (pub. avail. Dec. 1, 1996), Banque Indosuez
Luxembourg, SEC No-Action Letter (pub. avail. Dec. 10, 1996)
(discussing aggregation in connection with fund cloning procedures).
OF INV. MANAGEMENT, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N,
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opposed to five separate 100,000 share orders from the
different
managed
accounts.
The
pass-through
arrangement differs from this situation by sending a
500,000 share block consisting of 100,000 share blocks of
Stocks A, B, C, D, and E. In the former situation, the
investment adviser should not route the order to a broker
unless it is sure that it will offer best execution for the
500,000 share block in total and indeed the five clients are
likely to be treated more fairly by bunching their orders
into a single order. The latter situation, however, poses a
much greater concern regarding best execution of the
individual order since the adviser must assure itself that
the broker can offer best execution for each individual
order. In such circumstances, the risk that the interests of
a particular client may be compromised are arguably
greater, which could cause the SEC to regard the
arrangement as a joint transaction. 21 7 If so, investment
advisers providing such arrangements for their investment
company clients would need to receive exemptive relief
from the prohibitions in section 17(d) and rule 17d-1. In
order to grant the relief, the SEC would need to find that
the pass-through cash rebate arrangement provided for
participation by investment companies on an equal or no
less advantageous basis than other participants. 2 18
Similar fiduciary and transaction restrictions might
arise with respect to employee retirement plans under
ERISA. ERISA governs potential conflicting fiduciary
responsibilities in managing the assets of more than one
217 Even if the arrangement were characterized as a joint transaction,
the adviser itself would not appear to be a participant since its role in
the pass-through arrangement is as a servicing agent. Cf The Flex-

Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 78,178, at 76,733 (Nov. 22, 1985) (noting that affiliated
person engaged in service arrangement with fund does not engage in
joint arrangement where compensation is not based on revenue
generated by arrangement).
218 See, e.g., In the Matter of State Street Bank and Trust Company,
Investment Company Act Release No. 23,441, 68 SEC Dkt. 147 (Sept.
22, 1998) (granting application permitting investment company's
participation in securities lending facility where revenues generated by
facility and fees earned by investment company would comply with
standards of rule 17d- 1.)
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client. An issue would arise whether cash pass-through
arrangements compromise fiduciary obligations owed to
individual plans that participate in such pass-through
arrangements. 2 19 Like the SEC, the DOL has rule-making
authority to clarify circumstances under which such passthrough arrangement would not violate established federal
law fiduciary standards under ERISA. 220 If it is determined
that existing class exemptions do not cover pass-through
exemptive relief with the SEC
arrangements, coordinated
22 '
would be desirable.
Another affiliated transaction restriction for registered
investment companies arises under section 17(e)(1) of the
Investment Company Act. 2 22 As noted, 223 soft dollar rebate
Cf. SMC Capital, supra note 213, at 79,097 (Sept. 5, 1995) (noting
that in addition to federal securities law restrictions relating to
aggregation of orders, managed accounts subject to ERISA would need
to address exclusive benefits requirements of section 404(a) of ERISA
and prohibited transaction restrictions of ERISA section 406). See
notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
supra
220
It is not entirely clear how the pass-through arrangement should
be treated under the fiduciary provisions of ERISA. DOL has provided
brokerage
use of directed
guidelines regarding permissible
arrangements. See ERISA Technical Release No. 86-1, supra note 27, at
88, 155-56. The Department's staff has also indicated that the fiduciary
provisions of ERISA would not be violated where an investment
manager uses brokerage commissions to procure goods and services for
the plan that the plan would otherwise be obligated to pay. See DOL
Information Letter to Capital Institutional Services, Inc. (Oct. 16, 1986).
In addition, the Secretary has established a class exemption from the
prohibited transaction restrictions that authorizes ERISA fiduciaries,
including investment advisers, to direct brokerage transactions on
behalf of pooled separate accounts that jointly benefit the accounts,
provided the fiduciary satisfies certain procedural conditions. See Class
Exemption for Securities Transactions Involving Employee Benefit
Plans and Broker-Dealers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,686 (1996).
221 Coordinated rule-making could be viewed as a commercial
necessity. From an adviser's perspective, collective pass-through
arrangements may be attractive to advisers only to the extent that a
number of clients are willing to participate in the rebate arrangement.
Favorable action by the SEC on collective pass-through rebates, in the
face of an adverse determination by DOL, would mean that investment
company clients, but not pension plans, could participate in collective
pose some
would
treatment
This disparate
arrangements.
inconvenience to those advisers that service both types of clients.
222 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (1999).
223 See supranote 26.
219
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arrangements involving assets of investment companies
such as mutual funds violate, absent compliance with the
safe harbor of section 28(e), section 17(e)(1) of the
Investment Company Act which prohibits investment
advisers from receiving direct or indirect compensation, in
addition to their advisory fee, in connection with brokerage
transactions. A pass-through rebate arrangement would
not raise the same concerns because, unlike the soft dollar
arrangement, the pass-through arrangement would not
involve the receipt of compensation by the adviser.
Although the adviser is a conduit for the cash rebates, the
rebates are remitted to the adviser's clients. Where an
investment adviser acts as a conduit for rebates that
"directly and exclusively benefit the fund," the SEC has
indicated that section 17(e)(1) is not violated. 224
The investment adviser may bear additional accounting
or recordkeeping costs in connection with the collective
administration of a pass-through arrangement for which it
might seek compensation from the participants. Such
compensation would most likely be deemed compensation
in connection with brokerage transactions since the
compensation would derive from costs incurred in
connection with the pass-through brokerage arrangement,
and thus arguably violate section 17(e)(1). However, in
analogous circumstances, the staff of the SEC has
indicated that compensation for administrative services in
connection with securities transactions is not always a
sufficient nexus where such compensation would be
"typical" of compensation that would be received if similar
services were rendered in another context.2 25 If the staff is
unconvinced by this position, the adviser may be required
224 See

1994
Investment Company Brokerage Arrangement
Accounting Proposing Release, supra note 80, at 42,188 n. 1.
225
See Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A., SEC No-Action Letter (pub.
avail. May 25, 1995) (holding that compensation to custodian for
services provided by custodian in connection with securities lending
program did not constitute compensation within scope of section
17(e)(1)).
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pass-through
to absorb the administrative costs of the
22 6
arrangement as part of its advisory fees.
2. General Fiduciary Obligations
Joint transaction restrictions are closely related to
general fiduciary duty issues that arise under section 206
of the Investment Adviser Act, 227 ERISA and state law.
However, unlike the requirements of Investment Company
Act section 17(d) and rule 17d-1thereunder which are
mandatory absent an SEC exemption, general fiduciary
obligations typically turn on a close analysis of the facts
and circumstances in light of general fiduciary principles.
An investment adviser's use of a pass-through rebate
arrangement on a fully disclosed basis, consistent with
best execution principles, should satisfy fiduciary
obligations imposed pursuant to section 206. In a passthrough arrangement, the adviser remits the cash rebate
to the advisory client. Because the benefits from brokerage
allocation arrangements are passed through to clients,
there does not appear to be a potential conflict between the
226

The costs of administering the pass-through, however, need not be
prohibitively expensive with the pervasive use of computer technology.
It is possible that the more stringent the allocation standard, the more
costly it will be to administer a pass-through arrangement. To conserve
on administrative costs, it may be appropriate to seek allocation
methodologies that balance benefits against costs of allocation. Thus,
for example, trading volume may be a perfectly sound methodology for
allocating rebates even though the commissions earned on trades from
some accounts entail more profit for the broker-dealer than
commissions earned on other trades. The administrative cost of
evaluating each trade might well be prohibitive, making trading volume
alone a satisfactory, albeit imperfect, allocation methodology. In any
event, costs associated with administering a pass-through arrangement
are likely to be less than the operating and management costs
associated with directed brokerage arrangements. Directed brokerage
arrangements require the adviser to track trades very precisely on an
account-by-account basis and provide reports of those trades to the
advisory client. Although a pass-through retains certain of the
classification costs in processing trades, the adviser is able to do it on a
group rather than individual basis. Thus, the adviser is less likely to
have to break up similar trades from different accounts and retains a
freer hand in making routing decisions to secure best execution for its
clients.
227 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1999).
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interests of the adviser and its clients collectively.
Employing such an arrangement on a fully-disclosed basis
would further remove the taint of potential conflicts of
interest.
Nor does the pooling of brokerage from more than one
different managed account violate general fiduciary law
principles if done on a fully disclosed basis. The staff of the
SEC recently considered in an analogous context the
permissibility under section 206 of an investment adviser
aggregating orders from a group of managed accounts for
execution purposes and internally allocating the trades
among the participating accounts. The staff indicated that
it would take no enforcement action provided the adviser
adhered to procedures designed to ensure that no one
advisory account would be favored over any other advisory
account. In the staffs view, such fully-disclosed
arrangements satisfied the requirements of Investment
Advisers Act section 206 in treating clients fairly and
providing full and fair disclosure of all material facts. 228
A fully-disclosed pass-through arrangement poses no
greater fiduciary concerns than those presented by
aggregation of orders. The pass-through arrangement
would require aggregation of orders. In addition, however,
it would generate a benefit in the form of cash rebates. The
pass-through arrangement would be fair to clients
provided that the rebate proceeds are equitably
apportioned among clients. 229
228 See SMC Capital, Inc., supra note 213; accord Pretzel & Stouffer
Chartered, supranote 216.
229 The viability of pass-through arrangements would be enhanced by
adoption of a regulatory safe-harbor that established minimum
standards for pass-through arrangements to avoid liability under
section 206. The SEC could use its interpretive or exemptive rulemaking authority to establish such a safe harbor, including standards
governing rebate apportionment schemes that are presumptively
equitable and consistent with the adviser's fiduciary obligations. Cf.
rule 206(3)-2, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(3)-2 (1998) (exemptive provision for
agency cross transactions for advisory clients).
It could be argued that pass-through arrangements pose conflict of
interest issues besides those affecting advisory clients participating in
the pass-through program. In particular, the SEC may need to consider
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Similar issues could arise under state fiduciary law
principles. State law poses an additional challenge since
the multiplicity of jurisdictions creates a possibility of
divergent standards among different jurisdictions.
Nevertheless the likelihood that any state would conclude

that

the pass-through

rebate

arrangement

violates

fiduciary law principles is fairly remote. The pass-through
rebate would be fully disclosed to clients in advance.
Moreover, states are likely to look to federal law in this
23 0
area, even absent express or implied federal preemption,
since section 206 and ERISA are themselves based on
interpretations of common law fiduciary standards.
conflicts that may exist between the interests of an adviser's
participating and non-participating clients. To the extent that a passthrough arrangement represents an increasingly significant portion of
an adviser's trades, the accounts of non-participating clients may be
used increasingly and disproportionately as a source of soft dollar
commissions. Thus, a potential by-product of a pass-through
arrangement may be to increase the tendency to use soft dollars from
the accounts of non-participating clients to cross-subsidize research
that benefits the accounts of participating clients. The pass-through
arrangement contrasts in this respect with order aggregation schemes;
aggregating orders from some accounts does not adversely affect
trading by other accounts in different securities.
There are several responses. Section 28(e)(1) explicitly authorizes
cross-subsidization among accounts. Moreover, any adverse effects are
the result of the decision by non-participating clients not to participate
in the pass-through mechanism and therefore any adverse effect
suffered by non-participating clients is a direct result of their own
decision. Indeed, the pass-through mechanism does not raise an issue
different from that presented by directed brokerage arrangements that
have the same potential to increase the proportion of soft dollar
commissions coming from accounts that do not direct brokerage.
Finally, the SEC could consider disclosure initiatives aimed at reducing
undisclosed indirect effects from pass-through or directed brokerage
arrangements on other accounts. Such initiatives might include
requiring advisers to disclose whether soft dollar commissions are
drawn disproportionately from some managed accounts.
230 While a controlling federal regulatory law standard might give rise
to preemption of an inconsistent state law fiduciary standard under the
Supremacy Clause, enactment of section 28(e) ironically undercuts that
argument in the context of rebate arrangements. Section 28(e)
specifically delimited the scope of federal preemption of state law in the
case of soft dollar arrangements, implicitly suggesting that federal
agencies are precluded from further expanding preemption of state law
fiduciary principles in the case of rebate arrangements.
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C. PROMOTING COMPETITION BETWEEN CURRENT BROKERAGE
REBATE ARRANGEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE PASS-THROUGH
REBATE ARRANGEMENTS

A collective pass-through arrangement would appear to
be reconcilable with existing federal and state law
restrictions. Would steps aimed at easing this process be
sufficient to guarantee either the success of such
alternative arrangements or greater competition? The
answer may well be no. Merely creating a legal climate
favorable to a greater variety of practices may not alter the
current competitive landscape; the pervasiveness of soft
dollar arrangements and commercial inertia could well
deter or retard the emergence of new forms of rebate
arrangements
such as a collective pass-through
arrangement.
Ideally advisory clients should determine which
brokerage rebate practices best serve their interests. If
investors genuinely prefer soft dollar arrangements to
pass-through rebate arrangements then investor choice
rather than regulatory process should dictate the
outcome.
Certain regulatory measures,
especially
disclosure initiatives, might nevertheless serve to enhance
competition between soft dollar arrangements and passthrough rebate arrangements. These requirements would
not mandate a shift from soft dollar arrangements to
collective pass-through arrangements, but merely ensure
a more meaningful opportunity for advisory clients to be
able to choose reconsideration of existing industry
practices.
1. Disclosure and Pass-Through Arrangements
Regulators may wish to consider ways to refine existing
disclosure policies with a view to enhancing the ability of
clients to make comparisons among rebate arrangements
in selecting investment advisers. Disclosure is a tool for
enabling clients of advisers to make informed decisions.
New disclosure proposals could be directed at ensuring
that investors are aware of the availability of pass-through
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arrangements as an alternative to soft dollar arrangements
and the potential economic benefits of such arrangements.
Certain disclosure requirements currently applicable to
soft dollar arrangements would also be applicable to passthrough cash rebates, such as requirements regarding
consideration of brokerage arrangements as a factor
affecting selection of brokers.2 31 Reported performance and
expenses are another way in which clients may indirectly
consider the effects of rebate arrangements.
Accounting requirements, however, may have to be
reviewed to ensure that substantive differences between
the two types of arrangements are adequately conveyed to
clients in terms of performance and expense disclosure.
Soft dollar and pass-through arrangements differ in their
monetary effect on clients. Soft dollar arrangements that
involve higher average commissions will adversely affect
reported performance if the soft dollar rebate does not
232
otherwise result in enhanced investment performance.
A pass-through arrangement, in contrast to the soft
dollar arrangement, would cause reported performance
with respect to the same investment portfolio to be higher
because the rebate in effect reduces investment costs.
Investment adviser performance figures, therefore, would
reflect the direct benefits of a pass-through rebate in terms
2 33
of reduced capital costs.

supra note 192.
text and notes accompanying notes 195-96.
It could be argued that the pass-through rebate should not be
treated as reducing capital costs since the pass-through rebate is
contingent on an adviser directing a certain volume of transactions to
the broker. In connection with expense reimbursement caps pursuant
to which the adviser agrees to temporarily reimburse a fund for
expenses that exceed a prescribed ratio, the SEC has required more
prominent disclosure of unreimbursed fees, although permitting funds
in footnotes to allude to the reimbursement feature. Such an approach
in the pass-through context is not warranted since there is nothing
temporary about the rebate and incorporating the pass-through rebate
into capital costs is likely to reflect a more accurate picture of the true
effect of commissions on performance. The effective commission rate is
the commission less any rebate received and that result is what would
231 See
232 See
233
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This disclosure proposal could be made even more
exacting by requiring investment advisers using soft dollar
arrangements to disclose annually to their clients whether
such arrangements were used in lieu of pass-through
rebates, and if so, why, and whether pass-through
arrangements were used in brokerage directed on behalf of
other of the adviser's clients and, if so, why such
arrangements were not used for the client. 234 In addition,
an adviser could be required to disclose on a pro forma
basis the monetary effect of failing to use pass-through
arrangements where such a rebate arrangement is
available. In theory, of course, advisory clients would like
to obtain information more broadly regarding the
monetary effect of an adviser's various brokerage
arrangements. Past efforts to develop meaningful
disclosure in this regard, however, have proven
frustrating.
Another possibility would be to require investment
advisers to disclose the average pass-through rebate
obtained with respect to all managed accounts and the
percentage of transactions for all accounts under
management on which a pass-through rebate was
obtained. Admittedly these average figures may not be
illustrative of arrangements that could be obtained for a
particular account. To that extent, advisers should be able
to qualify any such disclosure by describing how the
figures may not in fact be comparable and do not reflect,
for example, indirect benefits obtained by the client under
the soft dollar arrangement.
be reflected in performance figures calculated by reducing capital costs
by the amount of any rebate received.
234 One of the recommendations of the recently completed SEC Staff
Soft Dollar Report is instructive in this regard. In addition to urging that
clients receive more detailed disclosure about advisory firm brokerage
practices, the staff recommends requiring clients to disclose the
availability of commission recapture and commission reimbursement
arrangements. 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at
51. This recommendation is notable in recognizing that disclosure
regarding the availability of alternative rebate arrangements (rather
than access to information about soft dollar practices alone) may be
particularly significant in advancing the interests of advisory clients.
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The obvious benefit from such disclosure is that it gives
the client more information that may be relevant to
selecting or negotiating with an investment adviser. Such
disclosure, however, may also be potentially burdensome
for the adviser. Nevertheless the disclosure burden that
would be imposed under the pro forma disclosure urged
here would be significantly less than the disclosure burden
that would have resulted from the 1995 Adviser Disclosure
Release, a proposal subsequently abandoned by the
SEC.

235

2. Collective Pass-Through Arrangements and
Paying Up
An incidental benefit of collective pass-through
arrangements is that such arrangements might provide a
more reliable benchmark from which to evaluate whether
an investment adviser was paying up for research. The
effective commission rate in a collective pass-through
arrangement (the commission after netting out the rebate)
could be viewed as the relevant benchmark in determining
what another broker would have charged for effecting the
transaction. If the effective commission in a pass-through
arrangement is less than the commission charged by an
execution-only broker, then both advisers and regulators
should use the former rate in determining whether paying
up exists and whether the amount paid up is excessive in
relation to the benefit received.
3. Fiduciary Obligations to Consider
Pass-Through Alternatives
Another area for heightened scrutiny concerns the
conduct of pension fund trustees and boards of directors
of investment companies. The boards of investment
companies have an important role to play in reviewing and
See Disclosure by Investment Adviser Regarding Soft Dollar
Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 35,375, 60 Fed. Reg. 9750 (Feb.
14, 1995) (requiring excessively detailed client-specific and firm-wide
disclosure regarding brokerage arrangements). Not only would such
information have been burdensome to collect and disseminate, but the
effect of disseminating the information may well have led to conduct
that deterred rather than fostered price competition.
235
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monitoring policies and procedures of the fund with
respect to portfolio execution and expenses. 236 Such review

encompasses practices relating to soft dollar and other
rebate arrangements. In the absence of viable alternatives
to soft dollar arrangements, however, mere reiteration of
board responsibilities (or those of pension fund trustees) is
likely to have little effect.
Proposals for increased vigilance and oversight with
respect to fund expenses by investment company boards
and pension trustees would take on added significance if
such fiduciaries were able to evaluate the investment
adviser's conduct in light of the availability of collective
pass-through arrangements. SEC and DOL interpretive
pronouncements should indicate that in evaluating
brokerage expenses and policies, fiduciaries should
consider the availability of pass-through rebate
arrangements as an alternative to soft dollar and directed
237
brokerage arrangements.

VIII. COLLECTIVE CASH PASS-THROUGH REBATE
ARRANGEMENTS AND PUBLIC POLICY
Assuming collective pass-through rebates are feasible
both legally and commercially, it is also necessary to
consider whether fostering such arrangements as an
alternative to existing rebate arrangements is desirable
public policy or likely to have any effect. The reasons why
collective pass-through rebates should be viewed favorably
from a policy perspective are discussed below.
See 1998 SEC STAFF SOFT DOLLAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-46.
There is some irony in this latter proposal in light of the history
regarding brokerage rebate arrangements. The duty to at least consider
a pass-through alternative where soft dollar arrangements are being
used carries faint echoes of the duty to recapture debate from an earlier
generation. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
236

237
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COLLECTIVE PASS-THROUGH ARRANGEMENTS VERSUS
OTHER BROKERAGE ARRANGEMENTS

Collective pass-through rebates enjoy comparative
advantages over either soft dollar arrangements or
directed brokerage arrangements. Because a pass-through
rebate goes back to the client, there is no conflict of
interest related to receipt of the rebate. Thus, the agency
concerns that characterize soft dollar rebate arrangements
rebate
pass-through
in
nonexistent
largely
are
arrangements. In this respect, the collective pass-through
is similar to a directed rebate arrangement. In addition,
unlike soft dollar arrangements, a collective rebate
arrangement allocates rebate benefits in accordance with
each managed account's contribution of brokerage
commissions. The research benefits generated by soft
dollar arrangements in contrast may benefit some
managed accounts disproportionately to others, measured
commission
brokerage
respective
their
against
contributions.
A collective pass-through rebate is also superior to
directed commission arrangements that form the basis for
reimbursement
or expense
commission recapture
programs. A collective pass-through rebate, like the
directed commission arrangement, benefits advisory
clients directly. But, unlike the directed commission
arrangement, the collective pass-through does not entail
the same degree of disruption to the investment adviser's
role in securing best execution on behalf of the client since
the adviser, rather than the advisory client, retains
responsibility for selecting brokers in connection with any
pass-through arrangement.238 Moreover, by pooling
238 See earlier discussion regarding best execution supra notes 13 &
30. A collective pass-through rebate program should be more attractive
from the perspective of advisers than directed rebate arrangements for
another reason as well. Directed rebate arrangements are more
expensive for the adviser to administer because the adviser must more
carefully track execution of trades with respect to the particular
account. Administration of a collective pass-through rebate program
would be more analogous from the adviser's perspective to
administration of a soft dollar program.
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brokerage, an adviser may find it easier to satisfy its
clients' rebate objectives, without sacrificing best
execution. This fact underscores another benefit of the
pass-through alternative relative to directed commission
arrangements: it is likely to be available to a broader range
of advisory clients and will be a more cost-effective rebate
arrangement for clients generally. Many advisory clients
lack the expertise and sophistication to establish a
directed brokerage arrangement. In addition, many
advisory clients may be precluded from establishing a
directed brokerage arrangement by the size of their trading
account.
A collective pass-through arrangement offers a means to
overcome issues of scale and sophistication in connection
with a directed brokerage arrangement. An investment
adviser is more likely to generate the scale of trading that
is necessary to support a cash rebate program because
trades from different accounts would be pooled to earn a
rebate from a broker-dealer. Advisers also possess
significant advantages relative to many advisory clients in
dealing with rebate issues by virtue of their business
expertise and the regularity with which they deal with
issues concerning allocation of brokerage.
A collectively
administered pass-through
rebate
arrangement may also offer advisory clients with
cominission recapture arrangements the same benefits
they currently enjoy, but with reduced transaction costs. A
commission recapture program entails negotiation and
administration costs that investment advisers may be
more effective in internalizing because brokerage
allocation is ancillary to the adviser's other business
activities.
A cash pass-through rebate may similarly be more
efficient than an expense reimbursement arrangement
negotiated
by an advisory
client. An
expense
reimbursement arrangement may demand an even greater
level of client sophistication or expertise than a
commission recapture arrangement because it requires
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the client to accept a rebate in the form of in-kind services
rather than cash. In effect, the reimbursement
arrangement is transformed into a barter transaction
rather than two distinct transactions: one consisting of
obtaining the best price for a brokerage execution of a
given quality and the other consisting of obtaining the
lowest possible price for services. The collective passthrough rebate enables the advisory client to keep these
239
two issues distinct.
B. ELIMINATING LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY
A collective pass-through rebate conserves on regulatory
burden and costs. Because a pass-through arrangement
does not implicate issues of self-dealing by an investment
adviser, it poses fewer regulatory concerns. Moreover, the
structure of a pass-through arrangement is much simpler
than that of a soft dollar arrangement. The conditions that
exist under section 28(e) governing compliant soft dollar
issues such as the "provided by"
arrangements standard, "mixed use" product allocations and utilization
of third-party providers - are irrelevant in the passthrough context. Indeed, because cash pass-through
arrangements do not raise conflict of interest issues, use of
pass-through arrangements would be appropriate in
principal transactions as well as agency transactions. As a
result, use of a pass-through arrangement would not turn
on any distinction between principal and agency
transactions which otherwise contributes to the
complexity of soft dollar brokerage allocation practices.
Finally, a pass-through arrangement also raises fewer
regulatory concerns regarding best execution relative to
expense reimbursement arrangement as two
239 Treating an
independent transactions has the effect of separately pricing services of
each part of the transaction. Unbundling the pricing of such brokerage
rebate arrangement offers advisory clients the same advantages that
money and payment systems offer relative to any barter transaction,
namely reduced transaction costs and greater efficiency in determining
the terms on which goods and services shall be exchanged. See Alan S.
Frankel, Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and Exchange of
Money, 66 ANTrrRusT L.J. 313, 315-16 (1998).
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directed brokerage arrangements because the adviser
retains principal control over decisions regarding selection
of brokers.
Because they are more transparent, pass-through
arrangements may also serve as a useful check on use of
other types of brokerage rebate arrangements. The passthrough will make far clearer the tradeoffs between
brokerage commissions with embedded research and
brokerage services and cash commission rates. This would
be important if the staff of the SEC sought to subject soft
dollar practices to closer scrutiny in terms of best
execution and paying up.
C.

THE LOWER AVERAGE COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE

A cash pass-through arrangement closely approximates
the more straightforward pricing strategy of simply
charging a lower average commission. A broker could
employ a graduated commission schedule that enables it
to differentiate among customers in much the same way as
a cash pass-through arrangement. Commissions would be
based on the amount of brokerage an investment adviser
was willing to direct to a broker. The functional similarity
of a pass-through arrangement and charging lower
average commissions raises the question, noted earlier, as
to why a broker would ever opt for a more complicated
rebate arrangement in lieu of charging a lower average
commission.
Although there are clear similarities between a
graduated commission schedule and the pass-through
arrangement, there are also differences that may explain
why pass-through arrangements may be commercially
more attractive for brokers and investment advisers than
the graduated commission schedule. A pass-through
arrangement allows the broker to use multiple pricing
strategies with respect to its customers rather than a
single low average commission because the terms of the
rebate may vary from customer to customer. In this way,
rebates may be a more effective strategy of masking the
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effective commission rate paid by different customers. A
pass-through arrangement also permits the broker to
retain the value of the rebate until it is returned to the
customer. A lower commission rate eliminates the need to
return the rebate since the customer never pays up in the
first place.
Investment advisers may prefer the pass-through rebate
arrangement to a graduated commission schedule because
paying low average commissions in some cases may cause
greater scrutiny of higher commission rates paid in
connection with other brokerage arrangements, such as
soft dollar research arrangements. A pass-through rebate
undercuts this perception somewhat by tending to show
similar commissions from different broker-dealers even
though the effective commission after factoring in rebates
and execution quality may be very different. Thus, advisers
may prefer to pay uniformly high commissions to avoid
having to justify higher commission rates paid to fullservice brokers or third-party soft dollar brokers, while
recognizing that use of such brokers is not always
warranted.
The existence of commission recapture arrangements in
the current environment attests to this perception issue.
The functional similarity between a pass-through
arrangement and graduated commission schedule
providing lower average commissions is a similarity also
arrangements.
shared with commission recapture
Notwithstanding the functional similarity of lower average
commissions and commission recapture arrangements, it
is clear that both brokers and advisory clients prefer in
recapture
commission
to
use
situations
many
arrangements rather than a graduated commission
schedule.
Use of collective pass-through arrangements is only one
initiative aimed at promoting choice and competition in
Other regulatory
rebate arrangements.
brokerage
initiatives might seek to rationalize the bounds of the safe
harbor with respect to soft dollar practices themselves.
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Accordingly, as a corollary to any initiative regarding
collective pass-through arrangements, it may be desirable
for regulators to reexamine current interpretive limitations
with respect to the section 28(e) safe harbor that do not
appear to advance the interests of advisory clients. For
example, as currently applied, the "provided by" standard
precludes investment advisers from independently
negotiating with research vendors for research products or
using intermediary clearinghouses to obtain the most
favorable economic terms with respect to research
products. In addition, the SEC should consider whether
use of soft dollar arrangements in connection with
principal transactions should be liberalized. Finally, the
SEC may wish to reconsider interpretive positions that
permit third-party research arrangements but discourage
240
third-party custodial arrangements.

Liberalization of existing positions with respect to soft
dollar arrangements, however, should not be undertaken
before the SEC has obtained some experience with
collective pass-through arrangements. Collective passthrough arrangements could provide valuable evidence
regarding the operation of market forces with respect to
brokerage rebate arrangements. Use of collective passthrough arrangements on a commercially significant scale
would attest to the viability of competition as a means of
disciplining brokerage rebate practices, thereby arguing
for greater liberalization with respect to soft dollar
practices as well. However, if collective pass-through
arrangements were unable to gain a commercial foothold,
it would suggest that there were significant obstacles to
meaningful competition. Such obstacles would argue
against further liberalization with respect to permissible
soft dollar practices until regulatory authorities have
sufficient assurances that liberalized practices would have
beneficial effects for advisory clients.
240

See supra Section V.C.
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D. THE VIRTUES OF CHOICE AND COMPETITION IN
BROKERAGE REBATE ARRANGEMENTS

Encouraging pass-through rebates as an alternative to
soft dollar and directed commission arrangements is
pass-through
the
reason:
for another
desirable
rebate
alternative
an
introducing
by
arrangement,
arrangement, promotes competition among brokerage
rebate arrangements and enhances the role of advisory
clients in influencing brokerage rebate practices. Even if
pass-through rebates were not affirmatively beneficial, it is
clear that they do no harm since they do not create the
problems of either soft dollar or directed brokerage
arrangements. Presumably advisory clients will be in the
best position to determine which type of rebate
arrangement is most advantageous.
Even though pass-through arrangements are not clearly
more advantageous for advisory clients than soft dollar
arrangements, investment advisers should be permitted to
such
by offering
other advisers
compete with
the
to
consider
able
arrangements and clients should be
availability of pass-through arrangements in selecting an
adviser. Because there is no basis for concluding that a
pass-through arrangement is inevitably worse for
investors, client self-interest should be given considerable
in determining which type of rebate
deference
arrangement is most advantageous to the client. Affording
clients a choice among a broader range of rebate
arrangements will promote greater confidence that the
rebate arrangement selected best serves the interests of
advisory clients.
Pass-through rebates are also likely to engender greater
competition than soft dollars by bringing a greater level of
transparency to rebate arrangements. Bundling in soft
the
non-transparent
dollar arrangements renders
a
of
relationship between investment performance
particular account and the research obtained under a soft
dollar arrangement (research that is potentially shared by
many accounts). As a result, client monitoring of the
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benefits of soft dollar arrangements is not possible except
in the largely perfunctory sense of recognizing that the
investment adviser may be deriving unquantifiable
benefits that improve the adviser's ability to service clients
generally. The lack of transparency associated with the
benefits obtained from soft dollars diminishes the ability of
customers to exercise discipline over portfolio brokerage
costs.

24 1

Unbundling brokerage allocation and the purchase of
research promotes greater competition in commission
rates and in the pricing of research services. Since the
pass-through rebate effectively frees up funds dedicated to
purchase research either from or through the investment
adviser, those proceeds can be put to their best use
whether for obtaining the same or higher quality research
services from the lowest cost provider or purchasing other
investment

services. 242 In

either case,

the

relevant

purchaser of brokerage and research services is likely to be
more discerning and selective in making its purchasing
decision when using hard dollars rather than soft dollars.
E.

WILL INDUSTRY EVER ACCEPT COLLECTVE PASS-THROUGH
ARRANGEMENTS?

Even if collective pass-through rebate arrangements
represent an incremental improvement in public policy
and are feasible, there is no assurance that they will be
embraced by the investment management industry.
Advisers may prefer to avoid using such arrangements in
favor of soft dollar arrangements. Similarly, brokers may
241 This is not to say that competition in the soft dollar realm is
absent. Competitive issues undoubtedly manifest themselves to
investment advisers in terms of soft dollar ratios for converting some
portion of a commission into a soft dollar rebate and the pricing of
brokerage and research services purchased with soft dollars. However,
because soft dollar arrangements are inherently less transparent than
pass-through arrangements, there are higher transaction costs
associated with oversight of brokerage expenses in a soft dollar
environment by advisory clients.
242 If a client prefers bundling, of course, it can continue to opt for a
bundled arrangement through its investment adviser.
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decline to offer them if they believe that to do so would
imperil their standing with investment advisers.
There is nevertheless good reason to believe that
collective pass-through arrangements may gain a
meaningful foothold if permitted. First, collective passthrough arrangements give investment advisers a way to
discourage advisory clients from resorting to directed
brokerage arrangements. Second, if collective passthrough arrangements gain some presence in the market,
advisers will as a competitive matter be unable to ignore
their use. An adviser which makes the option available to
some clients will in all probability be forced to make it
available to all clients. Moreover, if it is clear to clients that
pass-through arrangements better serve their interests
than soft dollar arrangements, they are likely to become
use
pass-through
advisers
that
insistent
more
arrangements in at least some cases where an adviser
might be more inclined to use a soft dollar brokerage
arrangement. Finally, the combined effect of disclosure
proposals and best execution interpretations could induce
brokers to offer, and advisers to make use of, such
243
arrangements.
pass-through
collective
that
mean
this
Does
arrangements are ever likely to vanquish soft dollar and
directed brokerage arrangements entirely? The answer is
almost certainly no. Rather the best hope and most likely
outcome is for collective pass-through arrangements to
243

The SEC could also consider more aggressive regulatory positions
to encourage brokers to offer pass-through arrangements. For example,
the SEC could conclude pursuant to rule-making that brokers who offer
certain types of brokerage rebate arrangements, such as third-party
research arrangements or directed brokerage arrangements, should
also be required to offer customers the option of a collective passthrough arrangement. Such a requirement would rely on rule-making
authority pursuant to section 15(c)(2)(D) of the Securities Exchange Act

[15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2)(D) (1999)] which gives the SEC authority to adopt
rules that are reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent conduct by
brokers. Undoubtedly such an affirmative obligation would be
extremely controversial and should be undertaken, if at all, only after
examination of the competitive consequences for third-party and
commission recapture brokers relative to full-service brokers.
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alter the existing pattern of usage with respect to soft
dollar and directed brokerage arrangements. Collective
pass-through arrangements have a greater potential to
displace commission recapture arrangements since
collective pass-through arrangements might better serve
the interests of both advisers and advisory clients.
Collective pass-through arrangements may also erode
usage of soft dollar arrangements. Nonetheless, advisers
are likely to be resistant to surrendering the soft dollar
benefits that they currently enjoy and, thus, it is unlikely
that pass-through arrangements would entirely displace
current soft dollar practices.
The relative significance of pass-through arrangements
as a policy initiative, however, should ultimately be
measured not in terms of its effect on the continued use of
soft dollar arrangements but rather in terms of its ability to
bring the benefits of enhanced competition to institutional
brokerage. The benefits would include greater price
competition among full-service and third-party brokers for
institutional brokerage and greater price discipline in
connection with the use of soft dollar arrangements.
IX. CONCLUSION

Soft dollar arrangements compliant with section 28(e),
although entirely lawful, remain a controversial practice.
Such arrangements are far less abusive of client interests
than the reciprocal and give-up arrangements which they
displaced, but it cannot be said with any degree of
confidence that the interests of advisory clients are wellserved by such arrangements. Directed brokerage
arrangements are a direct market response to the
prevalence of soft dollar arrangements, but they have met
with only limited success and have introduced separate
problems.
In view
initiative,
removing
favorable

of this situation, regulators should seize the
not by proscribing such practices but by
obstacles to rebate practices that are more
to advisory clients. This article has discussed
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one such alternative - a collective cash pass-through
rebate. Advisory client choice rather than government
mandate, however, should be the final arbiter respecting
rebate arrangements. Thus, use of the collective cash
pass-through arrangement proposed here should be
voluntary. By permitting such arrangements and creating
conditions that would enable them to compete with
existing brokerage rebate arrangements, regulators can
ensure that advisory client choice and competition play
decisive roles in shaping brokerage rebate arrangements
rather than regulatory fortuity or industry self-interest
and inertia.
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